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ARTICLES 

DIAGNOSING LIABILITY: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF 

POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 

Deirdre M. Smith* 
This Article examines the origins of the unique relationship between the 
psychiatric diagnosis Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the law and considers 
the implications of that relationship for contemporary uses of the diagnosis in legal 
settings. PTSD stands apart from all other diagnoses in psychiatry 's standard 
classification system, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM} , and is the focus of significant controversy within psychiatry, because its 
diagnostic criteria require a determination of causation. By diagnosing a person with 
PTSD, a clinician necessarily assigns responsibility to a specific event or agent for 
causing the person 's symptoms, a practice more commonly associated with law. In 
short, the diagnosis uniquely medicalizes liability. The law has turned to PTSD, on the 
erroneous assumption that its location in the DSM signifies that it is well-settled 
science, to serve as a mechanism to resolve difficult problems in assessing legal 
responsibility. These uses include determining whether a criminal complainant is 
credible and when emotional distress from another's negligence is sufficient in itself to 
serve as a basis for liability. However, by adopting PTSD 's conceptualization of 
causation of psychological injury, courts unknowingly delegate normative 
determinations of liability to psychiatry broadly and to the individual psychiatrists who 
'Professor of Law and Glassman Scholar, University of Maine School of Law. I am grateful to the following 
people who read earlier drafts of this Article and provided many helpful insights: Angela Arey, Naomi 
Breslau, Stephen Barber, Malick Ghachem, David Rubin, Sarah Schindler, Jessica Sibley, Barbara Hermstein 
Smith, Jennifer Wriggins and Allan Young. I also appreciate the comments and reactions offered by 
participants in the Northeast Law and Society Meeting, Amherst College, October 2010, and the University of 
Maine School of Law Faculty Workshop, June 2010. I am appreciative of Dean Peter Pitegoff for providing 
generous summer research support, and of the staff of the Donald L. Garbrecht Law Library for its invaluable 
research assistance. This Article is dedicated to the late Professor Daniel W. Shuman. 
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present PTSD evidence at trial. This Article argues that the legal system should 
consider PTSD 's origins and its persistent controversies as part of a broader 
reexamination ofthe role ofthe diagnosis in the law. 
"[A}s soon as you accepted that the man's break down was a consequence 
ofhis war experience rather than ofhis own innate weakness, then inevitably 
the war became the issue. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The psychiatric diagnosis Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is powerful on 
many levels. The term permeates our culture, and the very mention of it can evoke 
imagery of the horrors of war, genocide, child abuse, and epic disasters. Affixing the 
label of PTSD to an individual suggests that the person was once mentally healthy and, 
as a result of a distinct and horrific experience, is now psychologically damaged and 
scarred. The person "reexperiences" the event through frightening symptoms such as 
flashbacks , fear, anxiety, avoidance, and nightmares. It is the diagnosis that attaches to 
psychological injuries-that is, a mental disorder attributable to an external cause. And, 
for all of these reasons, it is a diagnosis that appears uniquely suited for aiding the 
determination of liability in court. 
PTSD has generated much attention and controversy within both law and 
psychiatry in large part because it contains elements of two fields that do not always fit 
together easily. PTSD stands apart from all other diagnoses in the American Psychiatric 
Association's (APA) standardized classification, the Diagnostic and Statis tical Manual 
ofMental Disorders (DSM), because it has a determination of causation built into the 
definition? whereas other listings are agnostic as to the etiology of disorders. That is, 
although PTSD's listing has the typical descriptive cluster of symptoms found in all 
psychiatric diagnoses, its criteria also require a diagnostician to assign the cause of 
such symptoms to a specific external event or other source, known as the "A 
Criterion,"3 a practice more commonly associated with the law4 In short, the diagnosis 
medicalizes liability. 
This Article traces the historical origins of the unique relationship between PTSD 
and the law and explores the implications of such relationship for contemporary uses of 
the diagnosis in legal settings. Part II examines the early conceptualizations of 
psychological injury within medicine and the relationship of those theories to questions 
of legal responsibility from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. It reviews 
1. PAT BARKER, REGENERATION 115 (19 91) (Barker's fictionalized account of World War I British 
military psychiatrist W. H. R. Rivers). 
2. See A M. PSYCHIATRlC Ass' N, D IAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 467­
68 (4th ed., text rev . 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (listing "expos[ure] to traumatic event" among 
diagnostic criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder). 
3. The name "A Criterion" results from the fact that the requirement of an external traumatic cause 
appears in subsection A of the DSMs PTSD criteria. DSM -IV-TR, supra note 2, at 467. 
4. See Gillian Mezey & Ian Robbins, Usefulness and Validity ofPost-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a 
Psychiatric Category, 323 BRIT. M ED. J. 561,562 (2001) (attributing criticism ofPTSD diagnosis to its unique 
status as the only compensable psychiatric disorder). 
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the history of PTSD's forerunners-railway spine, shell shock, and traumatic 
neurosis-and demonstrates that a link to external causes, often with an association 
with liability questions, has been a key attribute of these diagnoses, even though the 
specific symptomatology and theories of the precise causal mechanisms at work have 
differed significantly over time. Part II then considers the parallel developments in the 
law regarding liability for psychological injuries during this same period. 
Part III recounts the campaign for the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM and the 
unusual place of the diagnosis, and specifically the A Criterion, within the APA's 
classification system. The diagnosis first appeared in the third edition of the DSM in 
1980 as a result of heavy lobbying by Vietnam veterans' groups who saw it as a 
mechanism to legitimate the extreme symptoms of veterans, enabling them to receive 
care and benefits for combat-related mental illnesses. 5 However, the APA subsequently 
loosened the diagnostic criteria to reflect use of the diagnosis for people experiencing a 
wide range of life experiences, and the diagnosis became ubiquitous in personal injury 
litigation and widely used in criminal law as well. Although psychiatry broke away 
from the psychoanalytic and other psychodynamic theories of the origins of mental 
disorders in the rest of the DSM-III, PTSD represented a rooting in the past, both for 
the patients and for the field. 
This historical discussion serves as the backdrop for Part IV of this Article, which 
explores the uses of PTSD in the legal context and considers how PTSD, as one group 
of commentators put it, "acquired [its] own legal currency. ' >6 This Part focuses on two 
particular uses of the diagnosis to address problems of establishing liability: (1 ) 
proving that a criminal complainant or civil plaintiff was subjected to an alleged trauma 
to prove criminal or civil liability for such trauma; and (2) enabling personal injury 
plaintiffs to pursue "stand-alone" claims for psychological injuries. Part IV also 
examines the minimal evidentiary limitations that courts impose on such uses. 
Part V returns to psychiatry and reviews two key controversies concerning PTSD 
that challenge many ofthe core assumptions upon which the APA based its recognition 
of the disorder: (1) the validity of the A Criterion and the causal relationship between 
events and symptoms; and (2) the extent to which PTSD is a "construct" rather than a 
"scientific discovery." This discussion concludes that the inherent complexities of both 
the formation of emotional responses to life events and the development of psychiatric 
diagnoses preclude any simple "resolution" of these debates. 
Part VI concludes the Article by reviewing the lessons for law from PTSD's 
history and by considering the implications for the role of PTSD evidence in litigation 
specifically and for the relationship between the law and psychiatry on a broader level. 
Medical diagnoses are largely the result of "negotiations" among various institutions 
and stakeholders rather than being pure scientific "discoveries." The history of PTSD's 
negotiations reveals a particularly prominent role for legal interests. From the late 
5. See AM. P SYCHIATRIC A SSN, D IAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236, 
237 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III] (showing inclusion of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a chapter on 
anxiety disorders generally); Wilbur J. Scott, PTSD in DSM-III A Case in the Politics ofDiagnosis and 
Disease, 37 Soc. PROBLEMS 294, 309 (1990) (attributing the inclusion of PTSD in DSMIII to the 
collaboration between key psychiatrists and the Vietnam veteran community). 
6. Stuart A. Greenberg et al., Unmasking Forensic Diagnosis, 2 7 INT 'LJ.L. &PSYCHIATRY 1, 10 (2004). 
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nineteenth centmy to the publication ofDSM-III, medicine produced various diagnostic 
labels for psychological injuries, particularly those for which individuals sought 
compensation or other legal benefit Psychiatry thus addressed socio-legal needs as 
well as medical needs when it established PTSD. The law has turned to PTSD and its 
unique linking of an identifiable event and psychiatric symptoms to serve as a 
mechanism to resolve difficult problems in assessing legal responsibility, such as 
determining whether a criminal complainant is credible and when emotional distress 
from negligence is sufficient in itself to serve as a basis for liability. 
However, most courts that admit evidence of PTSD for such purposes impose 
minimal scrutiny to the diagnosis. Rather, the fact of PTSD's location within the DSM 
(coupled with courts' misplaced assumptions about the DSM itself) has led most courts 
to grant PTSD the status of well-settled science. Courts are likely unaware of PTSD's 
legal origins, the persistent controversies within psychiatry and psychology about the 
theoretical underpinnings of the diagnosis, and the complicated notion of "causation" 
within contemporary psychiatry. All of this suggests that courts should exercise caution 
before permitting the diagnosis to serve as evidence in a determination of liability. 
Accordingly, the legal system should consider PTSD's historical development and 
contemporary controversies as part of a broader reexamination of the role of the 
diagnosis in the law. By adopting PTSD's particular (and unsettled) conceptualization 
of the causation of psychological injmy, courts may unknowingly delegate the 
normative determinations of legal responsibility to psychiatry broadly and to the 
individual psychiatrists who present PTSD evidence at trial. Such uses recast PTSD as 
essentially a legal tool, potentially undermining its clinical function in aiding those who 
have experienced the horrors ofwar, assault, and disaster. 
II. THE PSYCHIATRIC FORERUNNERS OF PTSD AND PARALLEL 

DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW 

Although the term "posttraumatic stress disorder" was first coined in the 1970s 
during the development of the diagnosis that eventually appeared in the third edition of 
the DSM, the direct lineage of the term extends to at least the late nineteenth centmy7 
As PTSD's history reveals, the link between medical concepts of psychological injmy 
and legal notions of responsibility is not of recent origin but was present from the 
earliest conceptualizations of such injuries. Thus, it is impossible to talk of PTSD and 
its forerunners apart from broader socio-political attempts to attach legal responsibility 
for psychological injuries to identifiable sources. 
A. EarlyMedical Conceptualizations ofPsychological Injury 
The history of psychiatry reflects a wide range of theories on the origins of mental 
illness. Some have thought that the symptoms of mental instability originate from 
spirits, humors, vapors, or demons 8 The notion that an exogenous event could alter 
one's behavior, thinking, and beliefs~that one could sustain a psychological injury~is 
7. ALLAN YOUNG, "filE HARMONY OF ILLUSIONS : INVENTING P OST-TRAUMATIC S TRESS D ISORDER 5 
(1995). 
8. See generally ROY P ORT ER, M ADNESS : A BRIEF HISTORY 1--{)1 (2002). 
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of more recent origin, and has always been controversial. Freud and other followers of 
his theories were significant proponents of the notion that one's prior life experiences, 
particularly negative ones, can have lasting influence on one's psyche9 Although Freud 
himselflater altered these theories to give fantasy a more prominent role, the essential 
notion of a lasting emotional reaction to a specific event has persisted to this day. 
PTSD is often associated with exposure to combat, and indeed military psychiatry 
is where many of the concepts of PTSD found their origins during the First World 
War10 However, the story of PTSD in fact begins with the railways11 Prior to the 
spread of the railways, and the accompanying spate of railway accidents, traumatic 
injuries were not commonly the subject of either everyday conversation or litigation12 
The word ''trauma" was, until the late nineteenth century, a term associated exclusively 
with physical wounds. 13 John Erichsen, a British surgeon and academic, is often 
credited with being the first to apply the term to psychiatric injuries14 in his book, On 
Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, first published in 186615 Erichsen 
theorized that railway injuries from "Jars, Shakes, Shocks, or Concussions" to the 
spinal cord could cause injuries (specifically, lesions) that could have several 
manifestations, including "cerebral" changes affecting memories, thoughts, temper, and 
sleep. 16 Erichsen did not and could not explain the specific causal mechanism in place 
leading to so-called "railway spine,"17 but his work led to that of others who more 
thoroughly developed the association between railway injuries and nervous system 
disorders18 
9. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 36-38 (describing Freud's belief that hysterical attacks are caused by the 
failure to discharge emotion attached to prior traumatic experiences). 
10. Two scholars, a historian and an anthropologist, have produced excellent and highly regarded 
historical analyses of the early development of PTSD. See generally BEN SHEPHARD, A W AR OF N ERVES : 
SOLDIERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2000); YOUNG, supra note 7. 
11. In this important respect, the origins ofPTSD share a critical link with the development ofAmerican 
tort law and its conceptualizations of liability. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value ofInjury, 
1900-1949,49 How. L.J. 99, 108 (2005) ("Railroad injuries in the mid and late nineteenth century spurred the 
development of tort doctrine and tort practice."). 
12. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 16. 
13. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 13; see also RUTH LEYS, TRAUMA: A GENEALOGY 19 (2000) (linking 
psychical "trauma" to the term' s original use to describe a surgical wound); Scott Baldwin et al., The Creation, 
Expansion, and Embodiment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder A Case Study In Historical Critical 
Psychopathology, 3 S c i. REv . MENTAL HEALTH P RAC. 33, 43 (2004) (explaining psychological trauma as a 
metaphor for literal physical trauma). 
14. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 13; see also Edward M. Brown, Regulating Damage Claims for Emotional 
Injuries Before the First World War, 8 BEHAV. Scr. & L. 421, 421-22 (1990) (discussing Erichsen's 
description of a disorder affiicting railway accident victims who show no obvious physical injury); Flora V. 
Woodward Tibbits, Neurasthenia, the Result ofNervous Shock, as a Ground for Damages, 59 CENT. L J. 83, 
85 (1904) (discussing Erichsen's etiology of"traumatic neurasthenia"). 
15. JOHN ERIC ERICHSEN, ON RAILWAY AND 0 THER INJURJES OF THENERVOUS SYSTEM (1866). 
16. Id at 94,96-99. Another nineteenth century proponent of the theory of actual physical damage to the 
nervous system (in his case, lesions) as the cause of traumatic neurosis was Berlin neurologist Hermann 
Oppenheim. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for a discussion ofOppenheim' s study. 
17. ERICHSEN, supra note 15, at 94 (conceding that, how the injuries to the spine "directly influence its 
action I cannot say"). 
18. BARBARA YOUNG W ELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW AND RAILROAD 
REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, at 154-56 (2001); YOUNG, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
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Erichsen developed his theory and diagnostic term with litigation specifically in 
mind19 At the time, British and American societies were confronting the impact of 
industrialization, and particularly railways, on society. Railway accidents were 
"frequent, terrifying and highly publicized instances of the capacity of industrial 
technology to maim and kill. "20 A significant number of railway accidents led to claims 
for compensation21 However, in a number of these cases, railways were able to escape 
with little or no financial liability where, notwithstanding the presence of negligence, 
the physical injuries were minimal.22 Accordingly, Erichsen, who testified frequently 
on behalf of patients in these cases, developed his theory of railway spine to decrease 
the "discrepancy of surgical opinion" regarding those who exhibited symptoms that 
arose after the accident, and when it had been assumed that there had been no injury23 
These symptoms included "headache, confusion of thought, loss of memory, 
disturbance of the organs of sense, [and] irritability of the eyes and ears. "24 His work 
initially had an enormous impact on litigation against the railways, resulting in large 
damages awards and settlements 2 5 
Medicine did not uniformly embrace Erichsen's theories and, given the financial 
impact on the railways and the lack of empirical basis for railway spine, they provoked 
swift criticism26 One of his most prominent critics was Herbert Page, a physician who, 
not surprisingly, did consulting work for a railway 27 Page immediately challenged the 
causal assumptions underlying Erichsen's theory of traumatic railway injuries. He 
rejected Erichsen's purely somatic hypothesis in favor of one that included a potential 
causal role for fear in the mix, thus recharacterizing the symptoms as psychosomatic28 
He referred to the condition as "nervous shock," and concluded that it arose only in 
those with a preexisting "nervous temperament. "29 
19. ERlCHSEN, supranote 15, at 2-3; WELKE, supranote 18, at 150-51; Brown, supranote 14, at 423. 
20. Brown, supra note 14, at 423; see also WELKE, supra note 18, at 139-46 (describing American 
society's fear in reaction to frequent railway accidents and their media coverage in the late nineteenth century). 
21. Brown, supra note 14, at 423. 
22. See id (explaining a legal defense that sometimes prevented railway employees from collecting 
damages against their employers before the advent ofworkers' compensation laws). 
23. ERlCHSEN, supranote 15, at 3-4. 
24. Id. at 119. 
25. Brown, supra note 14, at 424; see WELKE, supra note 18, at 162-{;3 (discussing corporate doctors 
and lawyers who blamed Erichsen for his pro-plaintiff bias and for huge damage awards in American courts). 
26. See WELKE, supra note 18, at 153 (discussing the mobilization of railway doctors against Erichsen 
and his conclusions about railway spine); Brown, supra note 14, at 424 (explaining that railway spine theory 
was vulnerable to criticism because of vague diagnoses and victims who recovered after settled cases). 
27. YoUNG,supranote 7 , at 16--17; Brown, supra note 14, at 425-26. 
28. Brown, supra note 14, at 425-26; see also WELKE, supra note 18, at 154-55 (explaining Page's 
argument against Erichsen's theory of injury to the spinal cord); Y oUNG, supra note 7, at 16--1 7 (describing 
Page's emphasis on mental factors, including fear, in the onset of symptoms); J. David Kinzie & Rupert R. 
Goetz, A Centwy of Controversy Surrounding Posttraumatic Stress-Spectrum Syndromes The Impact on 
DSM-III and DSM-IV, 9 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 160 (1996) (describing Page ' s rejection of Erichsen's 
theory of injury to the spinal cord and his beliefthat mental factors contribute to the disorder). 
29. Brown, supra note 14, at 425-26. 
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In his criticism, Page specifically raises the specter of malingering-the 
exaggeration or falsification of symptoms30-in light of the potential for compensation 
for railway injuries made possible by the passage in England in 1864 of an amendment 
to the Campbell Act, allowing recovery for railway injuries.31 Page, among others, 
suspected that desire for compensation played some role in the development and 
persistence of symptoms, even in unconscious ways.32 The resistance by doctors 
associated with the railways to permitting recovery of compensation for injuries that 
were not obviously physical was unrelenting, and some turned their criticism 
specifically to the doctors who diagnosed such conditions, who, they claimed, were 
responsible for the role of "suggestion" in the persistence of symptoms 33 Those 
arguing a purely psychological (or "hysterical") origin for lasting symptoms also 
challenged Erichsen and other proponents of such conditions in the courtroom,34 and 
had some success in limiting the railways' exposure for such claims3 5 
The debate regarding diagnoses such as "railway spine" soon spread beyond 
Britain. In Germany in the 1880s, neurologist Hermann Oppenheim developed the term 
"traumatic neurosis," and saw a key role for direct neuropathological injury in its 
onset36 His theory, like Erichsen's , developed as a result of work treating individuals 
who developed a range of symptoms after railway and other industrial accidents37 
Unlike Erichsen, however, he also saw a significant etiological role for "the psyche: 
terror, emotional shock."38 
Across the Channel in France, neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot was also 
interested in the development of traumatic syndromes. Charcot focused entirely on the 
causal impact of fear in creating symptoms even in the absence of any spinal injury or 
30. The current edition of the DSMdefmes malingering as the "intentional production of false or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives" including " obtaining 
financial compensation." DSM·IV-TR, s upra note 2, at 739. 
31. See Y OUNG, supra note 7, at 17 (attributing to Page the contention that railway accident victims 
could not think of injuries in isolation from their m onetary significance) . 
32. SHEPHARD, s upra note 10, at 16; WELKE, supra note 18, at 167-68; YOUNG, supra note 7, at 17; see 
also Brown, supra note 14, at 426-27 (describing the attempts of Erichsen's critics to define object iv e 
symptoms that could distinguish malingering). 
33. WELKE, supra note 18, at 166, 168. 
34. See id. at 163-64 (describing the cottage industry that arose among anti-Erichsen expert medical 
witnesses) . 
35. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 16. 
36. See id. at 98 (discussing the development of Oppenheim's theory that "actual physical damage to the 
brain and nervous system" caused victims' symptoms); WElKE, supra note 18, at 156 (attributing to 
Oppenheim the term "traumatic neurosis," a phrase indicating chronic nervous system disorders could be 
"produced by the stresses of modem industrial life itself') ; Paul Lerner, From Traumatic Neurosis to Male 
Hysteria The Decline and Fall of Hermann Oppenheim, 1889-1919, in TRAUMATIC PASTS: HISTORY, 
PSYCHIATRY, AND TRAUMA IN THE MODERN AGE, 1870-1930 140 , 144 (MarkS. Micale & Paul Lerner eds., 
2001) [hereinafter T RAUMATIC PASTS] (indicating Oppenheim's theory that "traumatic neurosis" was caused, 
in part, by minute lesions in the brain or nervous system, which lead a victim' s nervous system to deteriorate). 
37. Lerner, s upra note 36, at 144. 
38. !d. at 145 (translating HERMANN OPPENHEIM, D IE TRAUMATISCHEN NEUROSEN NACH DEN IN DER 
N ERVENKLINIKDER CHARITEINDENLETZEN 5 JAHREN GESAMMELTEN BEOBACHTUNGEN (1889)). 
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lesions39 This interest grew out of his close study of "hysteria," and he opined that 
Oppenheim' s descriptions of "traumatic neuroses" were essentially indistinguishable 
from hysteria, as he had classified it40 He suspected that traumatic experiences often 
accounted for hysteria in men41 In an argument that would foreshadow controversies 
arising a century later about PTSD, Charcot challenged the creation of traumatic 
neurosis as an "entity" aside from hysteria, distinguished only by having a specific 
origin, such as fear or fright 42 The term "traumatic hysteria" soon found use not only 
to explain the unusual symptoms experienced by those who had been exposed to an 
event but also to bring more credibility to the concept of "hysteria" generally, which 
had become a disparaging term by this time, used primarily to describe a "condition" 
(or perhaps simply malingering) displayed by overdramatic women43 
Oppenheim resisted Charcot's linking of post-traumatic responses with hysteria44 
He was concerned that Charcot's use of the term "traumatic hysteria" suggested too 
strong a role for the individual's thoughts and ideas and raised the specter of 
malingering 45 Oppenheim' s theories were eventually rejected by the German 
psychiatric establishment, in part because they had been successfully used to support 
compensation claims brought by railway and factory workers and because (unlike Page, 
for example) he did not suggest a significant role for individual predisposition in the 
onset of these neuroses46 Although Oppenheim is regarded as only a minor player in 
the development of modem notions of posttraumatic psychological injury (in fact, his 
name is nearly forgotten), his conceptualization of "traumatic neurosis" had a more 
lasting impact than the theories of any of his contemporaries, and, as we shall see, that 
term played an increasingly important role in personal injury litigation in the twentieth 
century. 47 
39. See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 19 (detailing Charcot' s theory that fear produced traumatic symptoms 
during a self-induced hypnotic state). 
40. Id at 20; see also WELKE, supra note 18, at 156 (discussing the emergence of labels, including 
Oppenheimer's "traumatic neurosis" and Charcot' s "traumatic hysteria," used to describe the same 
psychological ailment). 
41. See SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 9 (noting Charcot' s belief that male hysteria was "usually traumatic 
in origin"); Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 161 (noting Charcot's belief that "much of male hysteria was 
traumatic hysteria"). 
42. YOUNG, supra note 7 , at 20 (quoting JEAN-MARIN CHARCOT, CLINlCAL LECTURES ON DISEASES OF 
THE NERVOUS SYSTEM DELIVERED AT THE lNF1RMARY OF LA SALPETIUERE 224-25 (New Sydenham Soc'y 
1899)). 
43. Brown, supra note 14, at 426. See generally IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE 
PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCES OF M EMORY 185..S8 (1995); EDWARD SHORTER, FROM PARALYSIS TO 
FATIGUE : A HISTORY OF PsYCHOSOMATIClLLNESSINTHE MODERNERA 112-1 7 (1992). 
44. Lerner, supra note 36, at 145. Erichsen similarly disagreed with Charcot on this point, in part 
because he could not fathom the notion that men could be "hysterical." WELKE, supra note 18, at 173-74. 
45. Lerner, supra note 36, at 145. 
46. Id at 151-52. Many were also concerned that the application of his theory to war neuroses would 
have an impact on Germany's army during World War I. See, e.g., id at 157 (noting Oppenheim's theory 
became regarded as "a threat to national health and strength" because its application would create significant 
pension obligations to soldiers diagnosed with traumatic neurosis). 
47. Paul Lerner & Mark S. Micale, Trauma, Psychiatry, and History A Conceptual and 
Historiographical Introduction, in TRAUMATIC PASTS, supm note 3 6, at 1, 13-15. 
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Work on the psychological impact of accidents continued with a number of 
researchers in Europe and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century48 
American neurologist George Miller Beard first suggested the diagnosis of "traumatic 
neurasthenia," the symptoms of which resemble those of railway spine49 The term 
"neurasthenia" had been around for a few decades, and it was regarded as being more 
legitimate than hysteria, although its symptoms were vague and not well defined50 It 
was seen as a condition caused by "the stresses of advanced civilization," and, for that 
reason, many readily accepted a causal link with industrial accidents 51 Beard asserted 
that neurasthenia had a physical cause (as Erichsen had claimed was true for railway 
spine) and "defined as 'disease' what before had been seen as self-willed, and in the 
process shifted causation away from the individual to modem civilization. "52 
Many of those examining these questions of psychological injury turned their 
focus to the role of memory in the emergence of psychological symptoms-the 
"pathogenic memory" or "traumatic memory"53-and such "traumatic remembering" is 
a core concept of PTSD. 54 Sigmund Freud's original theories about traumatic memory 
(developed in conjunction with Josef Breuer) tied pathology t o a patient's memory of a 
traumatic event.55 The pathological mechanism was thought to stem from a patient' s 
inability to "discharge" his emotional reactions to the event, forcing the nervous system 
to "manage a sudden surge of excitation."56 Memories of these events then became 
isolated from a person' s consciousness and could no longer be reached.57 The key to 
treatment, therefore, was to bring such traumatic memories to the surface and verbalize 
them through "abreaction"58 t o achieve "catharsis,"59 so that the memories would lose 
their "pathogenic power."6 °Freud's "seduction theory" suggested that psychoneurosis 
stemmed from early childhood trauma, generally sexual abuse, whereas "actual 
neurosis" emerged from trauma later in life6 1 He later abandoned the theory to place 
more emphasis on the role of early fantasy in the development of neuroses 62 
48. Brown, supra note 14, at 427. 
49. WELKE, s upra note 18, at 157-58. 
50. Brown, supra note 14, at 427; see also Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 162 (describing 
neurasthenia as a common diagnosis in the 1900s for "nonspecific emotional" injuries caused by traumatic 
events). 
51. Brown, supra note 14, at 427; see also WELKE, supra note 18, at 157-58 (discussing Beard ' s theory 
that nervousness was caused by "noises that were necessary accompaniments of civilization"). 
52. WELKE, supranote 18, at 159. 
53. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 25, 39. 
54. Id. at 34. 
55. LEYs,supranote 13, at 19-20; YOUNG, supranote 7 , at 36. 
56. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 36. 
57. Id at 37. 
58. Id. at 38. 
59. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 13. 
60. YoUNG, supra note 6, at 37; see also SHEPHARD, supra note 10 , at 13 (describing Freud's treatments 
resulting in the restoration of a patient's mental state). 
61. YoUNG, supra note 6, at 3 7-38. 
62. Id at 38. With that shift carne the accompanying shift from abreaction to psychoanalysis. Id.; see 
also John P. Wilson, The Historic Evolution ofPTSD Diagnostic Criteria From Freud to DSMV-IV, 7 J. 
TRAUMATIC S TRESS 681 , 683--s4 (1994) (explaining the external pressures influencing the underpinnings of 
10 TEMPLE L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 84 
The theories of pathogenic memory advanced by Freud, Breuer, and French 
psychologist Pierre Janef'3 in the years leading up to the First World War began to 
displace the approaches to psychological injury described by Erichsen, Page, Beard, 
and Charcot 64 Interest in pathogenic memory in particular became strong during the 
war, when there was horror on a scale (both in terms of frequency and degree) that was 
previously unfathomable, at a time when clinicians in many countries were exploring 
these new notions of memory and consciousness 65 Suddenly, the countries involved in 
the fighting had thousands of emotionally-wounded soldiers and little plan to address 
the widespread epidemic.66 
The British military establishment set a number of distinct labels to diagnosis the 
psychiatric conditions seen in officers and enlisted men during this time67 The most 
prominent and lasting was "shell shock,"68 which, like Erichsen's original 
conceptualization of railway spine, was based upon an assumption that the symptoms' 
primary origin was a neurological injury from a specific event, such as the discharge of 
an explosive in very close proximity69 Shell shock soon became a blanket synonym for 
all war neuroses, particularly in light of the challenge of differentiating among the 
various conditions as they appeared in different individuals and a lack of a uniform 
classification system (or "nosology") in psychiatry or neurology at that time70 There is 
no indication that military psychiatrists followed anything resembling diagnostic 
criteria or shared a common understanding of how to differentiate among these various 
diagnoses.71 
The controversy continued regarding whether individual disposition played a role 
in the development of these conditions72 Some physicians concluded that "inborn 
Freud's seduction theory to include "the role of fantasy"). Although Freud's impact on the development of 
PTSD cannot be underestimated, his rejection of the seduction theory has led present-day proponents of the 
trauma theory (and repressed memory theory) of child sexual abuse to revile him. LEYS, supra note 13, at 18­
19. 
63. Janet's writings on dissociation have played a key role in contemporary conceptualizations ofPTSD 
and particularly the theory of "traumatic" and "narrative memory." LEYS, supra note 13, at 105 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
64. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 13. 
65. YoUNG, supra note 7, at41-42. 
66. Id 
67. The diagnostic labels included "hysteria," "neurasthenia," and "disordered action of the heart." 
YOUNG, supra note 7, at 50-52; see also SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 58, 65--{)6 (discussing "soldier's heart," 
a diagnosis similar to disordered action of the heart). Some historians have traced the use of the term "soldier's 
heart" to the American Civil War. E.g., WILBUR J. SCOTT, V IETNAM VETERANS SINCE THE WAR: THE POLITICS 
OF PTSD, AGENT ORANGE, AND THE NATIONAL MEMORIAL 29 (Univ. of Okla. Press 2004). The fmal 
classification was "not yet diagnosed (nervous)" (often known by its acronym "NYD [N)' ') , which was 
intended to serve as an interim label, but in practice was often the only "diagnosis" applied. YOUNG, supra 
note 7, at 52-53 (emphasis omitted). 
68. Cambridge psychologist C. S. Myers is credited with coining this term in a 1915 article, although it 
is possible that the term was already in use in the military by that time. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 1. 
69. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 50-51. See supra notes 16--24 and accompanying text for a discussion for 
Erichsen's original conceptualization. 
70. Id. at 60. 
71. Id. at 61. 
72. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 110--112; YoUNG, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
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timidity or neuropathic disposition" explained why some soldiers and not others 
developed these conditions.73 Many army psychiatrists assumed that a combination of 
"flawed heredity and constitution" accounted for the cause of most war neuroses. 74 The 
issues raised in those debates are echoed in the contemporary controversies about the 
interaction of the psychological and physiological (such as the endocrine system) in the 
symptoms of PTSD and the role of preexisting psychopathology in those who develop 
PTSD75 Most physicians at the time were not particularly concerned with identifying 
the specific causal mechanisms of these conditions since the treatments employed did 
not depend upon such understanding7 6 
However, the adoption of shell shock was a considerable change for the military, 
which had previously attached a label of "cowardice" to such symptoms. 77 And the fact 
that one in six who received the diagnosis was an officer made it a nearly "respectable" 
condition78 The British military did attempt initially to distinguish between a reaction 
properly classified as a ''wound" incurred in battle and a mere "breakdown," which 
carried far more of a stigma7 9 If the shell shock was not linked to a specific shell 
explosion, the soldier was labeled as "sick," not "wounded," and such designation 
precluded a pension award80 
By 1916, several military doctors concluded that the symptoms classified as shell 
shock did not necessarily depend upon a person's proximity to an explosion for the 
cause, but, in fact, may have a gradual onset or cause due largely to "emotions of 
extreme and sudden horror and fright"81 or "sudden psychic shock. '>82 Furthermore, a 
great number of soldiers were claiming to have the condition by name.83 Thus, the 
psychiatrists rejected the label "shell shock" and officially replaced it with "war 
neuroses," or "functional nervous disorders. '>S4 But the term was not easily discarded, 
as it made a lasting impression upon soldiers and the general public as a "neutral, 
physical label for a psychological condition. '>85 
W.H.R. Rivers, who was a Royal Army Medical Corps officer and psychiatrist in 
Great Britain who served for a time as a psychiatrist in Craiglockhart Military Hospital 
73. Y oUNG, note 7, at 54 (quoting Frederick Molt, The Lettsomian Lectures on the Effects of High 
Explosives upon the Central Nervous System, 187 T HE LANCEr 331, 331 (1 9 16)); see also SHEPHARD, supra 
note 10, at 30 (discussing Molt's views that predisposition affected post-war psychological impact). 
74. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 55. 
75. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 111-12, 125. 
76. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 55. These conditions were generally treated with rest, hypnosis, diet, and 
electricity. Id at 55-56. 
77. SHEPHARD, supranote 10, at 28. 
78. Id. at 73-75. 
79. Id at 28-29. 
80. Id. at 29. 
81. !d. at 31 (quoting CHARLES A. M YERS, SHELL SHOCK IN FRANCE, 1914--1918, at 36 (1940)). 
82. Id; see also YOUNG, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining how one-third of soldiers described symptoms 
that appeared gradually and without memorably significant events) . 
83. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 29. 
84. Id. at 31. 
85. Id. 
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in Scotland, was one of the early developers ofwhat carne to be known as PTSD86 He 
was notable for his "humane treatments" and for his use of abreaction-based treatments 
resembling what we would now call psychotherapy 8 7 He theorized, drawing largely on 
the work of Freud, that the symptoms of war neuroses, particularly in officers, carne 
from the repression of fear88 Thus, the key to treatment was to reverse the repression 
of traumatic memories by confronting them directly89 
Freud revisited the question of traumatic memory himself shortly after the war 
ended, and it is clear from these writings that he had not entirely abandoned the notion 
that external events can produce neuroses.90 He noted similarities between war trauma 
and others and concluded that all traumatic neuroses were based upon fear (in 
psychoneurosis, however, the origin of the fear was sexual conflict)91 In both contexts, 
repression operated as a psychological defense92 He regarded an injury to the "organ 
of the mind" from trauma that was rmexpected93 as one that was frmctional, not 
psychological94 His most significant contribution, and one we can see in the 
development of PTSD specifically, is the notion of an initial "traumatic blow" to the 
"protective shell of the ego," which was then followed by psychological 
consequences95 Although Freud's writings do not, as a whole, provide an entirely 
coherent theory of traumatic psychological injury, it is his ideas that have made the 
most significant indelible impact on contemporary psychological conceptualizations of 
PTSD96 
As the war progressed with an unexpectedly high number of apparent 
psychological casualties, it became particularly important for the military to be able to 
86. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 42-44. 
87. Id at 42, 56; see also id at 69--70 (distinguishing Rivers's "painless talking cure" from "physical 
suffering" inflicted by Lewis Yealland's and others' electrotherapy treatments). 
88. I d. at 65-66; SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 87--ES. Rivers was not strictly a "Freudian," but he did 
adopt many ofFreud's ideas and approaches. SHEPHARD, supranote 10, at 87; YoUNG, supra note 7, at 65-Q6. 
89. See SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 87-88 (noting River's method of treatment of war neuroses 
involved allowing the patient to "confront the memories" so that he could "reduce the horror"); YOUNG, supra 
note 7, at 67 (noting that Freud and Rivers agreed that treating anxiety neurosis required addressing the 
traumatic memory); see also SCOTT, supra note 67, at 30 (noting Freud' s suggested method for treating war 
neurosis was psychoanalysis). 
90. LEYS, supranote 13, at 21-23; Wilson, supra note 62, at 685. 
91. SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 6-7 (James Strachey trans., rev. ed. 1961) 
(1950); YOUNG, supra note 7 , at 78-79. 
92. Wilson, supra note 62, at 685. 
93. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 108. 
94. Wilson, supra note 62, at 686. 
95. Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 162; see also LEYS, supra note 13, at 23 (describing the term 
"traumatic" as "an experience which within a short period of time presents the mind with an increase of 
stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in the normal way"); SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 107­
08 (describing trauma as an outside excitation powerful enough to break through the shield which protects the 
brain from stimuli that will surely result in exhaustive defensive measures); Wilson, supra note 62, at 686--s7 
(explaining that "both the traumatic stressors and secondary ones can overwhelm the now depleted ego­
defenses, thereby setting-up the possibility of long-term post-traumatic stress disorder and other co-morbid 
conditions"). 
96. See LEYS, supra note 13, at 18, 25-27 (noting that Freud is "a founding figure in the history of the 
conceptualization oftrauma"). 
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distinguish those with true war neuroses from those who were malingering97 Taking a 
cue from the literature developed to weed out individuals with mere "compensation 
neurosis" among those filing claims against railways for injuries,98 military doctors 
consulted books that described mechanisms to identify those who might be feigning a 
neurosis to avoid further combat duty and to distinguish between true hysteria and mere 
malingering.99 
Once the war was over, concern shifted to reabsorbing these emotionally damaged 
soldiers into civilian society. More than 160,000 former British service members had 
received an award or were drawing a pension for a psychiatric injury.100 In the United 
States, more than one-third of military hospitalizations at the end of the war were for 
psychiatric conditions.101 Psychiatrists noted that some men recovered quickly upon 
return to civilian life, whereas others continued to struggle with symptoms1 02 
Psychiatrists began to draw a distinction between "true" and "false" war neuroses, with 
the former appearing only in those who had "a minimal predisposition" and the latter 
appearing in those with a predisposition that indicated that the war was not the true 
cause of the neurosis103 Those with the "false" label were simply neurotics whose 
breakdown was inevitable104 The British government attempted unsuccessfully to 
convince psychiatrists to assign specific veterans to each class for purposes of limiting 
the pension awards. 105 
In 1941, Abram Kardiner, an American psychoanalyst, published The Traumatic 
Neuroses ofWar, a detailed study of the long-term psychological impact of combat on 
World War I veterans 106 He noted that there were also soldiers whose breakdowns did 
not occur until after they returned home and then persisted for many years. 107 His book 
remained a "bible" for those studying war neuroses through the 1970s, when the 
97. SHEPHARD, supra note 10 , at 113-14. 
98. See in.fra notes 163-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of examples of how feigning a 
neurosis had been used to ex acerbate legal claims or increase recovery. 
99. Y oUNG, supra note 7, at 5 7-59. 
100. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 144. 
101. Id. at 153. 
102. Id. at 150-51. 
103. Id. at 151. 
104. See id. (indicating that those with "false" neuroses had predispositions). 
10 5. Id. at 158. Some raised the concern that the pension awards actually inhibited recov ery or 
encouraged the reporting of symptoms. Jd at 151. Based upon these assumptions, France did not award any 
pensions to those with war neuroses. Id. at 152. Similarly, as the number of psychiatric casualties increased, 
German psychiatrists began t o attribute the symptoms to malingering to avoid combat or to obtain pensions 
and employed "treatments" that were particularly brutal. HERB K UTCHlliS & STUART A. KlRK, MAKING U s 
CRAZY: DSM: THE PsYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL D ISORDERS 103-104 (1 997). 
106. ABRAM KARDINER, 1HE T RAUMATIC NEUROSES OF WAR ( 1941 ); SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 154-­
55; Kinzie & G oetz, supra note 28, at 165. The other influential works from this period include Roy Grinker 
and John Spiegel's War ~Neuroses and Men Under Stress, both published in 1945 and also heavily influenced 
by Freudian theory. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 331. See generally ROY R GRINKER & JOHN P. SPIEGEL, 
MEN U NDER STRESS (1945); R OY R. GRINKER & JOHN P. SPIEGEL, W AR NEUROSES (1945). 
107. SHEPHARD, supra note 1 0, at 152. 
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diagnosis of PTSD was first discussed and forrnulated.108 He urged quick intervention 
after men first exhibited symptoms to prevent the adaptive responses manifested as 
aversion and avoidance. 109 He theorized that a complex "physio-neurosis," a series of 
adaptive responses, accounted for the symptoms occurring in war neurotics110 
In the late 1930s, with the Second World War looming, the British Ministry of 
Pensions was the driving force behind the renewed debate on war neuroses. There were 
still a great number of World War I veterans receiving (or claiming) benefits due to a 
psychiatric disorder based upon the prior war.lll The Ministry's resident psychiatrist, 
Dr. Francis Prideaux, argued that many soldiers had incorrectly received diagnoses 
linked to exposure to battle, and that the men's predispositions, not traumatic 
experiences, were the key causal agents for most war neuroses112 He was successful in 
convincing other psychiatrists and bureaucrats of his view, but the debate left 
unresolved the question of how to differentiate between those very few soldiers who 
did deserve pensions and the vast majority who would only be encouraged to break 
down by the availability of a pension.113 Eventually, the British government decided 
not to award any pensions for war-related psychoneurosis until after the war had 
concluded.114 
Given the assumption that predisposition was the single most significant factor in 
who ended up with a war neurosis, the British and American armies attempted to 
screen recruits for psychiatric disorders during World War II115 However, by the end 
of the war, perhaps due to the utter failure of this approach, American military thinking 
had shifted from an assumption that preselection screening could keep out those men 
vulnerable to psychoneurosis to the view that "every man has his breaking point" and 
factors other than predisposition (including leadership) played a role in the cause of 
some men's breakdowns. 116 However, the military did not remove soldiers with 
apparent psychological injuries from service. Rather, in 1943, American military 
leadership determined that all psychiatric casualties should be given an initial diagnosis 
108. YOUNG, supra note 7 , at 89 (explaining that Kardiner 's book is "routinely cited as a landmark in the 
history of the posttraumatic disorders" and was used in creating "the symptom list for post-traumatic stress 
disorder"). 
109. SHEPHARD, supra note 1 0, at 156. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 165. 
112. Id. at 165-66. He also specifically rejected the possibility of a delayed onset ofneuroses after seven 
years had elapsed from the date of exposure. Jd at 166. 
113. Id. at 166-67. 
114. Id. at 167 (noting that one of the "main legac[ies] of the First World War [was] an official 
determination that quasi-medical words like 'shell-shock' should never be used, that the whole question of 
psychoneurosis should be both recognized and played down and that few pensions should be paid"). 
115. Id. at 187-90, 197-201. 
116. Jd. at 326; see also Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 168-69 (indicating that although some 
individuals had predispositions to mental illness, "even persons with sound personalities would break if the 
stress was high enough"). 
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of only "exhaustion,"117 or "combat fatigue," which would be treated with brief rest not 
far from the front. 118 
Research interest in trauma-induced psychopathology waned significantly until 
the final years of the Vietnam War119 However, well before that time, there was an 
emerging consensus that there could be a causal role for the "fright" and "shock" 
during severe accidents or other intense events that lead to injuries to the nervous 
system.120 These discussions were framed around notions of responsibility; that is, 
whether an external event or agent could cause such symptoms and the role of the 
individual's predisposition in whether the person developed the condition. 121 
B. Legal Mechanisms for Psychological Injury Claims 
Given that during the first decades of the twentieth century there were at least 
some segments of medicine that accepted that external events could lead to 
psychological injuries, it followed that attorneys and plaintiffs would seek to assign 
legal responsibility for such injuries to the persons who were responsible for the 
precursor events as a means to recover compensation. Despite Herbert Page's attempt 
to stem the tide of these claims for posttraumatic psychological injuries, his work and 
that of his contemporaries served as the foundation for refining the theories that served 
as a basis for the recovery of emotional damages, at least in cases where physical 
damages had also been sought122 
The history of the recovery for mental injuries, however, is one of a tension 
between those who asserted that such injuries were real and could be traced to specific 
stressors, and those who were more skeptical of such claims and argued that such 
recoveries should be permitted only where the possibility of recovery for meritless 
claims could be minimized. Reflecting the concern in the British military with 
117. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 216-17. 
118. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 30--31; YOUNG, supra note 7, at 92. Military psychiatrists started treating 
soldiers with "narco-analysis," administering high dosages of barbiturates, especially sodium amytal and 
pentothal, to not only calm the patient but to encourage the soldier to access and recount repressed memories 
of painful events as a form of drug-aided abreaction. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 208-21 0, 214-15; YOUNG, 
supra note 6, at 92. 
119. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 85; see also LEYS , supra note 13, at 15 (characterizing the history of 
trauma as one "marked by an alternation between episodes of forgetting and remembering," in which "it took 
the experience ofVietnam to 'remember' the lessons ofWorld War II"). 
120. WELKE, supra note 18, at 154-56. The various terms referring to disorders resulting from "frighf' 
or "shock" were often used interchangeably and their exact boundaries were not always well defined. See 
WELKE, supra note 18, at 156. For example, in a 1904 article, one legal commentator referred to railway spine 
as the "traumatic" form of neurasthenia, and indicated that it was the form of "most importance from a legal 
aspect, as railway accidents often cause it, and suits for damages often result. ... Many cases are said to be 
much improved or cured by the award of substantial damages." Tibbits, supranote 14, at 85. 
121. Historian Barbara Young Welke has analyzed in detail the role ofgender, both implicit and explicit, 
in the development ofmodem conceptualizations of psychological injuries during this period. In particular, she 
has noted that the role of predisposition was minimized by Erichsen, Beard, and others specifically because it 
was assumed that "normal" men, who comprised a significant number of those with symptoms of traumatic 
neurosis, were not generally at risk of developing nervous conditions, and therefore the cause of such 
conditions must be some external force. WELKE, supra note 18, at 171-202. 
122. Brown, supranote14, at428,433. 
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separating the truly neurotic from the merely malingering so as to not deplete the ranks, 
legal systems have similarly sought rules and standards that offered a way to 
distinguish the claims of those seeking compensation through a specious claim. 
As the American tort system came under increasing demand to address traumatic 
injuries from the industrial age, especially railways, courts immediately reacted with 
skepticism to notions of a "pure" emotional injury123 By the turn of the twentieth 
century, courts permitted recovery for emotional distress injuries as part of "pain and 
suffering" or "loss of enjoyment of life" damages in tort claims, but only where such 
distress was incidental to the primary physical injury,124 as so-called "parasitic 
damages. "125 Some courts and commentators simply expanded notions of what 
constituted "bodily harm" and did not make a specific distinction for injuries that were 
psychological in nature126 
However, courts were far more reluctant to permit claims to proceed that were 
based upon assertions of emotional injury alone, particularly for mere negligence127 
Courts largely followed the lead of Lord Wensleydale's 1861 ruling in the House of 
Lords: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, 
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone."128 American courts expressed 
their resistance by raising concerns about malingering, a potential explosion of 
litigation,129 or an assumption that people with normal constitutions (and particularly, 
men) could not be "shocked" into a mental disorder (and tortfeasors should not have to 
bear responsibility for compensating women's overemotional reactions )130 
123. WELKE, supra note 18, at 205-207; Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherenl, lncalculahle, 
Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea) , 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 253, 303 (2006); 
William L. Prosser, Intenlionallnjliction ofMental Suffering A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 875, 877 
(1939). 
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1965); see, e.g., Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Cotp., 
622 F.2d 1168, 1175 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded 451 U.S. 966 (1981) (holding that no plain error 
occurred when the court allowed the jury to assess as separate components pain and suffering, loss of 
enjoyment of life, and permanent disability). 
125. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNlFER B. WRIGGINS, T HE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND 
TORT LAW 38 (2010); Prosser, supra note 123, at 875, 880. 
126. John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort law liability for Emotional Harm , 90 MARQ. L. REv. 
789, 832-33 (2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: L IABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 4 cmt. d 
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 2005)). 
127. Brown, supra note 14, at 428-30; Prosser, supra note 123, at 874 ("'Mental anguish' has been an 
orphan child."). 
128. Lynch v. Knight, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 577 (H.L.) 598; see also Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 
(1888) 13 A.C. 222 (P.C.) 226 (Eng.) (holding that Plaintiff's shock-induced mental and physical injuries 
caused by a near-collision with a train were too remote to be compensable). 
129. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896), overruledby Battalla v. State, 
176 N E2d 729 (N.Y. 1961); WELKE, supra note 18, at 207--{)8, 210. 
130. See Ward v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 47 A. 561, 562 (N.J. 1900), overruled in part by 
Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965); CHAMALLAS & WRJGGINS, supra note 125, at 90; WELKE, supra 
note 18, at 210; Abel, supra note 123, at 303--{)4; Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, MOthers, and 
the law of Fright A History, 88 MICH. L. REv . 814, 829 (1990). Implicit in this skepticism as well is an 
assumption that emotional harm, as opposed to bodily injury or property damage, was not of sufficient value to 
warrant legal protection. CHAMALLAS & WRJGGINS, supra note 125, at 37-38. Tort law generally recognizes a 
rule that permits a plaintiff to recover for all damages flowing from a tortfeasor's wrongdoing, even if the 
plaintiff's injury (physical or mental) is far greater than that of the average person with a latent or underlying 
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Courts developed a range of "bright-line" rules to control the circumstances under 
which one could recover for psychic harm as the sole or primary injury. 131 Some of 
these rules limited the underlying theory of liability of the particular tort. Assault has 
traditionally permitted recovery for psychological harm even in the absence of physical 
contact, but only where the tortfeasor is found to have intentionally put the plaintiff in 
fear or apprehension of injury.132 Intentional infliction of emotional distress was first 
recognized as a tort in the United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth century in a 
case in which the defendant told the plaintiff, as a joke, that her husband had been 
seriously injured in an accident133 The ensuing shock produced "serious and 
permanent physical consequences," and the court permitted recovery on the assumption 
that this was a claim for physical injury even if the origin was a psychological shock. 134 
In the United States, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
slow to develop outside of the very specific and narrow context of claims against 
common carriers, innkeepers, and telegraph companies, or for the mistreatment of dead 
bodies.135 It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the American Law 
Institute' s Restatement of Torts made reference to the tort,U6 and some courts 
interpreted it to limit recovery to instances where the tortfeasor "subjects another to the 
mental suffering incident to serious threats to his physical well-being. "137 In 1965, the 
Restatement {Second) of Torts permitted recovery for intentional conduct that resulted 
in "bodily harm"; however, such recovery was premised on the plaintiffs ability to 
prove that her emotional distress was "severe" and the defendant's conduct was 
"extreme and outrageous."138 If the conduct was sufficiently atrocious, a court could 
assume that there would be some psychological injury, diminishing concerns about 
malingering or unexpectedly strong reactions 139 
vulnerability; the so-called "eggshell plaintiff' rule requires a defendant to "take" his plaintiff as he "fmds 
him." Joseph H. King, Jr., Causalion, Valuation, and Chance in Personallnjwy Torts Involving Preexisting 
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 , 1360--61 (1981). Courts may deny liability for 
emotional distress entirely as one way to limit the application ofthis rule to claims for psychological injury for 
"eggshell plaintiffs." Cj CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supranote 125, at 112 (noting that in highly unusual cases 
involving public policy concerns such as racial prejudice, it may be justifiable to use the doctrine of proximate 
cause to cut off liability for emotional harm). 
131. Abel, supra note 123, at 303-04. 
132. Kircher, supranote 126, at 790. 
133. Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.); see also Kircher, supra note 126, at 795 (noting 
that the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress can be traced to Wilkinson v. Downton, which did 
not explicitly name the tort but allowed recovery for the emotionally distressed plaintiff). 
134. Wilkinson, 2 Q.B. at 58-59; Kircher, supra note 126, at 796. 
135. Kircher, supranote 126, at 7 96-98. 
136. Jd at 797; see also Prosser, supra note 123, at 874 (acknowledging the creation of a new tort yet to 
be named). 
137. Kircher, supranote 126, at 798 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §46 (Supp. 1948)). 
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965); Kircher, supranote 126, at 800--{)1; Prosser, 
supra note 123, at 879 (noting that the character of the conduct ensures that genuine harm occurred and 
warrants redress). 
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 46 cmt k (explaining a court may assign liability without 
evidence of bodily harm if conduct is extreme and outrageous); Kircher, supra note 126, at 800 (noting "the 
defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct alone tends to prove the severity of the distress," eliminating a 
need for proof of any physical symptoms). 
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Recovery for emotional distress where a negligent, as opposed to intentional, act 
caused no other injury-the "stand-alone" tort of "Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
or so140Distress"-has been recognized by courts only within the last fifty years 
Courts' reluctance to permit stand-alone claims for emotional distress can be generally 
traced, not only to concerns about malingering or exaggeration and the great difficulty 
in quantifying emotional distress,141 but also to an assumption that if the only resulting 
harm is emotional the defendant's negligence did not rise to a level that should trigger 
liability of any kind142 The Restatement also reasoned that any emotional injury that 
would occur in the absence of physical injury would be "'so temporary, so evanescent 
and so relatively harmless' that the task of compensating for it would unduly burden 
defendants and the courts."143 Some courts thought that an emotional injury itself was 
"too remote" from the original accident to be compensable. 144 As a result of these 
views, a strange body of case law developed, with a significant number of different 
approaches. One high court referred to this as "one of the most disparate and confusing 
areas of tort law," characterized by "inconsistency and incoherence. "145 
Although American law generally did not recognize claims based solely on 
emotional distress damages due to negligence until recently,146 courts developed a 
variety of exceptions and requirements to permit some recovery, while retaining 
broader limitations on the claims. 147 The "impact rule" required a plaintiff to show 
some kind of initial physical contact or injury in order to recover for emotional distress, 
and denied recovery for the physical consequences of an initial emotional shock. 148 
140. Kircher, supranote 126, at 8 07-08. 
141. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Mass. 1982); see also Herbert F. Goodrich, 
Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv . 497, 504 (1922) (identifYing courts' prior 
reluctance to assign liability because of"danger of fraud through simulated injuries"); Kircher, supra note 126, 
at 808 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 360--61 (5th 
ed., 1984)) (identifYing the danger of falsified claims as a point of concern for courts in assigning liability for 
emotional distress). 
142. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 178-79; see Goodrich, supra note 141, at 504--05 (indicating that when 
conduct is intentional no impact is necessary for defendant's liability for emotional distress); Kircher, supra 
note 126, at 808 (quoting KEETON ET AL , supra note 141) (indentifYing potential triviality of emotional harm 
and the potential for an undue burden on defendant points to caution for courts); Prosser, supra note 123, at 
878 ("There has been much more readiness to grant a remedy where mental suffering is inflicted intentionally 
than where it is the result ofmere negligence."). 
143. Payton, 43 7 N.E.2d at 178 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b). 
144. Tibbits, supra note 14, at 87 (citing Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. , C. & St. L. Ry. Co. , 23 A. 340, 341 
(Pa. 1892), overruled cyNiederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970)). 
145. Camperv. Minor, 915 S.W.2d437, 440 (Tenn. 1996). 
146. See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(1) (stating that if an actor's negligent conduct 
creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm or emotional disturbance, but results in only emotional 
disturbance, the actor is not liable). 
147. Kircher, supra note 126, at 810 (stating that these limitation were due to "judicial concern over the 
genuineness of claims for negligently caused emotional distress"). 
148. CHAMALLAS & WRlGGlNS, supra note 125, at 40-45; Kircher, supra note 126, at 810-11; Tibbits, 
supra note 14, at 86. A handful of states still follow the rule. Kircher, supra note 126, at 810 n.113. In the 
nineteenth century, some courts recognized limited claims for "fright" or "shock" as a basis to recover for the 
psychological injuries on a theory ofnegligence, but only where there was an accompanying physical injury. 
Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 130, at 819--23. Several scholars have noted that the shaping (and limits) of 
such legal claims were often gender-based. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS & WRlGGlNS, supra note 125, at 37-47 
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Later, several courts required evidence that the alleged emotional distress had some 
kind of physical manifestation-such as insomnia, nightmares, weight loss, irritability, 
fatigue, and extreme nervousness149-even where the emotional distress itself was 
severe.150 This requirement imposed a kind of objective proof on mental distress claims 
so that they more closely resembled claims for physical injury. The "physical 
manifestation" rule was an alternate means to recover for emotional distress when there 
was no accompanying physical injury at the time of the accident151 Usually neither of 
these standards required showing an extensive physical injury or manifestation but both 
ensured that plaintiffs could not recover for purely psychic injuries (assuming that such 
a dichotomy could be drawn and understood). 152 
Some states limited negligence-based emotional distress recovery to people who 
were within the "zone of danger" of the event; that is, someone who was sufficiently 
close to the accident to be at risk of physical injury, even if none resulted153 This 
requirement limited recovery by "bystanders," generally family members who learn of 
the death or serious injury of a loved one, and was sometimes linked with the "impact 
rule. "154 And some courts permitted recovery by a bystander who was not in the zone 
of danger (i.e., fearing for own safety) so long as the person had a "close relationship" 
with the person actually injured.155 A few courts eliminated all limitations on negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claims on the assumption that concerns about severity 
(noting that the defendants in the first emotional distress cases were women, forging an early connection 
between women and fright-based injwy); WELKE, supra note 18, at 211-34 (describing the role ofmiscarriage 
in the legal recognition ofthe right to recover for harm resulting from nervous shock). 
149. Kircher, supranote 126, at 812-13. 
150. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 125, at 94; see also Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 442 (compiling 
cases evidencing such a rule); Fortes v. Ramos, No. CIV. A. 96-5663, 2001 WL 1685601, at *4 (R.I. Ct. App. 
2001) (detailing Rhode Island's treatment of the physical manifestation requirement). It is not surprising that 
nightmares were among the physical manifestations that could serve as a basis for recovery of psychological 
injuries as they had long been associated with traumatic neurosis. The "Battle Dream" generated medical 
interest during World War I, and it was considered the "most characteristic symptom of war neurosis." 
SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 92; see also BARKER, supra note 1, at 26. Freud in particular noted the role of 
traumatic experience with dreams. Rather than representing the fulfillment offantasy, which was the case with 
most dreams, he claimed that the recurring dream of trauma was the result of a fixation with the event leading 
to a compulsion to repeat the experience. JONATHAN LEAR, FREUD 154--56 (2005); SHEPHARD, supra note 10, 
at 107 (citing FREUD, supra note 91, at 7, 13). 
151. Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 442. In Kau.frnan v. Western Union Telegraph Co. , 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 
1955), the Fifth Circuit's approach was to be flexible regarding whether the "physical injwy" that was required 
in any event preceded or came after the emotional injwy. Id at 731. In that case, the shock from a false death 
notice came first and led to an increase in the plaintiff's blood pressure.Jd at 725-26. There were a few cases, 
however, to the contrary. See Tibbits, supra note 14, at 88--89 (discussing three cases in which plaintiffs were 
permitted recovery for"nervous shock" in the absence of physical injury causing such shock). 
152. See Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 442 (stating that the physical manifestation test was formulated in part 
due to the belief that physical impact requirements block many worthy claims for relief based solely on 
emotional damages). 
153. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 125, at 113; Kircher, supra note 126, at 815. 
154. Kircher, supranote 126, at 815- 16,823. 
155. Nielson v. AT&T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434, 442 (S.D. 1999); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 
(Cal. 1968). 
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and malingering were best left to be addressed by defendants through the adversarial 
156process.
Faced with this well-entrenched judicial hostility toward recovery for emotional 
distress and psychological injuries, many lawyers evoked quasi-medical concepts, such 
as "traumatic neurosis," in an attempt to bring legitimacy to their clients' claims for 
such injuries157 In practice, traumatic neurosis was not a clinical diagnosis per se, but 
rather a term generally reserved to describe psychological injuries in the context of 
personal injury litigation or claims for industrial and other occupational accidents. 158 
One psychiatrist described the condition in 1959 as being "the total neurotic reaction to 
a physical injury or, occasionally, near-injury," which "may take many forms, e.g., 
conversion hysteria, anxiety reaction, obsessive-compulsive reaction, reactive 
depression, and other less well-defined symptom complexes."159 By the time of the 
development of the DSM-111 in the 1970s, it does not appear that the term was in wide 
use in litigation. One psychiatrist wrote an article in 1971 calling on attorneys to pursue 
more claims based upon traumatic neurosis, characterizing such conditions as being 
"[r]elatively [u]ntried in the [c]ourts."160 He attributed the reluctance of attorneys to 
bring such claims, in part, to their "orientation . . toward factual proof,"161 lack of 
objective tests to confirm such condition, and fear "of treading in the uncharted waters 
of traumatic neurosis. "162 
By the middle of the twentieth century, some cases referred to "compensation 
neurosis. "163 Like "traumatic neurosis," it was not a recognized clinical term, but rather 
was a shorthand label for a subtype of traumatic neurosis that arose when there was the 
possibility of recovering compensation through a claim or litigation.164 Although it was 
156. See Kircher, supra note 126, at 816-18 (discussing cases that held no physical injury was required 
for plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress). 
157. The "traumatic" conditions such as "traumatic hysteria," "traumatic neurasthenia," and particularly 
"traumatic neurosis" eclipsed "railway spine" in litigation claims. See supra notes 26-52 and accompanying 
text for a discussion ofthe evolution of these terms. 
158. Kenneth M. Cole, Jr., Workmen's Compensation-Damages-Compensation Neurosis Held 
Compensable.-Miller v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511 (La App. 1957), 37 T EX. L. REv . 361, 
361 (1959); Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 165--{)6; see also Hubert Winston Smith, Relation ofEmotions 
to Injury and Disease legal Liabilityfor Psychic Stimuli, 30 V A. L. REv. 193, 304 (1944) (explaining that this 
term has little relevance given the current state of science); Hubert Winston Smith & Harry C. Solomon, 
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87 (1943) (asserting that the common prerequisites for an 
official diagnosis are lacking for neuroses); Jay Ziskin, New Terminology for the "Traumatic Neurosis" Case 
Challenging the Plaintiff's Psychiatrist, 32 DEF. L.J. 72, 73 (1983) (stating that the American Psychiatric 
Association never recognized traumatic neurosis). 
159. Cole, supra note 158, at 361 (citing Smith & S olomon, supra note 158, at 92-95). 
160. Lester Keiser, Traumatic Neurosis; A Common Problem RelaJively Untried in the Courts, 17 MED. 
T RIAL TECH. Q. 1, 1 (197 1). 
161. Id at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
162. Id at 6. 
163. Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 171- 72; see also Smith & Solomon, supra note 158, at 148 
(rejecting the notion of"compensation neurosis" as being medically distinct from traumatic neurosis; it is only 
one part of the total reaction to the event). 
164. Cole, supra note 158, at 361-62. A highly publicized 1961 study suggested some legitimacy to the 
claim that a plaintiff's symptoms improved after the resolution of a legal claim for recovery from 
psychological injuries. Henry Miller, Accident Neurosis (pts. 1 & 2}, 1961 B RIT. MED. J. 919- 25, 992- 98. 
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generally a pejorative term, some psychiatrists used it to draw a distinction from true 
malingering and regarded it as the mechanism through which the possibility of 
secondary gain could unconsciously aggravate the primary traumatic neurosis, similar 
to Herbert Page's theories published in the 1880s165 In fact, in the workers' 
compensation realm-which generally permitted a more liberal approach to causation 
and traumatic neurosis than did tort law166-some awards were expressly based upon 
"compensation neurosis. "167 
Therefore, in the century prior to PTSD's recognition by the APA, courts 
permitted individuals to recover for psychological injuries only to a very limited 
degree. The limitations imposed by courts on such recovery reflected the 
contemporaneous theories of psychological injuries during this period and raised many 
of the same debates, such as the distinction between the emotional and the physical, the 
role of individual predisposition, the impact of litigation on the development and 
persistence of symptoms, and concerns of malingering. These same themes later 
emerged during the debate leading to (and resulting after) the recognition of PTSD by 
the psychiatric establishment. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIIE PTSD DIAGNOSIS IN TIIEDSM 
Although some psychologists and psychiatrists advanced theories of 
psychological injury in the nineteenth century, the notion of psychopathology 
attributable to a specific external cause did not take root in mainstream psychiatry until 
it was embodied in the American Psychiatric Association's psychiatric classification 
system in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders. Early editions of 
the DSM included some references to psychological reactions to stress. However, it was 
through the addition of PTSD in the DSMs third edition-with criteria that required a 
clinician to identify a specific event as a cause of symptoms-that psychiatry 
unambiguously recognized a particular mental disorder as an injury attributable to 
exogenous forces, initially the horrors of war and later a wide range of distressing 
events. 
A. The Campaign for PTSD in DSM-III 
There is a striking irony in the history of psychiatry and the Vietnam War. In 
1967, some in the United States military claimed that the "incidence of 
neuropsychiatric illness"168 in Vietnam was markedly lower as compared to prior wars, 
165. Cole, supra note 158, at 361. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Page's theories. 
166. Brown, supra note 14, at431- 32. 
167. See Thompson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, 236 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Mo. Ct App. 1951) (noting that a 
psychoneurosis can be the basis of a workers' compensation award so long as a causal link to a workplace 
accident has been made); Bailey v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co , 2 79 S.W.2d 315, 316 (rex. 1955) (sustaining cause of 
action for "anxiety reaction" in a workers ' compensation case); Cole, supra note 158, at 361 (asserting that 
compensation neurosis was "tolerate[d]" in courts); Ramon A Von Drehle, Workmen 's Compensation­
Neuroses Unaccompanied by Physical Trauma Held Compensable, 34 TEx . L. REv. 496, 497 (1956) 
(describing awards ofworkers' compensation for psychoneurosis when there is a direct link with an accident). 
168. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 340. 
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and were confident that the problem of combat-induced psychoneurosis had been 
resolved.169 However, the war later served as the catalyst for bringing the notion of 
psychopathology induced by an identifiable external cause into the mainstream of both 
psychiatry and law. Once the lens of PTSD was in place, those initially optimistic 
assessments seemed sharply out of focus. The 1990 Vietnam Veterans Study concluded 
that between twenty-five and thirty-three percent of those who served in Vietnam met 
the criteria for PTSD at some point, and that, as of the date of the study, fifteen percent 
still met the criteria. 170 
The formal recognition of PTSD occurred at a time when American psychiatry 
was particularly concerned with diagnostic labels as it sought to overhaul its 
classification system. The APA published the first DSM in 1952 to create a 
standardized classification of diagnoses for use by clinicians.171 Prior to the release of 
the DSM, there were only a limited number of clinical psychiatric labels, which were 
generally limited to major mental illnesses seen in large public asylums.172 
After World War II, the spread of psychoanalytically-inclined psychiatry resulted 
in a great many more people being treated in the community who did not have the 
severe mental illnesses of those in the hospitals, creating a need for a broader range of 
diagnostic labels. Although the first edition of the DSM made significant strides 
towards addressing that need, it did not reflect a large consensus of psychiatrists. 173 The 
notion of "diagnostic criteria" was not in keeping with the psychodynamic approach 
that dominated American psychiatry at this time174 
The DSM-I did not include a term such as "traumatic neurosis" to reflect specific 
trauma-induced disorders. 175 Although it did include the diagnosis of "gross stress 
reaction," described as a "transient," situational personality disorder, this was 
essentially a short-term reactive disorder and not indicative of any underlying neurosis 
or psychosis.176 
169. See id (noting that an Army researcher stated "psychiatric casualties need never again become a 
major cause of attrition in the United States military in a combat zone"). 
170. Id 
171. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL: MENTAL DISORDERS (1st ed. 
1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]; SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 363. 
172. DSM-I, supra note 171, at v-vi; EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY : FROMTHE ERA OF 
THE A SYLUM TO THE AGE OF PROZAC 298 (1997); see also SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 363 (describing the 
prior status of diagnostic terminology). 
173. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 9 8; see also DSM-III, supra note 5, at 1 (reporting a new method of peer 
revision). Many of the labels were either a reflection of Adolf Meyer's biopsychosocial theory of mental 
disorder or based upon Freudian psychoanalytic practice. SHORTER, supra note 172, at 299. 
174. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 93. 
175. The initial diagnostic system established by the military had a category for "psychoneurotic 
disorders," but not a disorder specifically linked with exposure to trauma. Y oUNG, supranote 7, at 93. 
176. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 107; see SCOTT, supra note 67, at 32 (noting that the editors of D~l 
thought the disorder was "temporary" and normally disappeared in the absence of combat); SHEPHARD, supra 
note 10, at 364. 
DSA1-I defined the disorder as follows: 
OOO-x81 Gross stress reaction 
Under conditions ofgreat or unusual stress, a normal personality may utilize established patterns 
of reaction to deal with overwhelming fear. The patterns of such reactions differ from those of 
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The second edition of the DSM was published in 1968, during the height of the 
Vietnam War,177 and its editors aimed to be consistent with the International 
Classification ofDiseases178 The edition dropped "gross stress reaction" as a distinct 
diagnosis, and the editors suggested that the associated symptoms could be subsumed 
into the category "transient situational disturbances,"179 which consisted of "acute 
reaction[s] to overwhelming environmental stress" in adults "without any apparent 
underlying mental disorders."180 The symptoms would "usually recede as the stress 
diminishes" provided that the patient had "good adaptive capacity. "181 The subcategory 
of "[a]djustment reaction of adult life" encompassed "[f]ear associated with military 
combat and manifested by trembling, running and hiding."182 However, reflecting the 
hold that psychoanalytic schools maintained on American psychiatry, the broad notion 
of "neurosis," with its primary symptom being anxiety, remained in the manual,l83 in a 
category separate from the "transient situational disturbances. "184 
Thus, during the Vietnam War there was no diagnosis specifically tied to either 
combat or trauma, perhaps because that generation of DSM editors had not treated 
those with war neurosis185 The term "combat fatigue," a holdover from World War II, 
was sometimes used to describe the psychological effects of combat on soldiers, but it 
was not regarded as a true diagnostic label 186 This lack of a specific term equivalent to 
"shell shock" or "war neurosis" meant that, as veterans began to seek treatment and 
compensation for their persistent psychiatric difficulties, there was no diagnosis that 
neurosis or psychosis chiefly with respect to clinical history, reversibility of reaction, and its 
transient character. When promptly and adequately treated, the condition may clear rapidly. It is 
also possible that the condition may progress to one of the neurotic reactions. If the reaction 
persists, this term is to be regarded as a temporary diagnosis to be used only until a more definitive 
diagnosis is established. 
This diagnosis is justified only in situations in which the individual has been exposed to severe 
physical demands or extreme emotional stress, such as in combat or in civilian catastrophe (fire, 
earthquake, explosion, etc.). In many instances this diagnosis applies to previously more or less 
"normal" persons who have experienced intolerable stress. 
The particular stress involved will be specified as (1) combat or (2) civilian catastrophe. 
DSM-I, supra note 171, at 40. 
177. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 
1968) [hereinafter DSM-II]. 
178. Id. at vii; see International Classification of Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http ://www.who.int/classifications/ icd/en (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
179. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 33; see DSM-II, supra note 177, at 48-49 (identifYing "[a]djustrnent 
reaction of adult life" as a category of"[t]ransient situational distmbances" ). 
180. DSM-II, supra note 177, at 48. 
181. Id. at 48; YoUNG, supra note 7, at 107. 
182. DSM-II, supra note 177, at 49; see Wilson, supra note 62, at 690-91 (noting the "simplicity and 
inadequacy of these examples," particularly in light of the significant number of high-profile traumatic events 
that had occurred since the publication of DSM-I and the extensive research on psychological responses by that 
time). 
183. SHORTER, supra note 172, at 299. 
184. DSM-II, supra note 177, at 39-41. 
185. ScoTT, supra note 67, at 33; SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 364. 
186. See SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 349 (stating that combat fatigue, or combat exhaustion, was seen 
as a character or behavioral disorder, not actually a disease). 
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clearly captured their symptomatology. This created a substantial barrier to receiving 
medical care or benefits from the Veterans Administration (VA), since such care and 
benefits were available only for "service-connected" injuries 187 If the symptoms did 
not appear until at least a year after the veteran's discharge, the VA would not consider 
them to indicate a service-connected condition. 188 In the absence of a recognized 
diagnosis to capture the cluster of symptoms (and delayed onset) exhibited by many 
soldiers and veterans, military and VA psychiatrists diagnosed them with "character 
disorders" or schizophrenia, ruling out any "service-connected" disability 
compensation189 Therefore, the veterans and their advocates made it a goal to see that 
the next edition of the DSM included a diagnosis that would remedy this problem. 190 
The push to introduce a diagnosis that captured combat-related psychopathology 
began with a small organization called Vietnam Veterans Against the War, which held 
"rap groups" of veterans in New York City 191 The organization began working with 
two prominent psychoanalysts, Chaim Shatan and Robert Jay Lifton192 These 
discussions led to the founding of the National Veterans Resource Project193 The 
successful efforts to alter the listing of homosexuality in the then-draft edition of DSM 
signaled to the veterans and their supporters that any DSM listing could be the focus of 
debate and advocacy. 194 One major target of the advocacy for specialized treatment of 
Vietnam veterans was the VA, which was still oriented towards serving the veterans of 
World War II, as were other major institutions serving veterans (congressional 
committees and organizations like the Veterans of Foreign Wars) 195 The advocates' 
187. See id at 365 (explaining that the VA used the DSMII nomenclature which contained no diagnoses 
for "war-related trauma"). In an interview by Wilbur Scott, Chaim Shatan stated that he suspected that gross 
stress reaction was dropped specifically to reduce the potential financial liability of the VA. Sc oTT, supra note 
6 7, at 32 n.15. However, Scott's research did not uncover any specific reason for the omission of the diagnosis. 
Id. 
188. SCOTT, supra note 67 , at 52. 
189. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 350 (discussing abnormal official statistics reflecting increases in 
diagnoses of character disorders, and noting that the Army did not consider those disorders psychiatric 
diseases); Scott, supra note 5, at 298 (noting that many VA physicians concluded that veterans who appeared 
to be "agitated by their war experiences, or who talked repeatedly about them, suffered from a neurosis or 
psychosis \'.hose origin and dynamics lay outside the realm ofcombaf'). 
190. Id. at 365. 
191. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 355- 56; see ScoTT, supra note 67, at 14-15 (referring to the groups 
also as "rap sessions"). Sociologist Wilbur Scott' s thoroughly researched history of the efforts of veterans' 
rights advocates to gain recognition of PTSD, Vietnam Veterans Since the War (originally published as The 
Politics ofRea4justment), is regarded by many as the leading authority on this episode. See Baldwin et al., 
supra note 13, at 40 (noting that Scott' s body of work, including Vietnam Veterans Since the War, provides 
"one ofthe most detailed examinations" ofthe subject matter). 
192. SCOTT, supra note 67 , at 6; SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 355-56. 
193. SCOTT,supranote 67, at46; SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 357. 
194. See SCOTT, supra note 6 7, at 58 (indicating the homosexuality entry challenge created a large 
number of inquiries regarding revisions in DSJvl..II diagnoses list). 
195. See id at 52-54 (describing initial statutory efforts to introduce treatments specific to Vietnam 
veterans); SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 361-62 (detailing how the VA overcame political pressure to help 
Vietnam veterans and the efforts of advocates to effect change). 
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primary objective was to ensure that Vietnam veterans with continuing psychological 
difficulties could obtain health care and benefits from the agency196 
Shatan initially coined the missing diagnosis as "post-Vietnam syndrome,"197 
which he described as cluster of delayed-onset symptoms such as alienation, guilt, rage, 
the feeling of being scapegoated, and psychic numbing. 198 Shatan made no secret ofhis 
political goals with the diagnosis: "This is an opportunity to apply our professional 
expertise and anti-war sentiments to help some of those Americans who suffered most 
from the war. "199 
In making the case for Post-Vietnam Syndrome, Shatan and Lifton drew from 
post-war psychiatric literature about the Holocaust and Hiroshima200 In these contexts 
as well, the issues of psychological impact and compensation were closely tied. The 
West German government had a program to compensate concentration camp survivors, 
but only if a causal nexus could be established between the person' s experience and the 
psychiatric symptoms that persisted201 Around this time, Jewish psychoanalysts felt 
pressure to present research that, contrary to the claims of German psychiatrists, the 
psychological effects of trauma could last well beyond the traumatic event202 Such 
persistent symptoms were classified as "survivor syndrome," which was characterized 
by feelings of guilt as well as "depression, anxiety and nightrnares."203 As with the 
psychiatrists working with the veterans, those psychiatrists had taken on the dual roles 
ofmedical professionals and advocates204 
The timing of the campaign for the new diagnosis was significant. The DSM-111, 
which was finally published in 1980, embodies and reflects a revolution in 
psychiatry205 Specifically, it represents a power shift within psychiatry from those 
196. KUTCHINS &KlRK,supranote 105, at 100, 108-D9. 
197. SCOTT, supra note 67 , at 43. 
198. Id. at 43 (referencing Chaim Shatan, Post-Vietnam Syndrome , N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1972, at 35). 
199. ETHAN WATTERS, CRAZY LIKE Us : THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN P SYCHE 114 (201 0). 
200. SHEPHARD, supra note 1 0, at 361. 
201. Id at 359--60. 
202. Id at 360. 
203. Id 
204. Id at 360-61 The potential legal implications of the recognition of the llliique psychiatric impact on 
veterans was apparent from early on in the advocacy. A public defender in New York representing a Vietnam 
veteran in a destruction of property case tried unsuccessfully to assert a defense based upon "traumatic war 
neurosis." Sc oTT, supra note 67, at 58. The judge denied the defense on the basis that the diagnosis did not 
appear in the DSM-!1. Id The attorney appealed to Spitzer directly to find out if the DSMIII would 
reintroduce a diagnosis such as traumatic war neurosis and Spitzer informed him that "no change was 
planned." ld Noted attorney William Kunstler contacted Shatan in 1973 because he hoped to present a "post· 
Vietnam syndrome" defense for eight clients (known as the "Gainesville 8'') who were facing charges for 
planning to blow up the 1968 Democratic and Republican conventions. Id at 47 . The defendants were 
acquitted but apparently used no such defense. John Kifner, Defense is Short in Veterans Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Aug. 29, 1973, at 18; John Kifner, 8Acquittedin Gainesville ojG.O.P. Convention Plot, N.Y. TIMEs , Sept. 1, 
1973, at 1. 
205. See generally KUTCHINS & KlRK, supra note 105, at 1-16. See SHORTER, supra note 172, at 300­
302 (explaining how DSM·III marked the shift from using clinical criteria to using fixed scientific criteria to 
diagnose psychiatric conditions); Isaac R. Galatzer-Levy & Robert M. Galatzer-Levy , The Revolution in 
Psychiatric Diagnosis Problems at the Foundations, 50 P ERSP. BIO. & MED. 161, 161 (2007) (stating that 
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following psychoanalytic theory, which had dominated psychiatry (particularly in the 
United States for the previous half-century), to those associated with so-called 
biological psychiatry, which regards all psychiatric illness as having origins in brain 
chemistry and development206 The editors of DSM-III aimed to create a common 
language for not only clinicians but also for researchers to describe mental disorders in 
a way that did not require one to subscribe to any particular theoretical orientation207 
One of the editors' key objectives was to address the twin problems of the reliability 
(the extent to which examiners apply the same diagnosis to a set of symptoms) and 
validity (the extent to which a diagnosis reflects a "real" condition) in psychiatric 
diagnosis 208 
In a new approach, the editors adopted the basic framework of early twentieth 
century German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, considered to be the father of psychiatric 
nosology,2°9 in rejecting any diagnosis that did not have a basis in empirical findings. 
Each disorder was assigned a set of specific criteria to be used to assess patients and to 
assign diagnoses. Previously, the DSM had included only vague, brief descriptions of 
each disorder210 The classifications and criteria ultimately adopted in the DSM-III 
would be the result of field trials.211 To underscore the scrubbing of all whiffs of 
Freudianism, notions of the "unconscious" (and other invisible mechanisms) would be 
absent from the manual,212 and the editors were careful to note that the term "neurotic 
disorder" did not implicate any "special etiological process. "213 
At first, the lead editor of the DSM-III, Robert Spitzer, rejected the call for the 
new "post-combat disorder" diagnosis as unnecessary based upon the recommendations 
of other researchers studying the psychological problems of Vietnam veterans; a 
campaign to reverse this position was underway soon thereafter214 The advocates' key 
ally within the psychiatric establishment was psychoanalyst Mardi Horowitz, who had 
by this time developed an extensive theory, based largely upon the work of Freud, 
DSMIII "not only revolutionized psychiatric diagnosis" but also "transformed and dominated American 
psychiatry"). 
206. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 363--{)4 (providing historical examples of biological manifestations of 
psychological illness); SHORTER, supra note 172, at 239, 300--{)2 (summarizing trend in 1970s toward 
biological psychiatry). 
207. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 94, 99. 
208. STUART A. KIRK & HERB KUTCHINS, THE SELLING OF DSM: T HE RHETORlC OF SCIENCE IN 
PSYCHIATRY 28-32 (1992); Alix Spiegel, The Dictionary of Disorder How One Mcm Revolutionized 
Psychiatry, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 56,57-58. 
209. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 95-96, 99 (describing Kraepelin's pioneering work with psychiatric 
nosology). 
210. See SHORTER, supra note 172, at 301--{)2 (noting the increased length and detail of DSMIII as 
compared to previous DSMeditions). 
211. DSM-III,supranote 5, at4-5; SHORTER, supra note 172, at 302; YOUNG, supra note 7, at 95. 
212. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 100. 
213. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 9-10 (emphasis omitted); see also SHORTER, supra note 172, at 304 
(explaining that the editors of DSMIII differentiated between "neurosis" and a "neurotic process" in order to 
appease major interest group of psychoanalysts). Apparently, DSMIII retained the term "neurosis" (which 
Spitzer had attempted to strike out) only as a compromise to the psychoanalytic camp, who otherwise would 
have refused to approve the new manual. Spiegel, supra note 208, at 60--{)1. 
214. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 60-61; YoUNG, supra note 7, at 109--10. 
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Kardiner, and others, about "stress response syndromes. "215 Horowitz described a 
number of different reactions to traumatic stress, including avoidance of things 
associated with the events (including memories) and "intrusive" effects when the 
memories nonetheless caused a reexperiencing of the events, both of which Kardiner 
had described in his studies of World War I veterans216 Although the number of acute 
psychiatric casualties initially appeared to be lower in Vietnam,217 some officials noted 
the impact of "stress" on soldiers during their one-year stints218 Towards the end of the 
war, Horowitz predicted a high incidence of delayed-onset psychiatric reactions or 
"stress response syndromes" by soldiers 219 
The advocates of the new diagnosis were careful not to limit it to combat 
reactions, but rather applied it to a broad category of individuals exposed to 
"trauma."220 In their work with the APA, they revised the name of the proposed 
diagnosis to "catastrophic stress disorder," with a sub-type of "post-combat stress 
reactions. "221 The symptom list for the initial formulation of PTSD developed by 
Shatan, Lifton, and Horowitz222 was largely taken from Abram Kardiner' s The 
Traumatic Neuroses oJWar223 Together, these psychiatrists refined a "unitary kind of 
'trauma"' that was ultimately embodied in the diagnostic criteria of PTSD224 It drew 
heavily on Freudian theory about the emotional impact of repressed memories of earlier 
traumatic events: 225 the pathogenic memory226 They expressly stated that there were 
215. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 367; see also Sc o TT, supra note 67, at 62 (describing Horowitz's role 
with Vietnam Veterans Working Group). 
216. Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 172. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text for a 
discussion ofKardiner's wmk regarding the long-term psychological impact of war. 
217. ScoTT, supra note 67, at 33. 
218. See SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 349 (describing how Army physicians in Vietnam measured the 
effects of stressful military activities). 
219. See generally Mardi J. Horowitz & George F. Solomon, A Prediction ofDelayed Sfl'ess Response 
Syndromes in Vietnam Veterans, 31 J. So c . Is s UEs 67 (1975). The delay was attributed to the widespread use 
of both illicit drugs, such as heroin, as well as tranquillizers, such as chlorpromazine, both widely available. 
SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 351-53. 
220. See SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 366 (noting that "Shafton, Lifton and their allies" began to look at 
post-combat disorder as a sub-class of a more general phenomenon, and thus began reviewing "literature of 
catastrophes in general"). 
221. SCOTT, supra note 67 , at 64. 
222. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 367. 
223. Yo UNG, supra note 7, at 89, 91. 
224. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 367. 
225. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 105, at 114; see also Marilyn L. Bowman, Problems Inherent to the 
Diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in PsYCHOLOGICAL INJURlES AT TRIAL 820, 821 (Izabela Z. 
Schultz & Douglas 0. Brady eds., 2003) (Am. Bar Ass 'n CD-ROM) (describing the relationship between 
Freud's theory regarding "conflict-laden early experiences" and modern views of adult emotional disorders); 
Mardi J. Horowitz, Introduction to EsSENTIAL PAPERS ON POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1, 3 (Mardi J. 
Horowitz ed., 1999) (explaining that posttraumatic symptoms derive from the Freudian theory of shock 
mastery); Wilson, supra note 62, at 691 (noting that the PTSD diagnostic criteria in DSMIII reflect Freud's 
observations about the impact of trauma on human emotion, cognitive processes, ambition, relationships, and 
"physiological functioning"). 
226. See supra notes 53--{)6 and accompanying text for a discussion of theories that indicate the 
pathogenic memory plays a role in psychoneurosis. 
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no predisposing factors, other than the exposure to the traumatic event227 However, 
this description contained more etiology than the editors could tolerate. They responded 
that but for the link with a specified event the symptoms could be found in other 
conditions, and therefore the diagnosis was unnecessary 228 
The sole empirical support for the proposed diagnosis that Shatan and Lifton 
could offer was anecdotal evidence that some VA doctors had been noting "traumatic 
war neurosis" on patient charts for years in the absence of a recognized diagnosis 229 
Although this was not the type of empirical data that Spitzer aspired to have as the sole 
basis for the DSM-111 diagnoses,230 these case histories had a significant impact on 
Nancy Andreasen, the chair of the DSM-111 Committee on Reactive Disorders and a 
psychiatrist within the APA mainstream who had worked on the psychological impact 
of trauma, specifically with burn victims. 231 However, what was perhaps more 
convincing for those within the APA was the "moral" case for including the 
diagnosis.232 By adopting the diagnosis, the psychiatric establishment would help 
eliminate one of the key barriers to veterans' access to compensation and health care 
for their mental troubles. To do otherwise would leave the responsibility on the 
shoulders of the veterans themselves233 
The final name and criteria for PTSD emerged from the Committee on Reactive 
Disorders, and it largely followed the recommendation of Lifton, Shatan, and others on 
the working group that had developed the "catastrophic stress disorder" diagnosis, 
changing little other than the name of the diagnosis and eliminating the "post-combat" 
subtype234 It was placed within the "Anxiety Disorders,"235 and its "essential feature" 
was described as "the development of characteristic symptoms following a 
psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human 
experience. "236 The "characteristic symptoms" were "reexperiencing the traumatic 
event; numbing of responsiveness to, or reduced involvement with, the external world; 
227. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 367; ScoTI, supra note 67, at 64. 
228. YoUNG, supra note 7, at ll 0. 
229. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 34, 62-63; see also YOUNG, supra note 7, at 1ll (noting the significance 
ofthe Vietnam War in defming PTSD in the DSM-11!). 
230. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 105, at 114; see also Thomas Maier, Post-Traumalic Stress Disorder 
Revisited Deconstructing the A-Criterion, 66 MED. H YPOTHESES 103, 103-104 (2006) (noting that although 
PTSD did not emerge from a traditional "Popperian view of scientific progress," it is a good example of a 
"paradigm shift" as that term was used by Thomas Kuhn to describe "how scientific progress is never 
exclusively guided by empiric observations, but by theoretical concepts derived from highly selective 
observations"). 
231. See ScoTT, supra note 67, at 61-63 (indicating that a working group advocating for a category of 
"combat-induced disorder" felt "that they had won Andreasen over" with regard to their views). 
232. YOUNG, supra note 7 , at 114; see also KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 105, at ll6 (explaining that 
approval of PTSD was based largely on "demonstrating that victims suffer from impairments even if they do 
not show signs ofdebilitating physical trauma"). 
233. YOUNG, supra note 7, at ll4 (stating that failing to put PTSD in the DSMII1 would mean "denying 
medical care and compensation" to veterans and that "(a]cknowledging PTSD would be a small step toward 
repaying a debt" to young soldiers who sacrificed their youth in Vietnam). 
234. SCOTT, supra note 67 , at 66. 
235. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 225. 
236. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 236. 
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and a variety of autonomic, dysphoric, or cognitive symptoms. "237 The criteria 
differentiated between "acute" PTSD, with an onset within six months of the trauma 
and a duration of less than six months, and "chronic or delayed" PTSD, which had 
either or both an onset of more than six months or duration longer than six months 238 
In short, the diagnosis appeared to provide the veterans precisely what they needed to 
pursue claims for compensation and care. 
B. The A Criterion 
The publication of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD in the DSM-III marked a 
significant moment in the history of both psychiatric diagnosis and legal claims for 
psychological injuries. PTSD provided psychiatry with a means to classify a 
psychological injury that developed "in normal people following an extremely 
traumatic event."239 Accordingly, unlike the remainder of DSM-III diagnoses, the 
criteria for PTSD were not "atheoretical," as that term is employed in psychiatric 
nosology240 Specifically, the list of diagnostic criteria for the disorder includes the "A 
Criterion" (also commonly referred to as the "stressor criterion"), which, inDSM-III, is 
described as "a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of distress 
in almost everyone. "241 As described in the explanatory text, the diagnosis required the 
prior occurrence of a specific etiological event "outside the range of usual human 
experience" that would create "significant symptoms of distress in most people. "242 In 
other words, the diagnosis itself contains a theory of the etiology of the symptoms. 
Robert Spitzer has acknowledged this to be the case: "[A] key distinguishing feature of 
PTSD is that it is not agnostic to etiology. Unlike virtually all diagnoses in the [DSM], 
PTSD rests on the assumption of a specific etiology, whereby a distinct set of events 
(criterion A) is assumed to be the uniformly most potent contributor to outcome."243 
237. Id The text also states that "[p]reexisting psychopathology apparently predisposes to the 
development of the disorder." Id. at 237. This language regarding predisposition seems at variance with Scott's 
description of the committee report that was the basis for the final diagnosis , but he provides no explanation 
for its inclusion in the DSMIII. 
238. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 238. There is no reference in the main text to the concept of "traumatic 
neurosis" or any other similar diagnostic labels that had been used (and were still in use) to describe 
psychological injuries. Baldwin et al, supra note 13, at 41. This is likely because the term was never accepted 
as part of any official psychiatric nosology. 
239. Rachel Yehuda & Alexander C. McFarlane, Confli ct Between CJnrent Knowledge Ahout 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder andIts Original Conceptual Basis, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1705, 1706 (1995). 
240. "Atheoretical" refers to an absence of an assigned specific theory for the cause of a mental disorder. 
See Dorthe Berntsen et al., Contrasting Models of Posttraumatic Stress Disorckr Reply to lvkmroe and 
Mineka, 115 P SYCHOL. REv. 1099, 1099-1100 (2008) (discussing how the PTSD diagnosis formed an 
exception to the absence of etiology throughout DSM-111); YoUNG, supra note 7, at 115 (providing a further 
explanation ofthe term "atheoretical'' in this context and his application of the term to PTSD and the DSM). 
241. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 238. 
242. Id at 236. 
243. Robert L. Spitzer et al., Editorial, Revisiting the Institute of Medicine Report on the Validity of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 49 COMPREHENSIVE PsYCHIATRY 319, 319 (2008); see also DSM-III, supra 
note 5, at 7 ("DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology ...."); Gerald M. Rosen & Scott 0. Lilienfeld, 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder An Empirical Evaluation of Core Assumptions, 28 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 
837, 839 (2008) (reiterating that the "core assumption" ofPTSD is the causal connection between a traumatic 
event and the ensuing series of reactions). 
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Similarly, the Institute of Medicine's recent analysis of PTSD observed that "the 
necessary cause of PTSD is by definition a traumatic event. "244 
The A Criterion has been described as the "gatekeeper"245 and the "defining 
feature"246 of the diagnosis because the "DSM theory of PTSD" is that "time and 
causality move from the traumatic event to the other criteria! features. "247 Absent "the 
event," the symptomatology would be assigned a different diagnosis. Once the event is 
identified and deemed to fit within the A Criterion definition of "traumatic," the 
symptoms are transformed into markers of PTSD248 DSM-III also set forth a specific 
list of symptoms or reactions to the A Criterion event, and it distinguished between 
reactions that had an onset soon after the event and those that were latent, occurring 
more than six months after the event249 A key feature in the symptom cluster described 
in DSM-III is the role of memory and dissociative experiences such as "flashbacks."250 
In other words, the past remains very much in the person's present and is the subject of 
"persistent reexperienc[ing]. "251 
The new diagnosis therefore "violated basic guidelines about theory and research 
that had been established for the DSM-III," and, most notably, the editors' attempts ''to 
eliminate etiology from their description of disorders. "252 At the time of the first 
iteration of PTSD, there was a controversy over whether the event, as opposed to a 
person's predisposition, should be regarded as the primary cause of the symptoms 253 
PTSD, as it finally appeared, reflected a break from the way traumatic neurosis and 
244. Spitzer et al., supra note 243, at 319 (quoting lNST. OF l\1ED., P OSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: 
DIAGNOSIS AND ASSESSMENT 23 (2006)). 
245. Robert I. Simon, Forensic Psychialric Assessment ofPTSD Claimants, in P OSTTRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER IN LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT 41, 57 (Robert I. Simon ed., 2d ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter PTSD IN LITIGATION]. 
246. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 120. 
247. I d. at 115. 
248. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 120; Baldwin eta!, supra note 13, at 44. 
249. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 238-39. 
250. Edgar Jones et al., Flashbacks and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder The Genesis ofa20th-Centwy 
Diagnosis, 182 BRIT. J. PsYCHIATRY 158, 160 (2003). The term "flashback" was not directly mentioned in the 
DSMIII, but was included as a synonym for some PTSD symptoms in the DSMIII-R. Id 
251. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass' N, D IAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF :MENTAL DISORDERS 250 (3d 
ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]; see Jones et al., supra note 250, at 160 (stating that soldiers were 
" reliving episodes from ... active service"). This is at variance from the notion of the transformation of 
repressed memories into internal conflicts as a result of subsequent events in the person ' s life. See Jones et al., 
supra note 250, at 160 (discussing the idea that "certain experiences, which are neither salient nor meaningful 
when they occur, acquire an emotional potency or importance by an additional piece of information" and, in a 
sense, "a normal recollection of an event becomes transformed into a disturbing and highly significant 
memory. " ). 
252. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 105, at 114. Strictly speaking, the category of "Substance Use 
Disorders" could arguably include a link to causation since the category "deals with behavioral changes 
associated with more or less regular use of substances that affect the central nervous system." DSM-III , supra 
note 5, at 163; Correspondence from David Rubin to Deirdre M. Smith, Prof. of Law and G lassman Scholar, 
University ofMaine School of Law (July 29, 2010) (on file with author). However, psychiatry does not appear 
to regard such association as having a basis in a "theory," in the same respect as PTSD's link with traumatic 
events. 
253. Berntsen et al.,supranote 240, at 1100. 
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similar conditions were viewed in that the persistence of the symptoms was not 
regarded as being due to an individual' s inability to adapt 254 The drafters of PTSD 
considered what they assumed to be the legal implications of this debate; as Horowitz 
later recalled: "If trauma were the main cause of symptoms, the institutions or people 
responsible for causing or not preventing the traumatic events could be held legally 
responsible for damage to victims."255 
The explanatory text accompanying the original PTSD criteria provided several 
examples of the kinds of traumatic events that meet the A Criterion (rape, military 
combat, floods, earthquakes, plane crashes, torture), and notes: "The disorder is 
apparently more severe and longer lasting when the stressor is of human design. "256 
One psychiatrist explained the rationale for this observation as follows: "Stressors 
caused by man appear to have a greater traumatic impact than natural events. The 
injured person usually feels that a manmade stressor is preventable, whereas natural 
disasters are unavoidable acts of God. Feelings of rage, retribution, and vengeance are 
commonly experienced."257 In other words, categories of trauma for whom another 
person (whether natural or corporate) could be held responsible were assumed to be 
most likely to result in reactions like PTSD. 
Notions about legal obligation thus drove the specific criteria of PTSD. In order 
for the veterans to be able to claim entitlement to "service-connected" benefits the 
proponents of the diagnosis concluded that such "connection" to military service 
needed to be built into the diagnosis. By framing the condition as it did, the DSM-III 
made it unquestionably clear that those who were previously psychiatrically healthy 
could suffer severe functional limitations as a result of being exposed to traumatic 
stress that was not of their own making. Thus, we see a diagnosis that embodies a shift 
of responsibility from one to another, or at least away from the patient. Without such a 
feature embodied in A Criterion, PTSD would have emerged in 1980 looking like all of 
the other DSM-III diagnoses, or more likely, it would not have emerged at all since its 
symptoms overlap with other disorders in the manual. 
With a diagnosis built around their experiences, veterans were indeed more 
successful in obtaining not only health coverage and disability benefits but also 
validation from the United States Government itself that they had endured an 
experience that transformed a "normal" person into one who was ill and in need of care 
and compassion. With PTSD cast as it was, there was little room for debate that its 
occurrence in Vietnam veterans was "service-connected," and therefore the veterans 
with such diagnosis would be among those receiving ''top priority" care and 
compensation258 Once PTSD was accepted for inclusion in the DSM, the veterans 
advocacy groups took the next step and successfully lobbied the Senate Veterans 
Affairs Committee to issue a report authorizing the VA to recognize and compensate 
PTSD in Vietnam veterans 2 59 
254. Id 
255. Horowitz, supra note 225, at 1. 
256. DSM-III, supra note 5, at 236. 
257. Simon, supra note 245, at 57. 
258. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 113. 
259. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 114. 
32 	 TEMPLE L4W REVIEW [Vol. 84 
There have been two revisions to the A Criterion since its initial inclusion in the 
DSM-1II in 1980. In 1987, with the publication of the revised edition of the Third 
Edition, DSM-111-R, the APA revised the criterion as follows: 
The essential feature of this disorder is the development of characteristic 
symptoms following a psychologically distressing event that is outside the 
range of usual human experience . . . [and] would be markedly distressing 
to almost anyone . 
The most common traumata involve either a serious threat to one's life or 
physical integrity; a serious threat or harm to one's children, spouse, or other 
close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one's home or community; 
or seeing another person who has recently been, or is being, seriously injured 
or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence. In some cases the 
trauma may be learning about a serious threat or harm to a close friend or 
relative, e.g., that one's child has been kidnapped, tortured, or killed 260 
This revision moved some of the explanatory description into the criterion itself 
(with minor rewording), and provided a list of examples of the kinds of events that 
would be considered "outside the range of human experience" and "markedly 
distressing to almost anyone. "261 The aim of this revision was to address the problem of 
different individuals having different "stress thresholds."262 The editors had hoped that 
providing the list of examples would clarify that the A Criterion stressors were "at the 
extreme end of the stress continuum," since it was assumed that the more "severe and 
life-threatening" events would be more likely to produce psychopathology such as 
PTSD263 
The APA revised the diagnostic criteria for PTSD for a second time in 1994264 
For theDSM-1V, the APA divided the A Criterion into two parts: 
A. 	The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the 
following were present: 
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or 
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a 
threat to the physical integrity of self or others 
(2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror265 
These changes broadened the criterion to allow a wider range of events and 
experiences to quality for the criterion and also introduced a subjective component266 
260. DSM-III-R.,supranote 251, at 247-48. 
261. Id at 247. 
262. Wilson, supra note 62, at 694. 
263. Id Wilson was on the committee that recommended the revisions. 
264. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 427-29 
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
265. Id at 427-48. The DSA1-IV also added a new disorder, "Acute Stress Disorder," which was also 
premised on the occurrence of a traumatic event, but, unlike PTSD, could be diagnosed within four weeks after 
the traumatic event to classifY an individual's immediate emotional reaction. Id. at 429--32; see also KUTCHINS 
& KIRK, supra note 105, at 117-18 (providing an overview of the new Acute Distress Disorder diagnosis). 
266. See Naomi Breslau & Ronald C. Kessler, The StJ'essor Criterion in DSA1-JV PosttJ'munaJic Stress 
Disorder An Empirical Investigation, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 699, 700, 703-704 (2001) (concluding 
that there was "no doubt that the intent [ofthe revision of Criteria A in the DSMIVJ was to enlarge the variety 
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DSM-IV eliminated the "normative criterion of the 'average' person," by removing the 
reference to "almost anyone."267 The revisions also removed the reference to the event 
being "markedly distressing" to the average person without specifying when such 
distress occurs-whether at the time of the event or in the recollection of it268 
There was also no longer a reference to events being "outside the range of usual 
human experience. "269 This revision ostensibly conformed the language of the criteria 
to its use in practice27 °Clinicians frequently disregarded the original phrasing in that 
they did not attempt to determine the actual frequency of such events or the appropriate 
context for such analysis 271 For example, among Vietnam veterans, exposure to death 
and dismemberment was not unusual. Sexual assault is not infrequent, particularly in 
certain cultures or locations272 And clinicians did not hesitate to diagnose PTSD in war 
veterans or rape survivors. However, some commentators have claimed that the DSM­
IV revision to the A Criterion resulted in a substantial increase in people diagnosed 
with PTSD.273 
The revisions to PTSD and the A Criterion did not silence the critics within 
psychiatry who questioned the validity and utility of having a disorder in the DSM 
linked categorically to a specific and identifiable cause rather than being no more than 
a set of frequently coexisting symptoms. In fact, the expanded range of potential 
stressor events, coupled with the contemporaneous increase in the forensic use of 
PTSD as discussed in the next Part, only served to fuel the debate. 
of experiences that can be used to diagnose PTSD" and that "the population's total life experiences that can be 
used to diagnose PTSD has increased materially by 59.2o/o"); Maier, supra note 230, at 105 (discussing 
changes in PTSD diagnosis from DSMIII to DSMVI); Simon, supra note 245, at 57 (discussing new language 
in DS!If-IVdiagnosis). 
267. Simon, supra note 245, at 59. Compare DSM-IV, supra note 264, at 427 (requiring "the person 
experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or 
serious injury , or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others"), with DSM-III, supra note 5, at 238 
(requiring "[e)xistence of recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of distress in ahnost 
everyone"). Some studies suggest that clinicians generally waived that requirement even prior to the 
amendment. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 124. 
268. Yo UNG, supra note 7, at 124-25. Freud and others made a link between the experience offear at the 
time ofthe event and the causation of traumatic neurosis. Id at 125. 
269. KUTCHINS &KIRK, supranote 105, at 118 (quoting DSM-III-R, supranote 251, at 247). 
270. See YOUNG, supra note 7 , at 127 (comparing DSMIII-R's literal meaning of traumatic event and 
actual diagnostic practice of PTSD). This revision is somewhat similar to the distinction between intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress , where the former was more 
readily accepted by courts because it required a showing of conduct so "extreme and outrageous" that the 
plaintiffs resulting emotional distress was not suspect. See supra notes 127- 56 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of emotional injury and liability. 
271. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 127. 
272. KUTCHINS &KIRK, supranote 105, at 118. 
273. Id. at 121. One study suggested a fifty percent expansion in those diagnosed after this revision. LISA 
APP!GNANESI, M AD, BAD AND SAD : A HISTORY OF W OMEN AND THE MIND DOCTORS 427 (2007); JUDITH 
HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE-fROM D OMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL 
TERROR 427 (rev. ed. 1997) (1992). Harvard psychiatrist Judith Herman, one ofthe leading figures in the effort 
to apply the PTSD diagnosis to women who had experienced sexual assault, sexual abuse, domestic violence, 
and other forms ofviolence, served on the APA committee that advanced the amendments. HERMAN, supra, at 
426--27. 
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IV. PTSD AND QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY 
Once the psychiatric establishment fully embraced the concept of a psychological 
injury by adopting PTSD in DSM-III, attorneys began to explore potential uses of this 
diagnosis in a wide range of settings in which the key question was how to assign 
responsibility, whether civil or criminal. In some respects, this was the continuation of 
the strategy used with the nonclinical term "traumatic neurosis," but it came at a time 
when there was also a turning point in law regarding the role of psychiatric diagnosis in 
legal proceedings. This change was due in large part to the fact that DSM-Ill was the 
first edition of the manual to have widespread use beyond the psychiatric profession. 
Psychiatric diagnosis itself had a new and central role in litigation that touched on 
mental issues, and the DSM-Ilrs code-like structure and ostensible "scientific" basis 
eased the way for the diagnoses themselves to be evidence in litigation. 
As noted in Part III, the DSM-III marked a revolutionary moment in the history of 
psychiatry274 Beginning with that edition, the DSM had remarkable impact. It is 
referred to by some as a "bible,"275 by others as a "consensus document." 276 It is used 
universally throughout the psychiatric profession in the United States and in a great 
deal of the rest of the world277 However, its true power comes from its wide adoption 
outside of the mental health profession, in a range of institutional, educational, and 
administrative settings. The legal system is one such institution that has widely 
incorporated use of the DSM278 Philosopher Ian Hacking, who writes about the 
interactions between science (including psychiatry) and the wider culture, observes 
that, although we assume that the classifications we create merely reflect what is there, 
such classifications in fact shape the systems that use them and the people within that 
system, creating a "looping effect."279 PTSD's influence on the legal system serves as 
an example of this effect. 
Although the APA certainly was aware that recognition of PTSD would yield 
immediate benefits for countless Vietnam veterans, the editors of DSM-III apparently 
anticipated the appeal the manual as a whole would hold for the legal system. Near the 
274. KUTCHINS &KIRK, supra note 105, at 5. 
275. Id 
276. Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Some Issues in Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Law, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1197-98 (2008); see also Abilash Gopal & Harold Bursztajn, On Skepticism and 
Tolerance in Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry, P sYCHIATRIC TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007 , at 2 (noting that some 
"ill,trained attorneys" erroneously believe that the DSMis the "bible of psychiatry" or that psychiatry "can be 
practiced from a cookbook"). 
277. See KUTCIDNS & KIRK, supra note 1 05, at 1 Q-12 (remarking that every mental health professional 
owns a copy of the DSM, and the DSMhas had a broad impact on other sectors of life); SHORTER, supra note 
172, at 302 (noting that, by the early 1990s, the DSMhad been translated into more than twenty languages and 
it was being used widely in France and Germany; "[t]he appearance of DSM-III was thus an event of capital 
importance not just for American but for world psychiatry"). 
278. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 1 05, at 11-12; see also Greenberg et al., supra note 6, at 7 (noting 
that the DSM"has become a forensic mantra"). 
279. Ian Hacking, Kinds ofPeople Moving Targets, 151 PRo c . BRIT. ACAD. 285, 285-86 (2006); see 
also YoUNG, supra note 7, at 107 (explaining that diagnostic technologies like the DSMIII "are an integral 
part of the historical formation of some of the disorders (including PTSD) that they now identifY and 
represent" ). 
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end of his introduction to DSM-III, lead editor Robert Spitzer included a brief 
paragraph titled "Cautions," which stated: 
The purpose of DSM-III is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic 
categories in order to enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, 
communicate about, study, and treat various mental disorders. The use of 
this manual for non-clinical purposes, such as determination of legal 
responsibility, competency or insanity, or justification for third-party 
payment, must be critically examined in each instance within the appropriate 
institutional context280 
However, the nonclinical and nonresearch uses of DSM-III, and specifically 
PTSD, were soon widespread in the legal system with scant little of the critical 
examination urged by Spitzer. Indeed, perhaps in response to this trend, the editors' 
caution has grown more emphatic with each new edition oftheDSM, to little avaiP81 
PTSD has had many applications in the law in a wide range of contexts, including 
criminal law (with respect to defenses and sentencing)282 and workers' 
compensation283 However, the discussion here will focus on two contexts in which 
courts have permitted PTSD, and particularly the A Criterion, to take a critical role in 
establishing liability: (1) to prove that a criminal complainant or civil plaintiff was 
subjected to a traumatic event, such as child sexual abuse; and (2) in tort cases, to 
establish liability for stand-alone claims for emotional distress. As one psychiatrist 
noted, PTSD is particularly powerful in legal settings because it " carries a legal and 
moral implication that someone else is responsible for an event so overwhelming that 
anyone could develop a potentially severe psychiatric disorder as a result. "284 Such 
280. DSM-III,supranote 5, at 12. 
281. Greenberg et al.,supranote 6, at 6. 
282. See, e.g., Coggin v. State, 745 P.2d 1182, 1184-ES (Okl. Crim. App. 1987) (describing expert 
testimony offered by defendant, which indicated that the night of the murder certain events had "triggered a 
'flashback' to Vietnam which put the appellant in a disassociative state" and the defendant "did not remember 
stabbing the victim"); State v. Miller, No. 48316, 1984 WL 6384, at * 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1984) 
(describing expert testimony offered by defendant that the victim ' s attack "caused [defendant] to flash back to 
Vietnam" and he had no memory of the murder); see also Daniel W. Shuman, Persistent Reexperiences in 
Psychiatry and Law, in PTSD rn LITIGATION, supra note 245, at 1, 9 (noting various uses of PTSD as a 
criminal defense strategy); Michael J. Davidson, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder A Controversial Defense for 
Veterans ofa Controversial War, 29 W M. & MARY L. REv. 415, 422-40 (1988) (discussing use of PTSD as 
defense in criminal prosecutions involving Vietnam veteran defendants); John 0. Lipkin et al., Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder in Vietnam Veterans Assessment in a Forensic Setting, 1 B EHAV. SCI. & L. 51, 63-64 (1983) 
(discussing connection between criminal behavior and PTSD symptoms). 
283. PTSD resulted in an expansion of recovery of workers' compensation benefits for employees who 
demonstrated psychological injuries from their workplaces. Much like the veterans who asserted "service­
connected" injuries arising from their combat, employees attempted to analogize their workplace to traumatic 
stressors and to seek compensation for work-related mental injuries. See generally, Izabela Z. Schultz, 
Psychological Causality Determination in Personal Injury and Workers' Compensation Contexts, in 
PSYCHOWGICAL INJURlES AT TRIAL, supra note 229, at 102. In one remarkable case, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona permitted a police officer to pursue a workers' compensation claim for PTSD, resulting from an 
incident in which he was shot nearly twenty-four years prior to the 1984 filing date. Henry v. Indus. Comm'n 
of Ariz., 754 P.2d 1342, 1344-45 (Ariz. 1988). The court permitted such a claim on the basis that PTSD was 
"not diagnosable" in 1960 when the incident occurred. Id. 
284. Liza H. Gold, PTSD in Employment Litigation, in PTSD rn LITIGATION, supra note 245, at 163, 
164. 
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power is particularly apparent in these two contexts because the fact of the medical 
diagnosis is assigned a role in the determination of /ega/liability. 
A. The Fact ofthe Traumatic Event 
With the recognition of PTSD by the APA, Vietnam veterans began using the 
diagnosis in the criminal law as part of defenses or in seeking lighter sentences. 
However, PTSD's impact in criminal settings attracted more notice when prosecutors 
began using the diagnosis in criminal trials for sexual assault and child sexual abuse. 
Prosecutors have long faced "distinctive evidentiary problems" when prosecuting child 
sexual abuse cases because generally the only witness is the child complainant285 The 
child may be particularly young or inarticulate, either of which could implicate 
problems of competency or credibility. Similarly, in rape prosecutions, the key factual 
disputes often turn on the credibility of the complainant286 In both cases, there is often 
little other evidence to corroborate the complainant's allegations. The recognition of 
PTSD by the APA suggested new potential strategies to address these challenges. 
Soon after the release ofDSM-III, prosecutors sought to offer testimony through 
psychological experts centered on the theory and criteria of PTSD to opine that the 
complainant's behavior was consistent with having been sexually abused or assaulted, 
and, from that assessment, to opine that the complainant in fact had been sexually 
abused287 or assaulted288 PTSD and the "traumatic stress model" of child sexual abuse 
were useful due to ''the unequaled etiological significance [PTSD] placed on 'outside' 
(external to psyche) trauma."289 Such experts generally employed the criteria or general 
concept of PTSD, but some also used terms such as "child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome" (CSAAS)290 or ''rape trauma syndrome" (RTS) 291 Such 
uses of the DSM and PTSD were met with fierce resistance from defense attorneys, and 
courts struggled with the question of whether to admit such evidence and for what 
285. Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in 
Child SexualAhuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDozo L. REv . 2027,2033 (1994). 
286. See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years ofRape Reform A Frustrating Search for 
Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REv. 981, 1016--17 (2008) (explaining that a major reform in rape 
prosecutions deals with "weaknesses in the prosecutor's case arising from victim conduct which appears to be 
inconsistent with that of an individual who had just been sexually assaulted"). 
287. Askowitz & Graham, supra note 285, at 2046; see also SUSAN A. CLANCY, THE TRAUMA MYTH: 
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN-AND ITS AFTERMATH 100--101 (2009) (discussing the 
introduction of sexual abuse as a traumatic event in order to conceptualize the harm endured by a victim as a 
form ofPTSD). 
288. Klein, supra note 286, at 1016--1 7. 
289. CLANCY, supra note 287, at 101. 
290. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 353 S.E.2d 805, 807-{)8 (Ga. 1987) (admitting testimony from an expert 
on child sexual abuse syndrome who discussed the behavioral characteristics and the stages an alleged victim 
goes through), superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-110 (y.lest 2011), as recognized in Park v. State, 
495 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
291. People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 132 (N.Y. 1990); Ann Wolbert Burgess, Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, 1 BEHAV. Scr. & L. 97, 98 (1983); see aLso State v. Allewalt (Aile walt If) , 517 A.2d 741, 754 (Md. 
1986) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (reviewing the origin of the term "rape trauma syndrome" and noting that it is 
recognized as "a sub-category of post-traumatic stress disorder in which the triggering trauma is rape" ). 
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purposes. A significant body of case law, with a wide variety of approaches, developed 
in the first twenty years after PTSD was recognized. 
The least controversial use of such PTSD evidence is on rebuttal to rehabilitate 
the complainant after impeachment by offering possible alternative reasons (based 
upon the diagnoses) for the person to have acted in a manner that, on the surface, would 
appear to be inconsistent with being a victim of rape or sexual abuse 292 Courts have 
been significantly more conflicted, however, on the issue of whether to admit during a 
prosecutor's case in chief expert testimony that the complainant had PTSD symptoms 
for the purposes of establishing that the person had been a victim of rape or abuse293 
The prosecution would offer an expert to testifY that the alleged victim displayed 
"typical" or hallmark symptoms of these syndromes indicating that the victims had 
experienced trauma consistent with that alleged by the prosecution294 
Courts have been sharply divided on the admissibility of such evidence 295 One 
court that upheld the admission of such evidence concluded that, since the incidence of 
PTSD in an individual "indicates that she might have been sexually abused," such 
evidence is probative of one of the central questions in these cases, even if the evidence 
is not being offered in response to an issue raised by the defense 296 Other courts that 
have admitted such evidence reasoned that it was not being admitted to prove that a 
crime had been committed but rather only to help the jury understand the behavior of 
sexually abused children297 or to negate suggestions or defenses of consent298 The 
excluding courts' concern with admitting PTSD testimony for such purposes, even if 
not articulated precisely this way, essentially stems from the role of the A Criterion­
that the application of the diagnosis to an individual appeared to represent a clinical 
opinion that the person had in fact been exposed to a traumatic event299 
292. See State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192,207 (NM. 1993) (explaining that nearly all jurisdictions have 
concluded that PTSD evidence is appropriate to explain a victim's behavior that is inconsistent with having 
been raped); Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 138 (concluding that jurors can be assisted by evidence ofRTS to dispel 
common misconceptions about rape). 
293. Askowitz & Graham, supra note 285, at 2048-51. 
294. See Burgess, supra note 291, at 110 (recounting a Montana Supreme Court case where evidence of 
the complainant' s symptoms of rape trauma syndrome was found to be probative and helpful to the jury to 
resolve); Alberico, 861 P.2d at 207-08 (holding that the prosecution' s introduction ofexpert testimony to show 
that a crime had been committed was proper). 
295. See Aile walt II, 571 A. 2d at 751 (finding PTSD expert testimony is admissible by distinguishing it 
from RTS testimony, which most courts find inadmissible); Chapman v. State, 18 P.3d 1164, 1172 (Wyo. 
2001) (stating that although most courts fmd testimony about PTSD to be sufficiently reliable to warrant 
admission, the purposes for which this testimony may be admitted remains a subject for debate). See generally 
Missy Thornton, State v. Chauvin: Determining the Admissibility of a Post-Trmunatic Stress Syndrome 
Diagnosis as Substantive Evidence ofSexual Abuse, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1743 (2004) (discussing split among both 
federal and state courts on whether expert witness testimony about PTSD to establish the trauma in fact 
occurred is admissible). 
296. Alberico, 861 P.2d at 207-09. 
297. E.g., Chapman v. State, 18 P 3d 1164, 1172 (Wyo. 2001). 
298. Statev. Huey, 699P.2d 1290,1294 (Ariz. 1985). 
299. See State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 707--{)8 (La. 2003) (stating that the method of diagnosing a 
person with PTSD is designed for therapeutic purposes and is not reliable as a fact-fmding tool); People v. 
Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138--139 (N.Y. 1990) (finding the therapeutic nature ofRTS makes it unreliable when 
introduced to prove a crime took place); State v. Black, 745 P 2d 12, 18 (Wash. 1987) (holding that RTS 
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The various judicial opinions in the litigation of a Maryland rape case, Allewalt v. 
State,300 exemplify the key arguments in this debate. In the 1983 trial, during which the 
defendant asserted a consent defense, the trial court permitted the state to offer rebuttal 
testimony of a forensic psychiatrist 301 The psychiatrist had examined the complainant 
and concluded that she had the symptoms of PTSD302 The trial court admitted the 
testimony after conducting a voir dire examination of the expert, concluding that PTSD 
"has been around for a long time," is "nothing new," and was "recognized" within 
psychiatry303 The trial court reasoned that the witness would "assist [the] jury in 
making a determination as to [the complainant's) state of mind at the time of the event 
on the basis of post event findings. "304 However, on cross-examination, the psychiatrist 
conceded that in developing his opinion about whether the complainant had PTSD, he 
assumed that she had in fact been raped by the defendant "I think it is more important 
that the individual reporting, that is the patient or person you are evaluating, believes 
that it took place. But the whole diagnosis is predicated on the assumption that 
some traumatic incident occurred. "305 The psychiatrist also opined that none of the 
complainant's other circumstances (i.e., a history of depression and "marital and 
domestic problems") would account for her symptoms306 
An intermediate appeals court reversed the conviction on the basis that the expert 
testimony was improperly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed the 
probative value, which was quite small in light of the fact that the assumption the rape 
had taken place rendered the expert's conclusions unreliable in establishing that she 
had not consented to the sexual encounter307 The appellate court was also concerned 
that the testimony appeared to be bolstering the credibility of the complainant "By 
stating that a rape could cause the disorder, an expert implicitly verifies the victim's 
claim that rape did cause it."Jos 
expert testimony is not a scientifically reliable means of proving rape occurred because the diagnosing 
individual is not concerned with the accuracy of the victim's description ofthe event); People v. Bledsoe, 681 
P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984) (noting that RTS testimony is not scientifically reliable because it is not based on a 
narrow set of criteria and its purpose is to help a victim of trauma, not to prove the trauma occurred). The 
opinion is "clinical'' in the sense that it is based upon an examination of the person for purposes of making a 
medical assessment. 
300. (Allewalt I) 487 A.2d 664 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), vacated, 517 A.2d 741 (Md. 1986). 
301. Allewalt I, 487 A. 2d at 665--{)6. 
302. Id at 666. 
303. State v. Allewalt (Al/ewalt II), 51 7 A. 2d 741, 743 (Md. 1986). 
304. Id 
305. Allewalt I, 487 A.2d at 666 (omission in original) (quoting cross-examination testimony). 
306. Id 
307. Id. at 669-70. Other courts have also excluded similar evidence on the basis that jurors would be 
confused by the evidence or the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced, and based their rulings on rules 
similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E2d 131, 138-39 (N.Y. 1990) 
(excluding RTS expert testimony because it might create an inference in the minds ofjurors that rape occurred, 
which presents undue prejudice against the defendant). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although 
relevant, ev idence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evro. 403. 
308. Allewalt I, 487 A.2d at 670. 
39 2011] DIAGNOSING LIABILITY 
The Court of Appeals of M3I)'land, in a sharply divided opinion, reversed and 
reinstated the conviction309 The majority specifically noted the diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD and concluded that the psychiatrist was "acting well within the field of his 
special training and experience" when he opined, as part ofthe diagnostic process, that 
the alleged victim had experienced a sexual assault.310 In other words , arriving at an 
opinion about the occurrence of a trauma was simply part of what the PTSD criteria 
required. The majority concluded that the appellate court had imposed too high a 
standard on the admission of such testimony. Rather, it reasoned, this was simply 
another form of expert testimony as to causation of symptoms, which is generally 
admissible. 311 The majority reviewed the competing line of cases on the issue of 
admitting PTSD (or RTS) testimony in the prosecution of rape cases and concluded 
that the testimony of the expert was sufficiently limited to warrant its admission at trial: 
Just as a jury can understand that evidence of the complainant's hysteria 
shortly following an alleged sexual assault tends to negate consent, so a jury, 
with the assistance of a competent expert, can understand that a diagnosis of 
PTSD tends to negate consent where the history, as reviewed by the expert, 
reflects no other trauma which in the expert's opinion could produce that 
medically recognized disorder312 
The concurring justice opined that there was some role for a forensic psychiatrist 
to offer testimony about PTSD generally (since it would not be within the general 
knowledge of the fact-finder), but thought that courts should draw the line at permitting 
a psychiatrist to opine that the witness had PTSD resulting from the alleged crime.313 
The author of the dissenting opinion, however, reasoned that "[b]ecause post-traumatic 
stress disorder is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic tool useful in counseling, and 
the relevant scientific literature does not even purport to claim that the disorder is a 
scientifically reliable means of providing that a rape occurred," the testimony should 
not have been admitted314 He also thought that there was no way to guard against the 
jury concluding that the expert had reached a conclusion about the alleged victim's 
credibility and using the testimony to reach their conclusions about that issue315 
Courts across the country debated the admissibility of such evidence for several 
years after the first reported cases, and apparently the consensus of the courts at present 
is to admit PTSD (or related syndrome) evidence in sexual assault cases, generally with 
a limiting instruction to jurors regarding the appropriate use of the evidence316 The 
309. Allewalt II, 517 A.2d at 752. 
310. I d. at 746-47. 
311. Id. at 746-48. 
312. Id. at 751 (emphasis added). The court noted that there was a "nice question" that was "(l]urking" 
in the case, which was whether a defendant could offer testimony of the absence of PTSD as evidence of 
consent. Id. 
313. Id. at 759-<51 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). 
314. Id. at 755 (Eldridge, J. , dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see aLso 
People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300- Dl (Cal. 1984) (concluding that evidence that a witness suffers from 
rape trauma syndrome is inadmissible to show that the witness was raped). 
315. Allewaltii, 517 A.2d at 755-58 (Eldridg e,J., dissenting). 
316. Klein, supra note 286, at 1019 (discussing the trend of courts finding expert RTS testimony as 
relevant and appropriate); see, e.g., People v. Baenziger, 97 P 3d 271, 275 (Colo. App. 2004) ("It has been 
repeatedly held that rape trauma syndrome evidence is reasonably reliable."); People v. Nelson, 804 N.Y.S.2d 
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admissibility of PTSD or CSAAS evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions, 
however, remains varied from state to state317 Some courts that have rejected RTS or 
CSAAS have done so largely because, unlike PTSD itself, they are not found in the 
DSM,318 or because such terms have assumptions about the specific cause of the 
symptoms built into the names of the terms319 
The use of PTSD evidence to prove the fact of the traumatic event is not limited to 
the criminal context. In civil cases, although a plaintiff may offer evidence of PTSD for 
the purportedly limited purpose of proving the extent of her damages, the nature of 
PTSD and its A Criterion suggests a finding of liability as well. Some plaintiffs suggest 
that their PTSD symptoms are probative of whether they had in fact been subjected to 
trauma32 °For example, if someone displays symptoms of PTSD, such evidence could 
be persuasive on the question of whether she did in fact experience sexual harassment. 
Courts have been less wary of its use in civil cases as compared with criminal 
prosecutions, but some have expressed concern about the potential inferential leap 
invited by such evidence and put strict limitations on the extent of an expert' s 
testimony.321 
The A Criterion in the civil context raises the same problem of circularity as seen 
in the sexual abuse and rape cases. Clinicians cannot apply the PTSD diagnostic criteria 
without opining about the nature, extent, or even the existence of a reported or 
purported stressor event. Although a doctor setting a broken leg may refer to the fact of 
a motor vehicle collision in her report, whether or not a collision occurred has no 
bearing on whether the doctor concludes that the leg is broken. By contrast, the A 
Criterion requires an assessment of the stressor event on the part of the clinician to 
determine whether it met whatever the A Criterion required at that time. The existence 
of such a clinical determination cannot be deemed insignificant since the APA has 
amended the diagnostic criteria specifically (and more than once) to define who can be 
diagnosed with the disorder. 
If a psychiatrist cannot in fact diagnose a person as having PTSD without making 
a determination as to whether a stressor event satisfying the A Criterion occurred, then 
3 73, 3 73-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (ruling that RTS evidence was properly admitted in part because the court 
provided a limiting instruction). 
317. Dyane L. Noonan, Note, Where Do We Go From Here? A Modern Jurisdictional Analysis of 
Behavioral Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 493, 494-95 
(2005). 
318. E.g., Statev. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 212 (N.M. 1993). 
319. See State v. Roles, 832 P.2d 311, 318 n.4 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the term RTS is much 
more inflammatory than the term PTSD); State v. Gettier, 438N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Iowa 1989) (finding no error in 
admitting evidence where an expert testified to PTSD instead ofthe more prejudicial term, RTS). 
320. See, e.g, Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1358 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding admission 
of expert psychological testimony opining that the plaintiff's symptoms "were consistent with those of 
someone who had been sexually assaulted" ), overruled, Pa. State Policev. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (1994). 
321. See, e.g., Isely v. Capuchin Prov., 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that an 
expert on PTSD may only testifY to her theories and opinions of the syndrome and whether the plaintiff's 
behavior is consistent with someone who is suffering from PTSD); Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., 
No. 1:04-CV-6059-SMS, 2007 WL 715526, at *3-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 200 7) (denying defendant's motion to 
exclude PTSD testimony from plaintiff's expert but cautioning plaintiff's counsel to ask only about the 
diagnosis, causation, and extent of harm, rather than the underlying events in that sexual harassment case). 
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there is considerable question as to whether psychiatrists can testify in the more 
theoretically limited role that some courts assign in terms of rehabilitating victims who 
have been impeached or in cases in which the occurrence of the stressor event is a 
central controversy. This problem is not unique to the A Criterion since several other 
PTSD criteria also tie back to the supposedly traumatic "event." For example, if a 
person is "re-experiencing" an event, there is an explicit assumption that the person 
previously "experienced" the event that now arises in intrusive thoughts and 
nightmares. Similarly, if someone is avoiding something, such avoidance is a 
"symptom" only if it is associated with an identified traumatic event322 These 
symptoms each link to the diagnostician's initial assessment of the fact of "the event." 
Use in criminal and civil cases as proofof the occurrence of the traumatic event is 
based upon an assumption that a psychologist or psychiatrist, employing specialized 
skills, can attribute an individual's symptoms to a specific event, isolated from the 
"myriad other sources encountered in life."323 Thus, although the courts that found 
PTSD evidence to be potentially useful to fact finders claimed that they were not 
admitting expert testimony to bolster the credibility of the plaintiff or complainant, 
there can be little doubt that the evidence potentially has such effect.324 Given the 
central role of credibility in these cases and the challenge of reconciling competing 
stories, it is not difficult to imagine that a fact finder receiving the testimony of a 
mental health professional would, notwithstanding any limiting instruction, give it 
great weight as a measure of the truthfulness of the plaintiff-complainant's 
allegations.325 
B. Tort Liabilityfor Psychological Injury 
As noted above, courts have been far less reluctant to admit PTSD in civil claims 
than in criminal cases. The diagnosis offers plaintiffs "a significant benefit" when 
322. PTSD's connection to memory raises the prospect of treating or perhaps even preventing PTSD 
using memory dampening techniques. If this is the case, this raises the possibility that plaintiffs are expected to 
mitigate their damages, shifting responsibility for PTSD back to the plaintiffs. See Adam J. Kolber, 
Therapeutic Forgetting The Legal andEthical Implications ofMemory Dampening, 59 V AND. L. REv. 1561, 
1592-95 (2006). For a broader discussion ofthe question ofmitigation of psychological injuries, see generally 
Lars Noah, Comjortahly Numb Medicalizing (and MI1igating) Pain-and-Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 431,448-79 (2009). 
323. Ralph Slovenko, Introduction to PTSDINLITIGATION,supra note 245, at xix, xxiv. 
324. One court excluded PTSD evidence in a sexual harassment case in part out of concern that the 
expert witness had drawn his own conclusions about whether the rape had occurred and therefore his 
testimony would constitute improper bolstering of the plaintiff's credibility, or, at the very least, would appear 
to do that. Spencer v. General Electric Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1988), overruled in part by 
Pesso v. Montgomery Gen Hosp., No. 98-1978, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS (4th Cir. May 24, 1999), and Ellis v. 
Director, CIA, No. 98-2481, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21638 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1999). 
325. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychological Syndromes and Criminal Responsibility, 6 ANN. REv . L. 
& Soc. Sc i. 109, 118--19 (2010) (reviewing studies regarding the impact ofRTS testimony on juror decision­
making). Indeed, one court that concluded that PTSD should be admissible in sexual abuse prosecutions 
declined to draw distinctions among the various purported uses of the evidence. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 
192, 210--12 (N.M. 1993). The court reasoned that there was no "logical difference" between using such 
evidence to explain a complainant's behavior, to opine as to the complainant' s credibility, or to provide a 
specific opinion as to the "causality" of the complainant's symptoms in relation to sexual abuse. Jd 
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proving causation and the extent of emotional injuries in tort cases,326 and its potential 
use in personal injury litigation is apparent327 Articles appeared in legal publications 
assessing the potential impact on personal injury claims by the diagnosis,328 
particularly after the 1994 revisions of the A Criterion. 329 A psychiatrist observed that, 
by virtue of the A Criterion, "an external injury is by definition the explicit cause of 
this disorder," which then operates to support "legal arguments regarding single and 
proximate causation of harm."330 A forensic psychologist observed that PTSD is the 
"most common courtroom diagnosis" in claims of psychological injmy. 331 One defense 
attorney cautioned others that any PTSD claims they encounter must be "fleshed out as 
soon as possible and attacked immediately."332 
The APA's recognition of PTSD had a significant impact on the determination of 
liability for psychological injuries and, in the words of one group of commentators, 
"transformed and expanded the horiwns of tort litigation, resulting in the recognition 
of a host of new claims tied to the diagnosis. "333 It has had this effect in several ways 
that will be briefly reviewed here. 
The DSM-111 appeared at a time when courts were grappling with the issue of 
whether and under what circumstances to permit recovery for emotional injuries, as 
described earlier in Part II. Although some courts permitted recovery for ''traumatic 
neurosis," the notion of compensating for emotional injuries remained controversial. 
Many courts continued to apply the "impact rule" or the "physical manifestation" rule 
to limit damages for psychological injuries.334 With PTSD now listed in the definitive 
authority on mental disorders, however, several courts began to build their legal 
standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress around whether the emotional 
326. Richard L. Newman & Rachel Yehuda, PTSD in Civil Litigation Recent Scientific and Legal 
Developments, 3 7 JURIMETRICS J. 25 7, 258 (1997); see, e.g., Allewalt v. State (Allewalt I), 487 A.2d 664, 667­
70 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1985) (explaining how PTSD testimony is useful in civil cases arising out of rape for 
establishing damages and evaluating compensable injuries), vacated, 517 A.2d 741 (Md. 1986). 
327. See, e.g, Alphonso v. Charity Hosp. of La. at New Orleans, 413 So. 2d 982, 987 (La. Ct. App. 
1982) (affirming $50,000 emotional distress award that was based upon PTSD diagnosis resulting from sexual 
assault in hospital). 
328. See, e.g., Ziskin, supra note 158, at 73 (noting that all claims for "traumatic neurosis" would be cast 
using PTSD, "which appears to cover most ofthe cases formerly called traumatic neurosis"). 
329. See, e.g. , KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 105, at 122 (explaining how changes in PTSD diagnoses 
were recognized by an audience that included non-psychotherapists); Paul R Lees-Haley, DSMJV Alert 
Changes Important to Claims Evaluation, FoR THE DEF., June 1995, at 29, 30 (noting that problem of PTSD 
for defense attorneys may become worse under the DSM-JVrevisions); Mark I. Levy, Stressing the Point Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder Claims, FoR THE DEF., Nov. 1995, at 27, 27 (observing that PTSD claims were 
"growing by leaps and bounds" and resulting in particularly large awards, especially in employment cases). 
330. Gold, supra note 284, at 164. 
331. Albert M. Drukteinis, Understanding and Evaluating M!ntal Damages, PsYCHIATRIC TIMES, Apr. 
15, 2007, avai/ahle at http ://www.psychiatrictimes. com/display/ article/1 016&155241. 
332. James T. Brown, Compensation Neurosis Rides Again A Practitioner's Guide to Defending PTSD 
Claims, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 467, 482 (1996). 
333. Greenberg et al., supra note 6, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
334. E.g., Chapp etta v. Bowman Transp., Inc. , 415 So. 2d 1019, 1022- 23 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
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injury was "medically diagnosable," often using PTSD expressly or impliedly as the 
basis for evaluating whether specific claims met that standard335 
Some courts concluded that psychiatry had sufficiently progressed to the point 
where there was less reason to be concerned regarding the validity of such claims 336 
For example, in 1983, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bass v. Nooney Co337 was 
influenced by the "prevailing" belief among courts that "the development of psychiatric 
tests and refinement of diagnostic techniques have enabled science to establish with 
reasonable medical certainty the existence and severity of psychic harm" and "mental 
trauma. " 338 Accordingly, the court's new legal standard included the requirement that 
"the emotional distress or mental injury must be medically diagnosable and must be of 
sufficient severity so as to be medically significant."339 The dissent was less certain that 
the new standard was workable: "What does 'medically significant' mean in a 
courtroom?"340 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee dispensed with that state' s "physical 
manifestation" rule in Camper v. Minor,341 a personal injury case in which PTSD was 
the primary basis of the claim for damages, and instead imposed the requirement that 
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress "be supported by expert medical or 
scientific proof. " 342 A Louisiana appeals court reached a similar conclusion and 
allowed an award for emotional injury damages to stand because the plaintiff suffered 
from "more than fright[,]. there was sufficient proof of emotional injury, post­
traumatic stress disorder, to support the Trial Judge's award of damages."343 
335. See Jarrett v. Jones, 258 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Mo. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs PTSD was sufficient 
to establish that his emotional injury was "medically diagnosable and of sufficient severity to be medically 
significant."); Hamilton v. Nestor, 659 N.W.2d 321, 329--30 (Neb. 2003) (holding that although plaintiff did 
suffer diagnosable and medically significant emotional distress, it was not of sufficient severity to be 
actionable); Johnson v. Ruark Ob/Gyn, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990) (finding that severe emotional distress 
must be generally recognized and diagnosed by medical professionals); Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424,431 
(Wash. 1998) (holding that "nightmares, sleep disorders, intrusive memories, fear, and anger" would be 
sufficient to satisfY the "objective symptomatology" requirement for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
but only if they "constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder" such as PTSD). 
336. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hasps., 616 P 2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980), abrogated by Burgess v. Superior 
Court, 831 P 2d 1197 (Cal. 1992); Noah, supra note 322, at 437-39. The dissent in that case specifically 
disputed that psychiatry had "become better equipped to evaluate the traumatic effects of psychic stimuli." 
Molien, 616 P.2d at 825 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
337. 646 S.W 2d 765 (Mo. 1983) 
338. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769; see also Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio 1983) (criticizing 
the persistence of the physical manifestation rule because it "completely ignores the advances made in modern 
medical and psychiatric science"). 
339. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 7 72-73. A 1971 Georgetown Law School student piece was one of the 
authorities upon which the court derived its "medically diagnosable" standard. Comment, Negligently Inflicted 
Mental Distress The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 123 7 (1971 ). 
340. Bass, 646 S. W. 2d at 781 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). 
341. 915 S.W 2d 437,446 (Tenn. 1996). 
342. Camper, 915 S.W 2d at439, 446. 
343. Id at 1023 (emphasis added). One notable implication of the increased use of PTSD in making 
emotional distress, such as to "medically diagnosable" standards, was the prospect of extensive discovery of a 
plaintiffs mental health history or a requirement to submit to an independent psychiatric examination on the 
theory that such plaintiff has waived the psychotherapist·patient privilege. See generally Deirdre M. Smith, An 
44 TEMPLE L4W REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Some of the changes to PTSD' s A Criterion actually paralleled or even influenced 
the evolution in the legal standards for recovering for emotional distress. For example, 
many courts expanded the rules for liability to "bystanders" to include recovery for 
merely observing or encountering a trauma occurring to a family member344 Similarly, 
the revisions to the A Criterion in DSM-IV included extending "eligibility" for the 
diagnosis to one who "witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity 
of self or others. "345 Indeed, at least one court cited specifically to that amended 
diagnostic language in deciding where to draw the line in allowing recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims346 Another court held, for purposes of 
summary judgment, that an expert witness's opinion that the plaintiff had PTSD "as a 
direct and proximate result of being personally involved in a collision that resulted in 
the death of a child" was sufficient to generate a factual issue as to causation347 
Not all courts embraced PTSD as a measure of the advancement of psychiatry's 
role in law, and some explicitly rejected legal standards for recovery based upon the 
presence of a psychiatric diagnosis such as PTSD. 348 The Supreme Court ofAlaska, for 
example, reasoned that including a requirement of standard such as that in Bass-that 
the distress be "medically diagnosable or obj ectifiable"-would usurp the jury's 
function in determining the severity of the emotional distress as a question of fact. 349 
The recognition of PTSD also did not silence the concerns about malingering in 
claims for psychological injuries; indeed, malingering has been a central issue with 
PTSD, perhaps more than any other diagnosis, due to the strong association with 
litigation350 Although studies have documented the incidence of malingering, no 
Uncertain Privilege Implied Waiver (O'ld the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the 
Federal CoUJ'ts, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 79 (2008). 
344. E.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 865 (Corm. 1996); Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 284 
(M.e. 1992); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986). 
345. DSM-IV, supra note 264, at 427; see also Baldwin et al., supra note 13, at 42 (noting that DSM-IV 
expanded the qualifications for PTSD to include one who " 'witness[ ed]'" or '"learned about"' a threat to a 
loved one's life). 
346. Marzolfv. Stone, 960 P.2d 424, 429, 429 & n.2 (Wash. 1998) (citing DSMIV, supra note 264, at 
429, and permitting recovery for family member who observed an injured family member at the scene of an 
accident). In an article titled Compensation NeUJ'osis Rides Again defense attorney James T. Brown wrote: 
"PTSD[] is demonstrating an ability to influence the current tort system, both economically and doctrinally. 
The diagnosis is being used to erode traditional legal restrictions and barriers to recovery." Brown, supra note 
332, at 467. 
347. Jarrett v. Jones, 258 S.W.3d 442,449 (M.o. 2008). 
348. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995) (rejecting requirement of medical 
diagnosis in claims of emotional distress); Fortes v. Ramos, No. CIV. A. 96-5663, 2001 WL 1685601, at *4-9 
(R I. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2001) (reviewing Rhode Island's physical manifestation requirement and its 
underlying principles). 
349. Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 205. However, among the reasons that the jury would have had sufficient 
basis to award the plaintiff damages was that she "presented medical testimony that she suffered from post­
traumatic stress disorder." Jd 
350. Phillip J. Resnick, Guidelines for Evaluation ofMalingering in PTSD, in PTSD IN LITIGATION, 
supra note 245, at 187, 188. Defense-oriented commentators have attempted to resurrect notions of 
"compensation neurosis" to suggest that the secondary gain from alleging a potential traumatic stressor are the 
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empirical research has established a specific link between PTSD-related malingering 
and the prospect of compensation351 However, the diagnostic criteria are readily 
available, and some court opinions have noted incidents of coaching by attomeys352 
The DSM-IV' s addition of a subjective element in the A Criterion made the issue all the 
more acute353 Indeed, the DSM-/Vincludes a comment directed specifically at PTSD: 
"Malingering should be ruled out in those situations in which financial remuneration, 
benefit eligibility, and forensic determinations play a role. "354 This caveat is not 
directed at other diagnoses and did not appear in other editions 355 This reflects 
psychiatry's own acknowledgment of the unique link between that diagnosis and 
determinations of compensation. 
C. EvidentiaryLimitations on PTSD Evidence 
The key mechanism in law to determine what a fact finder may consider in 
making determinations of liability (or resolving other legal controversies) is the body 
of relevant evidence law. Thus, questions of whether and where a fact finder may 
consider PTSD in assigning criminal or civil liability necessarily implicates the rules of 
evidence, particularly those pertaining to relevance and expert testimony. However, 
perhaps because courts have regarded PTSD as being a medical (and therefore 
"scientific") diagnosis uniquely suited for aiding in determinations of liability, courts 
have generally leaned in favor ofputting such evidence in the hands of fact finders. 
Evidence of PTSD is generally offered through expert witnesses, whether they are 
treating clinicians who describe their diagnostic impressions of their patients or 
forensic examiners retained by one of the parties to evaluate an individual and render 
an opinion on a specific issue tied to the civil or criminal litigation. Accordingly, the 
admissibility ofPTSD evidence directly implicates the rules regarding the admissibility 
of expert opinion evidence. A comprehensive examination of the various rules 
governing the admissibility of evidence of PTSD and other mental disorders is beyond 
the scope of this Article,356 but a few of the particular admissibility issues that PTSD 
evidence implicates will be addressed. 
real causes of the plaintiff's symptoms, even in the absence of intentional mendacity. Eg., Brown, supra note 
332, at 468-69. 
351. See Resnick, supra note 350, at 187 (asserting that fmancial gain is primary motivation to 
malinger); Simon, supra note 245, at 81-82 (noting that secondary gain may be one of several factors in 
maintaining PTSD symptoms); Richard A. Bryant & Allison G. Harvey, The Influence of litigation on 
Maintenance ofPosttrmunaJic Stress Disorder, 191 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 191 (2003) (noting the 
"widely held view" that PTSD is "often mediated by compensation factors"). 
352. Some national service organizations reportedly distributed the PTSD criteria to Vietnam veterans, 
which could have made malingering easier. Resnick, supra note 351, at 195. See also Nelsen v. Research 
Corp. ofUniv. ofHaw., 805 F. Supp. 837,844--445 (D. Haw. 1992) (fmding lack of candor on part of plaintiff 
alleging PTSD for, among other things, reviewing diagnostic criteria for disorder before reporting the full 
range of symptoms). 
353. See Resnick, supra note 351 , at 187 (noting that PTSD diagnoses are made "almost entirely" on 
subjective symptoms, and that the accessibility ofDSMIV's criteria makes malingering easier). 
354. DSM-IV, supra note 264, at 427 (emphasis omitted). 
355. Gerald M. Rosen & Steven Taylor, Pseudo-PTSD, 21 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 201 , 201-{)2 (2007). 
356. For an overview of the applicable rules and case law, see generally DANIEL W. SHUMAN, 
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2005); David Faust et al., The Admissibility of 
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The DSM-III was published only five years after Congress enacted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which evidenced a shift towards a bias of admissibility of a wide 
range of relevant evidence, including opinion testimony357 In 1993, the year before the 
DSM-IV was released with its broader A Criterion, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc} 58 which, along 
with the follow-up cases in the following few years, significantly revised the approach 
federal and many state courts took to the admissibility of most kinds of scientific and 
other expert testimony359 The Court ruled that the federal common law Frye test for 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony~whether the basis for the opinion 
enjoyed "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community360~did not survive 
the enactment ofthe Federal Rules of Evidence with their "'liberal thrust' ... and their 
'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. "'361 Rather, 
the Court held, courts should serve as "gatekeepers" of the admissibility of such 
evidence and consider a range of factors (rather than prerequisites) in assessing the 
reliability and relevance of the proffered expert testimony362 
Most psychiatric evidence generally fared well under Frye as being "generally 
accepted. "363 The courts that reached such conclusions with respect to PTSD often 
based them primarily on the fact that PTSD had been included in theDSM364 In theory, 
"abandonment of the Frye 'general acceptance' test" by the federal courts and the 
states that followed Daubert's lead should have precluded granting any kind of 
"immunity from judicial scrutiny" to the DSM generally or PTSD specifically365 
However, few courts have used Daubert or other evidence rules to limit the 
admissibility of PTSD testimony, or indeed most other forms of clinical psychiatric 
evidence,366 and it appears that the controversies in the psychiatric and related medical 
BehaYioral Science Evidence in the Courtroom The Translalion ofLegal to Scientific Concepts and Back, 6 
ANN. REV. CLIN. P SYCHOL. 49 (2010). 
357. Shuman, supra note 282, at 5-6. 
358. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
359. See generally Danbert, 509 U.S. at 579 (abandoning "general acceptance" test, and prescribing trial 
court judges to assess admissibility of expert testimony on the scientific techniques and methodologies used); 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (reinforcing Daubert's principle of an independent judicial 
reasonableness evaluation of the conclusion, methodologies, and facts in expert admissibility determinations 
by prescribing an abuse-of-discretion standard of review on appeal); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1999) (extending the Danbert analysis to nonscientific areas ofexpertise). 
360. Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
361. Danbert, 509 U.S. at 588-s9 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
362. Id at 592-97. 
363. Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 1, 34 (1998). 
364. See, e.g. , People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 134- 35 (N.Y. 1990) ("[T]he diagnostic criteria for 
posttraumatic stress disorder that are contained in DSM III-R have convinced us that the scientific community 
has accepted that rape as a stressor can have marked, identifiable effects on a victim' s behavior ...."). 
365. Shuman, supra note 282, at 6. 
366. See Slobogin, supra note 325, at 118-24 (discussing psychological syndrome evidence specifically 
and concluding that courts "seldom examine closely all four of the evidentiary components described here 
(materiality, probative value, helpfulness, and prejudice)"); Slobogin, supra note 363, at 27 (noting a 
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or academic literature over the validity and reliability of this diagnosis have not had 
any significant impact on its use in courts. Courts also seem to be unconcerned with the 
fact that the PTSD criteria, including the A Criterion, were revised three times in 
fourteen years. 
Courts have been somewhat more willing to play the role of "gatekeeper" for the 
use of PTSD and related diagnoses by prosecutors in sexual abuse and rape cases since 
such use directly implicates questions of the reliability of the testimony. Nonetheless, 
many courts provide fairly cursory analyses before admitting PTSD-based evidence. In 
2001, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, applying Daubert, appeared to conclude that 
the broader question of admissibility of PTSD testimony in sex abuse cases was by 
then resolved367 In an appeal of a sexual abuse conviction, the defendant argued that 
the trial court erred in allowing the state to offer a psychiatrist's testimony that the 
complainant had PTSD on the basis that "the theory of PTSD related to child sexual 
abuse is not sufficiently developed to permit an expert to formulate a reasonable 
opinion on the subject. "368 The court rejected those arguments, noting first that PTSD's 
inclusion in the DSM was in itself evidence that it had "achieved acceptance in the 
fields of psychiatry and psychology."369 Further, the court reasoned, "the PTSD 
diagnosis appears to be grounded in basic behavioral psychology. "370 More 
significantly, by that time, the diagnosis had been "widely, although not universally, 
accepted by other jurisdictions as a reliable form of expert testimony in this context," 
although the specific purpose for which it could be offered was still subject to some 
controversy.371 
Another example of a court applying little scrutiny to the reliability of PTSD 
evidence as proof of sexual abuse is a 1993 opinion of the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico, State v. Alberico372 The court concluded: "We hold that PTSD testimony is 
grounded in valid scientific principle."373 The inclusion of PTSD in DSM-III was a 
large part of that determination because the court reasoned that "[t]he existence of 
DSM III-R and its general acceptance in psychology indicate that PTSD has been 
exposed to objective scientific scrutiny and empirical verification."374 The court also 
accepted the State's argument that trained psychologists could "isolate the cause of the 
symptoms because different stressors manifest themselves in different symptoms. "375 
The court thought that the "current state of the technique" of the diagnosis of PTSD 
had advanced sufficiently since the time of earlier decisions to permit experts to testify 
"mammoth study," which demonstrated that "courts ignore [Frye and Daubert] when psychiatric testimony is 
at issue"). 
367. See Chapman v. State, 18 P.3d 1164, 1173 (Wyo. 2001) (applying Daubert and stating that "(t]he 
pivotal question in determining the admissibility ofPTSD testimony in sexual assault cases is the testimony's 
relevance to the issues in the case"). 
368. Id. at 1169. 
369. Id at 1171. 
370. Id at 1172. 
37 1. Id 
372. 861 P 2d 192, 206-{)8 (N.M. 1993). 
373. Alberico, 861 P.2d at 208. 
374. Id 
375. Id at 209. 
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that the complainant's PTSD symptoms were consistent with having been sexually 
abused. 376 
By contrast, some courts have declined to admit PTSD evidence specifically due 
to concerns about its reliability for purposes of proving that a trauma had occurred and 
have held that the fact PTSD is included in the DSM does not end the analysis required 
under Daubert' s "gatekeeping" standard3 77 The Supreme Court of Washington held 
that it was improper to admit expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome, regardless of 
whether it was described as PTSD, on the basis that it was not a scientifically reliable 
method of determining whether a rape had occurred and it amounted to an expert 
opinion on the guilt of the defendant and the credibility of the plaintiff378 Similarly, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court concluded: "[I]t is widely accepted that PTSD has not been 
proven to be a reliable indicator that sexual abuse is the trauma underlying the disorder 
or that sexual abuse has even occurred. "379 
The concept of the "traumatic memory" underlying PTSD also led to the theory of 
the "repressed memory" of a traumatic event that could be subsequently "recovered" 
through psychotherapy380 This theory became a central issue in several lawsuits in 
which adults claimed to have recovered memories of childhood abuse and then sought 
compensation381 A federal district court considered the reliability of evidence of PTSD 
and repressed memory in lsely v. Capuchin Province382 Relying largely on the 
reasoning in Alberico and the extensive work of the plaintiffs expert witness-who 
376. See id at 209 (fmding testimony , which indicated that psychologists have ability to isolate the 
cause of different symptoms, more persuasive than ' judicial determinations ofvalidity based on evidence that 
[was] many years old"); id. at 213 (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit 
expert testimony on PTSD because the expert testimony was convincing based on the validity of the science 
and contradictory case law was based on out-dated scientific evidence). 
377. See, e.g., State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 705, 709 (La. 2003) (holding expert testimony 
inadmissible due to a lack of showing reliability and accuracy of PTSD evidence, and noting that despite 
PTSD being catalogued in the DSM, evidence that trial court performed its "gatekeeping" function was still 
necessary). 
378. Statev. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (Wash. 1987) . 
379. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 707-08 (concluding that the diagnostic criteria for PTSD was intended to be 
used for dealing with the aftermath of severe traumatic events, not for providing clinical and forensic tools). In 
civil cases as well, courts restricted the admissibility of PTSD evidence to prove that a plaintiff had 
experienced a traumatic event. In Spencer v. General Electric Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Va. 1988), a 
federal district court (applying Frye in a pre-Daubert case) excluded the plaintiff's proffered psychological 
expert who would have testified that the alleged victim in the underlying sexual harassment case suffered from 
PTSD and therefore some kind of trauma must have occurred for such symptoms to be present, and that the 
only stressors in her life that could have caused such symptoms were the alleged rape and harassment. Jd. at 
1074. The court reasoned that "[e]vidence of PTSD occasioned by rape ... is not a scientifically reliable 
means ofproving that a rape occurred." Id at 1075- 76. 
380. See RICHARD J. MCNALLY, REMEMBERING TRAUMA 8-11 (2003) (discussing the evolution of 
repressed memory theory throughout the development of the current PTSD diagnosis); Richard J. McNally , 
Progress and Controversy in the Study ofPosttraumatic Stress Disorder, 54 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 229, 241-44 
(2003) (discussing the debate surrounding the validity of repressed memory theory); Steven Taylor & Gordon 
J.G. Asmundson, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Current Concepts and ContJ'oversies, 1 Ps YCHOL. INJ. & L. 
59, 67--{;9 (2008) (discussing the controversy surrounding \illether repressed memories exist in PTSD 
patients). 
381. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 390. 
382. 8 77 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
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had, among other things, served on the committees that revised Criterion A in DSM-111­
R and DSM-1V-the court concluded that the expert "has met the foundational 
requirements to testifY regarding PTSD and repressed memory."383 The court further 
ruled that it would permit the expert to ''not only testify as to her theories and opinions 
concerning PTSD and repressed memory, but also to testify as to whether [the 
plaintiff's] behavior is consistent with someone who is suffering repressed memory or 
post-traumatic stress disorder."384 Although the court ruled that she could not go further 
and testify expressly that she believed the allegations, the court drew a very fine 
distinction there385 
In civil cases in particular, courts have grappled with the respective roles of the 
court, the fact finder, and the expert witness in applying the A Criterion to the issues 
presented at trial, particularly since the determination of the A Criterion so closely 
resembles the fact finding of causation typical in many trials386 These questions are 
particularly apparent in cases where the court or a party raises questions about whether 
the forensic examiners or clinicians strictly adhered to the DSM criteria, including the 
A Criterion, when assigning PTSD diagnoses. 387 Generally, courts do not exclude 
testimony on such basis, concluding that the issue goes to the weight rather than the 
admissibility of the testimony388 
For example, in Bachir v. Transoceanic Cable Ship Co.,389 the defendant filed a 
post-verdict motion to set aside an award to a former cook employed on a ship for 
damages resulting from an accident in which he tripped and fell over some pipes390 A 
neuropsychiatrist had testified at trial that the plaintiff had PTSD as a result of the 
accident, which satisfied the ''traumatic event" (i.e., A Criterion) requirement of the 
DSM-1V's criteria for PTSD 391 Although the defense offered contradictory expert 
testimony on the issue of whether such incident could trigger PTSD, the trial court 
383. Isley, 877 F. Supp. at 1066. 
384. Id at 1067. 
385. Id 
386. Compare Marzolf v. Stone, 960 P.2d 424, 429 (Wash. 1998) (determining that the court has the 
authority to determine the sufficiency of emotional trauma to impose liability on a defendant), and Nelsen v. 
Research Corp. ofUniv. ofHawaii, 805 F. Supp. 837, 844 (D. Haw. 1992) (determining that the court has the 
ultimate authority to determine if an individual meets the criteria for PTSD), with Bachir v. Transoceanic 
Cable Ship Co., No. 98 Civ. 4625(JFK), 2002 WL 413918, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2002) (determining that it 
is the juty's task to weigh and assess the credibility of expert witnesses regarding psychiatric testimony). 
387. Apparently, it is not uncommon for treating or evaluating clinicians to vary from following the 
DSM criteria for PTSD and other disorders. See Robert I. Simon, Prefrxe to POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER IN LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT, at XV (Robert I. Simon ed., 2d ed. 2003) 
("In litigation, it is quite common to find the diagnosis of PTSD made without any attempt to follow the 
diagnostic criteria for this disorder."). Cj Owen Whooley, Diagnostic Ambivalence Psychialric Workarounds 
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders, 32 Soc. HEALTH &ILLNESS 452, 458 (2010) 
(finding that "[t]o carve a space of autonomous practice psychiatrists develop a series of workarounds to 
insulate their practice from [a]literal, reductionist application ofthe DSM' '). 
388. See Lingo v. Burle, No. 4:06·CV·1392 CAS, 2008 WL 1914148, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2008) 
(denying a defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony based on the fact that courts "rarely exclude an 
expert from testifYing under Daubert for failure to adhere to the DSM"). 
389. No. 98 Civ. 4625(JFK), 2002 WL 413918 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2002). 
390. Bachir, 2002 WL 413918, at *1. 
391. Id at *8. 
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dismissed the post-trial challenge to the admissibility of the evidence as going only to 
"weight and credibility" and therefore an issue for the jury to decide392 
Some courts, however, have applied more scrutiny to plaintiffs' experts ' opinions 
where they appear to stray from the DSM criteria, and at least one even substituted its 
own assessment. In the bench trial opinion in Nelsen v. Research Corp. of the 
University of Hawaii,393 another injury-at-sea case, the district court made a specific 
factual finding that, despite the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist's testimony to the 
contrary, the underlying incident at issue in that case-an on-board flood on a research 
vessel due to a faulty bilge pump-did not meet the A Criterion as it appeared in the 
DSM-III-R394 Accordingly, for this reason, it was not "reasonably foreseeable" that the 
plaintiff would develop PTSD and he was not entitled to compensation for his 
psychological injury395 
Alvarado v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc396 is one of the few federal 
court opinions in civil cases demonstrating close scrutiny of PTSD testimony under a 
Daubert analysis, but the result may have been due to the apparent overreaching by the 
plaintiffs and their expert 397 The federal district court excluded plaintiffs' expert 
testimony in an employment discrimination claim brought by twelve employees 398 The 
psychologist retained by the plaintiffs examined all twelve and diagnosed each of them 
with PTSD 399 The district court conducted a close review of the psychologist's 
techniques under Daubert and concluded that they fell far short of being sufficiently 
reliable for admission400 Among the deficiencies noted were a failure to use any of the 
standardized diagnostic instruments available for PTSD evaluations and the absence of 
Criterion Al, the traumatic event401 The judge further noted that the expert's 
conclusion that all fifteen of the original plaintiffs had PTSD was highly suspect, given 
studies suggesting that the post-trauma incidence is closer to ten to fifteen percent 402 
392. Id at *8--9 (holding that the question of whether the incident at issue in the litigation was severe 
enough to satisfY the PTSD A Criterion was a matter for the jury , and that the plaintiff's expert testimony was 
proper ly admitted despite indications that he did not follow the DSM criteria when diagnosing plaintiff with 
PTSD); see also S.M. v. J.K., 262 F. 3d 914, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the fact that the plaintiff's 
psychiatrist did not follow the PTSD criteria in effect at the time of the examination only indicated the "range 
where experts might reasonably differ, and where the jury must decide among the conflicting views" (quoting 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999))). 
393. 805 F. Supp. 837 (D. Haw. 1992). 
394. Nelsen, 805 F. Supp. at 843-44; see also Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1495­
96 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff's psychological expert's testimony that plaintiff had PTSD as a result 
ofthe alleged sexual harassment because "the stressor essential for the diagnosis does not exist"). 
395. Nelsen, 805 F. Supp. at 844-46. Although the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to some 
compensation for his depression following his discharge from employment by the defendant, he was not 
otherwise entitled to compensation for a psychological injury. Id at 845-46. The court also appeared to 
discount the experts' assessment of PTSD since one of them had furnished the plaintiff with the DSMIII-R 
criteria before he was evaluated.Jd at 844-45. 
396. Civil Action No. H-06-2113, 2007 WL 4480134 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2007). 
397. Alv&ado, 2007 WL 4480134, at *3-7. 
398. Id at *7. 
399. Id at *1. 
400. Id at *3-7. 
401. Id at *4-6. 
402. Id at *6. 
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In short, with few exceptions, courts generally do not use rules of evidence as a 
basis to restrict PTSD-based expert testimony. Rather, reasoning that due to its 
inclusion in DSM PTSD is a "medically recognized disorder,"403 courts regard it as 
relevant, useful, and appropriate for fact finders to employ, even when making essential 
determinations of liability, and rely upon the adversarial process to flesh out the 
lirni tations of such evidence404 
There are several other possible reasons for courts' inclination (implicitly or 
explicitly) to use PTSD in liability determinations. Courts and attorneys are drawn to 
the DSM perhaps because the diagnostic criteria bear some resemblance to legal 
criteria, with "prongs" and categorical criteria. Courts may place significant weight on 
the identification of psychiatric disease by doctors because they are doctors, ascribing 
to them a special power to detect disease and malingering 405 Courts may simply use 
PTSD as a stand-in for a broader legal rule regarding recovery for psychological 
injuries406 Regardless of the specific reasoning, however, there is little indication that 
courts consider or acknowledge PTSD's development and long-standing association 
with assigning legal responsibility when deciding to admit such evidence. 
V. PTSD's PERSISTENT CONTROVERSIES 
As demonstrated in Part IV, many courts assume that PTSD represents a well­
settled scientific fact and, therefore, a reliable tool for fact finders to use when making 
liability determinations. However, during the three decades since the DSM-III's 
publication, the controversy over the diagnosis has not diminished and has perhaps 
intensified as a result of the extensive study of PTSD that took place only after the 
diagnosis was officially established407 Robert Spitzer, DSM-III's lead editor, noted 
403. Attewalt v. State (Allewaltll), 517 A.2d 741,751 (Md. 1986). 
404. See, e.g. , Jarrett v. Jones, 258 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Mo. 2008) (allowing expert testimony ofPTSD to 
show causation). 
405. See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness Mdical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 
241, 270 (1999) (stating that some courts have allowed tort plaintiffs to be awarded damages on the basis of a 
PTSD diagnosis and that psychiatric testimony that the plaintiff suffers from a diagnosable mental illness may 
provide some reassurance of legitimacy); Deirdre M. Smith, Who Stzys You're Disabled? The Role ofMdical 
Evidence in the ADA Definition ofDisability, 82 TULANE L. REv. 1, 43--47 (200 7) (explaining that courts' 
reliance on expert medical testimony in disability cases results from the "central role" society accords 
physicians in deciding who is truly disabled). 
406. Noah, supra note 405, at 270-71 ("It may be ... that courts have accepted general evidence 
concerning PTSD as a nosological entity to support a doctrinal expansion of emotional distress claims, 
recognizing that stressful events can cause serious psychological injuries even without physical manifestations, 
in which case the accuracy of individual diagnoses arguably becomes less important"). British commentators 
have suggested the development of legal standards that follow more closely the current understanding of 
PTSD, while noting that "policy reasons and not medical evidence ... inform the law of psychiatric injury." 
Marias C. Adarnou & Anthony S. Hale, PTSD and the Law ofPsychiatric lnjwy in England and Wales 
Finally Coming Closer?, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &L. 327,331-32 (2003). 
407. See Gerald M. Rosen et al., Editorial, Problems with the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Diagnosis 
and its Future in DSM-V, 194 BRIT J. PsYCHIATRY 3, 3-4 (2008) (noting that "since its inception in 1980 little 
about PTSD has gone unchallenged"); Rosen & Lilienfeld, supra note 243, at 853 (stressing "that most every 
core assumption underlying the diagnostic construct [of PTSD] has met with questionable support, if not 
falsification"); Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 239, at 1705 (noting the "competing agendas" and 
"theoretical inconsistencies" that emerged in the years after the inclusion ofPTSD in the DSMIII); Taylor & 
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recently that, since PTSD's introduction "no other ... diagnosis, with the exception of 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (a related disorder), has generated so much controversy 
in the field as to the boundaries of the disorder, diagnostic criteria, central assumptions, 
clinical utility, and prevalence m vanous populations."408 The large-scale 
epidemiological studies of PTSD have revealed strikingly diverse conclusions, putting 
some trauma researchers on the defensive regarding the validity of the diagnosis 
itself409 The original questions raised about PTSD have not been answered in the eyes 
of many in psychiatry, including, perhaps most centrally, whether it is a normal 
reaction to an extraordinary event410 
PTSD has been subjected to particular scrutiny within behavioral science in part 
because of the use of the diagnosis, or at least the term, in the courts and the broader 
culture411 Many psychiatrists and psychologists have been struck by the widespread 
adoption of PTSD as "a household word and courtroom plea. "412 Forensic psychiatrist 
Roger Pitman observed: "Perhaps more than any other psychological or medical 
disorder, [PTSD] has influenced, and been influenced by, the law. . [It] has become 
the most important diagnosis in the forensic psychology of personal injury. "413 Former 
AP A President Alan Stone has been highly critical of PTSD's widespread adoption, 
particularly in personal injury law: 
Asmundson, supra note 380, at 65-66 (finding criterion for traumatic stressor to be too liberal in some 
instances, such as viewing of film The Exorcist being classified as a traumatic stressor for individual who 
developed PTSD,Iike symptoms afterwards). Cj CHRIS R. BR.EWIN, POSTTRAUMATIC S TRESS DISORDER: 
MALADY OR M YTH? 25-28 (2003) (examining historical divergence in diagnosis ofdiseases similar to PTSD). 
408. Robert L. Spitzer et al., Saving PTSD.from Itself in DSMV, 21 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 233 , 233 
(2007). 
409. YoUNG, supra note 7, at 130-33; see also LEYS, supra note 13, at 6--7 ('[T]he very terms in which 
PTSD is described tend to produce controversy." ). 
410. Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 239, at 1705-lJ7. 
411. See APPIGNANESI, supra note 273, at 427-28 (explaining that when the criteria delineating what 
qualified as PTSD were broadened, the diagnosis rate rose by half); SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 355, 385--E7 
(stating that the mental health field's adoption of PTSD as "scientific truth" and the ensuing media attention 
led to an "infinite" amount of literature on the subject); SHORTER, supra note 172, at 290 (noting that after 
entry into popular culture, PTSD was "trivialized ... as a way of psychologizing life experiences"); Baldwin 
et al., supra note 13, at 45-48 (questioning legitimacy of popular concern about American citizens developing 
psychological injuries from learning about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks with an absence of such 
concern in following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor); Rachel Yehuda & Alexander C. McFarlane, PTSD 
is a Valid Diagnosis Who Be11£jits from Challenging Its Existence?, 26 PsYCHIATRIC TIMES, no. 7 , July 9, 
2009, at 31, tNailahle at http: //www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/ article/10168/1426957 (suggesting that 
some psychiatrists are bothered by PTSD due to their "resentment that some persons fake [PTSD] symptoms 
for secondary gain" or that some patients cease treatment as soon as they are awarded compensation). 
412. Paul R. McHugh & Glenn Treisman, PTSD A Problematic Diagnostic Category, 21 J. A NXIETY 
DISORDERS 211, 212 (2007). One psychiatrist commented that the concepts "traumatic" and "stress" forPTSD 
have become so non-specific as to be almost meaningless, and suggested that a more accurate term is "Post 
Something Really Horrible Disorder." Chris Cantor, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 's Future, 192 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 394, 394 (2008). 
413. Roger K. Pitman et al., legal Issues in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in P SYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES 
AT TRIAL, supra note 229, at 861, 861- 63; see also Landy F. Sparr & James K. Boehnlein, Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder in Tort Actions Forensic Mi11£jield, 18 BULL. A M. A CAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283, 283 (1990) 
("[PTSD] as the basis for a tort claim is a union of forensic problem children."). 
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No diagnosis in the history ofAmerican psychiatry has had a more dramatic 
and pervasive impact on law and social justice. 
By giving diagnostic credence and specificity to the concept of psychic 
harm, PTSD has become the lightening rod for a wide variety of claims of 
stress-related psychopathology in the civil arena . 
. . . The recognition of this disorder by the medical community changed the 
nature of personal injury litigation 414 
Several psychiatrists and psychologists, even those with forensic training and 
experience, raised questions early on regarding the ways that PTSD found its way into 
the courtroom. In 1983, Lawrence Raifman, with training in both law and psychology, 
questioned the use of PTSD in legal settings and argued that PTSD's underlying 
conceptual problems made it a particularly poor fit for answering legal questions, 
whether they arise in criminal or in civil matters 415 He was particularly concerned that 
the misuse he observed in just the first few years of the diagnosis's official existence 
would eventually lead to "skepticism and possible stigmatization of PTSD 
complainants," which would ''threaten the credibility and validity of the diagnostic 
entity. "416 
There is no dispute within psychiatry that many people who experience serious 
and distressing events may have resulting long-term psychological symptoms, some 
quite severe417 However, the specific conceptualization of PTSD as a stand-alone 
diagnosis with a defined set of symptoms has brought widespread attention and 
scrutiny within psychiatry418 Two key questions linger that have direct implications for 
the legal uses described in the prior Section: the validity of the A Criterion and the 
extent to which PTSD is a construct rather than a "scientific discovery." 
A. Revisiting the A Criterion 
The most significant area of dispute within psychiatry regarding PTSD is, as has 
been the case since the publication of DSM-III, the precise role of the A Criterion, or 
underlying stressor event, in the development of a person's PTSD symptoms 419 
414. Alan A. Stone, Post-TramnaJic Stress Disorder and the law Critical Review ofthe ~New Frontier, 
21 BULL. AM. A CAD. PSYCHIATRY &L. 23, 23, 29, 34 (1993 ). 
415. Lawrence J. Raifman, Problems of Diagnosis and Legal CGliSaJion in Courtroom Use of Post­
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 1 BEHAV. Sc i. & L. 115, 119--29 (1983). 
416. Id at 126. 
41 7. See Rosen & Lilienfeld, supra note 243, at 838 (stating that even though PTSD may not be entirely 
valid as a diagnosis, the "serious and often disabling" symptoms associated with it are not imaginary ). 
418. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 390-91 (PTSD's "theoretical underpinning ... [is] unravelling."). 
41 9. Miranda Van Hooff et al. , The Stressor Criterion-AJ and PTSD A Matter of Opinion?, 23 J. 
ANXIETY DISORDERS 77, 77 (2009); Frank W. Weathers & Terence M. Keane, The Criterion A Problem 
Revisited Controversies and Challenges in Defining and.Measuring Psychological Trauma, 20 J. TRAUMATIC 
STRESS 107, 107-12 (2007). For ex amples ofliterature applying the varying views on this dispute, see Naomi 
Breslau & Glenn C. Davis, Posttramnatic Stress Disorder The Stressor Criteron, 175 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL 
DISEASE 255, 259--62 (1987) (classifYing stressors as extraordinary and ordinary); Meaghan L. O'Donnell et 
al., Criterion A Controversies and Clinical implications, in CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER 51, 60-67 (Gerald M. Rosen & B. Christopher Frueh eds., 20 10) [hereinafter CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO 
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Controversies regarding the A Criterion are often directly related to the increasing use 
of the diagnosis in civil litigation as a theory of recovery and the role of the diagnosis 
in the determination of legal causation420 In a recent editorial co-authored by Robert 
Spitzer, three psychiatrists observed that the diagnosis's narrow focus on a single 
specific event may lead clinicians to "ignore crucial pathogenic features," remarking 
that, "[u]nfortunately, what may be best for a lawsuit is not necessarily best for the 
patient. '>421 
The determination of causation as required by the A Criterion raises questions of 
bias and skewed subjective assessment on the part of both the clinician and the patient, 
decreasing the validity and reliability of PTSD diagnoses 422 Several studies have 
suggested a significant potential role for bias on the part of clinicians when diagnosing 
PTSD423 Research has indicated that PTSD is a diagnosis that may be particularly 
susceptible to "confirmatory" bias, in that a clinician who is aware of a person's 
experience (or allegation) of a potentially qualifying stressor may be more likely to 
assume that the person does have lasting symptoms from such an event (particularly if 
the distress from the trauma has led to the initiation of litigation)424 In one study of 
forty-seven sexual harassment cases in which a plaintiff was subjected to forensic 
psychiatric evaluations by examiners retained by either the plaintiff or defense 
attorneys, seventeen plaintiffs received PTSD diagnoses from plaintiffs' examiners but 
only three plaintiffs received PTSD or chronic PTSD diagnoses from defense 
examiners425 Some courts have suggested in specific cases that the forensic examiners 
PTSD] (separating A Criterion into narrow and broad definitions to analyze how diagnosis changes with 
definitional change). The other PTSD criteria are the subject of dispute as well, but I will focus here only on 
the A Criterion since that is the one that most clearly implicates legal questions. See Preface to 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES, at xi-xii (Gerald M. Rosen ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter PTSD: IssUEs AND CONTROVERSIES] (listing current disputes involving PTSD's criteria). 
420. See Landy F. Sparr & Roger K. Pitman, PTSD and the law, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD: SCIENCE AND 
PRACTICE 449, 454 (Matthew J. Freidman et al. eds., 2007) (attributing the "geometric increase" in PTSD­
based civil claims to the expansion of the DSAl-IV's criteria for PTSD); Pitman et al., supra note 413, at 861 
("Non-psychiatric incentives (e.g., the prospect of fmancial gain or avoidance of criminal punishment), which 
are present in all civil and criminal legal systems, have cast a shadow over the validity of the PTSD diagnosis 
and delayed its acceptance into diagnostic systems in psychiatry."). 
421. Rosenetal,supranote407,at4. 
422. William J. Koch et al., Empirical Limits .for the Forensic Assessment ofPTSD Litigants, 29 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 121, 128-29 (2005). 
423. E.g., Bowman, supra note 225, at 826-39; see also Olav Nielssen, eta!., The Reliahility ofEvidence 
About Psychiatric Diagnosis After Serious Crime PCD't I. Agreement Between Experts, 38 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 516, 523 (2010) (fmding lower reliability for PTSD in criminal forensic settings than for 
any other tested diagnosis, and attributing the findings, in part, to the fact that "it is difficult, with the current 
diagnostic criteria, to make the diagnosis in a reliable way in legal settings"). 
424. Bowman, supra note 225, at 826-39; see also William J. Koch, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Following Motor Vehicle Accidents Clinical Forensic Guidelines, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, 
supra note 229, at 794, 803--{)4 (noting confirmatory bias following motor vehicle accidents generally); Gerald 
M. Rosen, The Aleutian Enterprise Sinking and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Misdiagnosis in Clinical and 
Forensic Settings, 26 PROF. PSYCHOL. REs. & PRAc. 82, 84-85 (1995) (using marine disaster as case study and 
finding confirmatory bias among survivors). 
425. B.L. Long, Psychiatric Diagnoses in Sexual HCD'assment Cases, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. P SYCHIATRY 
&L. 195, 196-97 (1994). 
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may have (perhaps even intentionally) attempted to support the plaintiffs' claims when 
diagnosing plaintiffs with PTSD426 
There are also concerns about the heavy reliance during the diagnostic process on 
subjective reporting by the patient of both the stressor event and the resulting reactions, 
as well as the subjective impressions of the diagnostician427 One study documented 
low inter-rater reliability in determining whether specific events met the A Criterion 
and noted that "interpreting Criterion-A I is a highly subjective process influenced not 
only by the personal experience of the victim but also the experiences and rnindset of 
those who rate them. ' >428 The researchers raised the question that courts struggled with 
in the personal injury cases in which the evaluator determined that the event at issue 
met the requirements of being a "stressor."429 They questioned how a clinician 
conducting a diagnostic evaluation could "define a stressor as 'traumatic' without 
relying on [her] own subjective interpretation of the definition ofCriterion-Al."430 The 
widespread use has resulted in "conceptual bracket creep," meaning that clinicians are 
continuously broadening the categories of events that qualify for the criterion, thereby 
diminishing the significance of the criterion in the process 431 
Even aside from these concerns about bias and subjective assessment, a number of 
studies have raised questions about the core assumption of PTSD (and its particular use 
in the legal context): that the symptoms of PTSD (that is, anxiety, poor sleep, 
irritability, flashbacks, and so forth) were in fact caused by a traumatic event. In a 2007 
study, a group of researchers concluded that symptoms of PTSD were of equal 
prevalence among subjects divided into groups of those who identified as being 
"traumatized, non-traumatized, [or] equivocal."432 The researchers noted that "the 
diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder may harbor an uncertain theory of etiology 
within its name," which suggests caution due to the "practical importance, as 
psychotherapy may be structured, research studies designed, and legal compensation 
awarded on the basis of an unexamined assumption that symptoms of PTSD are caused 
by specific traumatic events."433 This study also refers to research noting the presence 
426. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc., Civil Action No. H-06-2113, 2007 
WL 4480134, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 200 7) (excluding evidence offorensic psychologist \l.ho diagnosed all 
twelve plaintiffs with PTSD); Nelsen v. Res. Corp. of Univ. of Haw., 805 F. Supp. 837, 844-45 (D. Haw. 
1992) (discounting plaintiffs experts' PTSD diagnosis because one of them had provided him with the DSM 
criteria before evaluations by the others); Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (W.D. Mo. 
1989) (excluding PTSD evidence in a sexual harassment case on the basis that it appeared to be the "current 
diagnosis of choice with [the plaintiffs] psychologists and they fit their patient to that diagnosis"); see also 
Pitman et al., supra note 413, at 875 (stating that bias can arise when diagnosing PTSD because of"sympathy" 
or "antipathy" the diagnostician may hold toward a patient's status as a victim). 
427. Roger K. Pitman & Scott P. Orr, Forensic Laboralory Testing for PTSD, in PTSD IN LITIGATION, 
supra note 245, at 207, 207 . 
428. Van Hooff et al., supra note 419, at 85. 
429. See supra notes 367- 79 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the judicial scrutiny of 
stressors and their use in diagnosing PTSD. 
430. Van Hooff et al., supra note 419, at 7 8. 
431. McNally, supra note 380, at 231; Van Hooff et al., supra note 419, at 77. 
432. J. Alexander Bodkin et al., Is PTSD Caused by Traumatic Stress?, 21 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 176, 
176 (2007). 
433. Id at 181. 
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of PTSD symptoms after "sub-threshold traumatic events," including divorce, money 
problems, and the death of livestock434 These findings suggest that the mere presence 
of PTSD symptoms may serve as an imprecise or perhaps even improper proxy for 
legal standards that are based upon the severity of an underlying event. 
Some psychological researchers theorize that is it not entirely accurate to state that 
the A Criterion event caused the PTSD symptoms to develop because the primary 
determining factor in whether someone develops such symptoms is the way in which 
the person recalls the event. One group has suggested that a person's "memory of a 
stressful event, rather than the event itself, is the key to PTSD. '>435 Thus, it is the way a 
person organizes and accesses the memory of an event that is most determinative of 
whether PTSD symptoms will develop436 It is widely understood by psychologists that 
certain individuals are predisposed to develop PTSD in response to particular events437 
and that individuals have widely varying responses to threatening events438 This 
suggests that any individual who develops PTSD had a preexisting, yet latent, 
condition, and that PTSD reflects merely a triggering of such condition439 Thus, the 
causal relationship between the stressor event and PTSD symptoms is not one of 
"mechanistic linear causality but of dynamic interaction," and therefore is far more 
complex than was originally assumed440 
The implications of these findings could be significant for the legal context, and at 
least one court has raised such questions. After a bench trial, the court in Burns v. 
Republic Savings Banf<l41 concluded that one carmot readily determine where causation 
from the event ends and where perception and memory of the event begins 442 The 
court rejected the plaintiff's forensic expert who had opined that the plaintiff had 
434. Id; see also Harold Merskey & August Piper, Postfl'aumalic Stress Disorder Is Overloaded, 52 
CAN. J. P sYCIDATRY 499, 499-500 (2007) (arguing that PTSD is diagnosed in a great number of cases where 
there has been no actual traumatic experience). 
435. Berntsen et al., supra note 240, at 1104. Indeed, such a view is more consistent with Freud's initial 
conceptualization oftraumatic neurosis. LEYS, supra note 13, at 20. 
436. David C. Rubin et al., Memory In Posttraumatic Stress Disorckr Properties of Voluntary and 
Involuntary, Traumaiic and Nonfl'aumalic Autobiographical Memories in People with and Without 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 137 J. ExPERIMENTAL P sYCHOL.: GEN. 591, 594 (2008) ("[P]roperties of the 
memory of the event rather the A1 and A2 criteria of the event itself will predict PTSD symptoms. Thus, 
individual differences factors influencing the availability of the memory (such as personality and 
temperament) will have a well-specified role to play." (citation omitted)); see also Bowman, supra note 225, at 
824-25 (noting that pre-event "traits" appear to contribute more significantly to the development ofPTSD than 
the severity ofthe traumatic event itself); Y o UNG, supra note 7, at 136, 141 (noting that some non-combat war 
veterans, after hearing of others' traumatic experiences, will "remember" false events). 
437. Bowman, supra note 225, at 825-26; Horowitz, supra note 225, at 9. 
438. Bowman, supra note 225, at 821-23. 
439. See Bowman, supra note 225, at 833 ("The clinical model for PTSD is biased by simple dose­
response thinking, as if humans and flat-worms had their well-being and behavior equally totally determined 
by external events."); John A. Call, Liability for Psychological Injury Yesterday and Today, in 
PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 229, at 40, 52-53 (citing studies associating PTSD with 
"childhood behavior problems, dysfunctional families, physical abuse, current unemployment, genetic 
predisposition, and experience with previous traumas"). 
440. Berntsen et al.,supranote 240, at 1105. 
441. 25 F. Supp. 2d 809 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
442. Burns, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 822 n.7. 
57 2011] DIAGNOSING LIABILITY 
depression resulting from PTSD, and concluded instead that she had a "depressive 
episode ... caused, at least in part, by [the plaintiffs incorrect] perception that she had 
been treated unfairly and discriminated against. '>143 
PTSD was originally conceptualized as a "natural process of adaptation to 
extraordinarily adverse situations" that arose in "normal people. '>144 The dispute over 
the validity of this assumption has social and political dimensions as well as legal 
ones445 The veterans' campaign for PTSD's recognition emphasized that the disorder 
was one caused entirely by their combat experiences 446 However, subsequent research 
pointed to several "risk factors," and such findings "are inconsistent with the notion 
that traumatic events are the primary cause of symptoms and challenge the idea of 
PTSD as a typical stress response. '>147 Some psychologists, particularly within the field 
of traumatology, resist such arguments, as they seem to redirect "blame" to the 
"victim"448 and challenge the "every person has a breaking point" notion that led to the 
development of PTSD for veterans as a service-connected event 449 
Commentators have also suggested that events are "traumatic" in part due to a 
person's experience with society's response to the event, and that certain events will 
have less effect as traumatic stressors "as society begins to supply victims with social 
443. Id at 821~22 (emphasis added). Although the "eggshell plaintiff' rule would nonetheless allow 
recovery of any damages that could be found to flow from the tortfeasor's actions (assuming such calculation 
can be made), it would not implicate essential questions ofliability. 
444. Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 239, at 1706; see aLso McNALLY, supra note 380, at 87 
(characterizing original view ofPTSD as a "normal response to an abnormal stressor"). 
445. Yehuda & McFarlane, supranote 239, at 1706. 
446. See supra Part III. A for a discussion ofhow veterans of the Vietnam War were largely responsible 
for the official recognition ofPTSD. 
447. Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 239, at 1707-{)8; see aLso McNally, supra note 380, at 237~39 
(noting that the risk of developing PTSD symptoms is influenced by genetic and other vulnerability factors); 
Simon, supra note 245, at 59 (citing studies that have identified risk factors for exposure to traumatic events); 
Taylor & Asmundson, supra note 380, at 60 (emphasizing the important role played by risk factors in the 
development ofPTSD). 
448. See McNALLY, supra note 380, at 89 (noting that some "people" are offended by risk factor 
research because "it entails blaming victims for their plight"). Some researchers have alleged that the link 
between PTSD and its political and legal uses has inhibited scientific debate on the validity of the diagnosis. 
Editorial, Challenges to the PTSD Construct and its Database The Importance of Scientific Debate, 21 J. 
ANXIETY DISORDERS 161, 161~62 (2007); see aLso Maier, supra note 230, at 105 ("[I]t is still difficult and 
sometimes even impossible to mention other influencing factors, especially in psychotherapies or in litigation 
contexts. This is not helpful for the further development of therapeutic and preventive interventions in 
PTSD."); Van Hooff et al., supra note 419, at 85 ("[D]iscussions about PTSD are often polarized because of 
the role this diagnosis plays in determining causation, and hence negligence, in many litigation settings."). 
449. One reviewer theorizes several reasons why the clinical model and DSM criteria continue to be 
based upon a dose-response, event-causative model, including the fact that the model was based upon those 
who sought treatment; that individuals "make errors in reasoning about the causes and meanings of emotional 
arousal"; and clinicians "may fear being accused of 'blaming the victim' in looking at factors beyond the 
event ... This fear represents a shift away from a scientific approach to PTSD to a moralistic model." Marilyn 
Laura Bowman, Individual DijJerences in Posttraumatic Distress Problems with the DSM-IVModel, 44 CAN. 
J. PsYCH. 21, 27 (1999). She also suggests that "the DSM model for PTSD developed partly in response to 
advocacy groups attempting to normalize the condition ofpeople with certain experiences." Id. at 29. 
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support services." 45 ° For example, some attribute the widespread PTSD and other 
readjustment problems in Vietnam veterans to the hostile and unsupportive society they 
encountered upon their return. In fact, some studies have found that those with milder 
physical injuries are at a greater risk of developing PTSD because of the limited 
psychological support they received after a traumatic event 451 
In addition to these studies evaluating the validity of the A Criterion generally, 
several studies have specifically concluded that the diagnosis cannot be reliably used to 
determine whether the person has been subjected to trauma, particularly in cases of 
child abuse 452 A group of legal and psychological commentators concluded, based 
upon their review of the current literature, that psychologists and psychiatrists have no 
skills grounded in "specialized knowledge" to identify whether a child has been a 
victim of sexual abuse, and there is no scientific basis for child abuse syndrome 
evidence453 
Given the controversies over the A Criterion-that it is unique, often disregarded, 
and seems to encourage use (and misuse) in legal settings-some psychiatrists have 
raised the question of whether, after thirty years, psychiatry should simply jettison the 
A Criterion or even the entire diagnostic category of PTSD454 However, the APA is 
unlikely to take steps that could be interpreted as a denial of the "close relationship of 
trauma and disorder. '"'55 
450. Raifman, supra note 415, at 129. It has even been suggested that "[a]s with other medical diagnoses 
oriented to legal consequences, PTSD will-in the future--no longer be a medical syndrome. " I d. 
451. Simon, supra note 245, at 60. 
452. Askowitz & Graham, supra note 285, at 2047--48. Some have specifically criticized its use on the 
basis that child sexual abuse did not meet the A Criterion because it often occurs over time. E.g, David 
Finkelhor, Early cmd Long-Term E.fficts ofChild Se:xualAbuse An Updale, 21 PROF. PsYCHOL REs. &PRAC. 
325, 328-29 (1990); see also William J. Koch et al., Empirical Limits for the Forensic Assessment ofPTSD 
Litigants, 29 L. & H UMAN BEHAV. 121, 136--40 (2005) (discussing how documentation of the trauma 
experienced from sexual abuse, which rarely occurs, is critical to a careful forensic assessment of the Criterion 
A status); Steve Herman, Improving Decision 115aking in Forensic Child Se:xual Abuse Evaluations, 29 L. & 
HUMAN BEHAV. 87, 107 (2005) ("The current fmding of low overall accuracy in clinician judgments about 
unconfirmed allegations of child sexual abuse is consistent with the almost universal consensus among top 
scientific experts that these evaluations currently have no firm scientific basis."). See generally CLANCY ,supra 
note 287 . 
453. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PsYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 516 (3rd ed. 2007); see also Daniel W. Shuman, The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL. A M. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 25, 28 
(1989) (noting that child abuse accommodation syndrome, although often the subject of expert psychological 
testimony, is not consistent with the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and not supported by scientific literature). 
454. E.g., Gerald M. Rosen et al., Afterword PTSD's Future in the DSM Implications for Clinical 
Practice, in CL!NlC!AN' S GUIDE TO PTSD, supra note 419, at 263, 264-65; Olav Nielssen & Matthew Large, 
Post-Traumatic Stress DisordRr's Future, 192 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 394, 394 (2008); see also Maier, supra note 
230, at 105 (arguing that since the criterion has little use in the clinical setting, it should be eliminated from the 
diagnosis); Rosen & Taylor, supra note 355, at 206 (discussing how PTSD would be diagnosed if the field of 
traumatology were t o do away with the A Criterion); Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 416 (noting that " the 
existence ofPTSD is being called into question"). 
455. Maier, supra note 230, at 106; Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 411 (arguing that, although 
original assumptions PTSD was based on have been proven incorrect, the diagnosis should be retained since it 
has been "on-target in so many ways for so many trauma survivors"). Such a step would likely render the 
diagnosis superfluous: How can something bepost-traumatic if the precursor was irrelevant? 
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Indeed, in 2010, the APA working group released its proposal for yet another 
revision to PTSD in theDSM-V, which would retain the A Criterion but would modify 
it once more: 
A. The person was exposed to one or more of the following event(s): death 
or threatened death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or 
threatened sexual violation, in one or more of the following ways: 
1. Experiencing the event(s) him/herself 
2. Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as they occurred to others 
3. Learning that the event(s) occurred to a close relative or close friend; 
in such cases, the actual or threatened death must have been violent or 
accidental 
4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the 
event(s) (e.g., first responders collecting body parts; police officers 
repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse); this does not apply to 
exposure through electronic media, television, movies, or pictures, 
unless this exposure is work related456 
Additionally, Criterion A2, which was added in 1994 to describe the subjective reaction 
of the patient to the traumatic event, would be eliminated from the criteria457 
This proposal aims to "tighten[] up the A 1 criterion to make a better distinction 
between 'traumatic' and events that are distressing but which do not exceed the 
' traumatic' threshold" by restricting the types of events that can serve as a basis for a 
PTSD diagnosis to three: actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual 
violation4 58 The "threat to physical integrity" category would be removed, eliminating 
the application of the A Criterion to many events currently considered to be potential 
stressors, including sexual harassment459 The ambiguous term "confronted with" 
included in the DSM-IV revision would be replaced by a list of specific ways that the 
person was "exposed" to such events. 460 Finally, with the elimination of Criterion A2­
now deemed to be of "no utility"-the subjective reaction of the individual would be 
irrelevant to the diagnostic process461 None of these changes, however, addresses the 
456. AM. Ps YCHIATRIC Ass 'N, G 05 Posttraumalic Stress Disorder, DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=165 (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) 
(citation omitted). One reason for this new language is in response to the findings of Van Hooff eta!., supra 
note 419, at 82, about the low inter-rater reliability in terms of meeting the A Criterion when the event was 
witnessed by the patient, rather than directly experienced. 
457. See supra notes 264--73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1994 DSM-IV revisions to 
the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 
458. AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass 'N, supra note 456 (follow "Rationale" tab). The use ofthe term "event(s)" in 
the proposed A Criterion revision suggests that, for the first time, diagnosticians could assign the cause of a 
person's PTSD to more than one distinct event. 
45 9. In an influential article, psychologists Claudia Avina and William O'Donohue suggest that "threat 
to physical integrity" in the DSM-JV's Criterion A1 potentially extends to sexual harassment in three ways: 
"(1) by threatening the victim's financial well-being, (2) by threatening the victim's physical boundaries, and 
(3) by threatening the victim's control over situations that she should legitimately be able to have some 
control." Claudia Avina & William O'Donohue, Sexual Harassment and PTSD Is Sexual Harassment 
Diagnosable Trauma?, 15 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 69, 73 (2002). 
460. Compare DSMIV, supra note 264, at 427, with AM PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 461. 
461. AM. PSYCHIATRICAss'N,supranote456 (follow"Rationale" tab). 
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fundamental criticisms of the A Criterion and the role of causation in diagnosing 
PTSD462 
The research findings with respect to the uncertain reliability of the diagnosis of 
PTSD and the uncertain validity of the disorder itself underscore the dangers of 
admitting PTSD evidence in legal proceedings, particularly for the purpose of proving 
that a traumatic event occurred. Not only is the A Criterion itself the subject of a great 
deal of scientific debate as to its utility and validity, there is little to no research to 
support many of the PTSD-related theories that have found their way into trials, such as 
the existence of "typical" or "hallmark" symptoms that are reliable indicators that a 
person has been subjected to a particular kind of trauma, such as child sexual abuse or 
rape, or has repressed memories of a trauma. To be sure, PTSD does have many 
defenders within psychiatry and psychology who offer responses to many of the key 
challenges to PTSD's validity463 However, even they are likely to concede that there is 
nothing resembling a scientific consensus within psychiatry about the core assumptions 
of PTSD as a stand-alone diagnostic category464 
Perhaps of most significance to the applicability of PTSD in legal contexts, these 
debates regarding PTSD and particularly the A Criterion exemplify the broader debate 
within psychiatry regarding the uncertain role of the concept of "causation" in that 
field. "Causation" has an unquestionably central operation in law, which uses the terms 
"legal cause" and "proximate cause" to construct normative rules to assign legal 
responsibilities between and among parties to a controversy. Such assignment is one of 
the core functions of law, particularly of litigation. However, causation has a far more 
uncertain-and some would argue nonexistent-role in contemporary psychiatry, 
which classifies and treats mental disorders based largely upon symptomatology 
without regard to etiology. Indeed, the role of "causes" of mental illness was the 
essential dispute between those within psychiatry who based their understanding of 
mental disorder upon psychoanalytic and other psychodynamic theories, and those who 
assumed that there were biological bases (even if they had not yet been precisely 
isolated) for most psychopathology 465 PTSD's A Criterion, with its roots in the former, 
is an outlier (and some would say a relic) within contemporary psychiatry's DSM. 
B. PTSD as a Construct 
Courts' use of a PTSD diagnosis as discussed in Part IV implicates the scientific 
basis of that diagnosis. However, science has an uncertain role in PTSD. The scores of 
empirical findings that emerged after the diagnosis had been in place for many years 
led the American Journal of Psychiatry, the official publication of the American 
Psychiatric Association, to title a 1997 editorial "What is PTSD?" in light of research 
462. Rosen et al., supra note 454, at 268 ("[T]he new working proposal for Criterion A does not resolve 
any of the core issues that constitute the 'Criterion A problem .... " '). 
463. See generally BREWIN, supra note 407. 
464. Id at 1 ~3. 
465. For a more detailed discussion of the use and conceptualization of "causation" within law and 
psychiatry respectively, see Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff Psychiatric Evidence 
in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZOL. REV. 749, 755~71 (2010). 
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that challenged some of the basic assumptions upon which the diagnosis had been 
based, and to conclude that the question "has no one answer."466 
This observation reflects the broader dispute within psychiatry regarding whether 
PTSD was a "discovery" or a "product" of psychiatric discourse 467 One of the core 
assumptions of PTSD is that the symptoms included in the DSM diagnosis represent 
"the way" that trauma (or at least certain types of trauma) can lead to 
psychopathology468 Thus, the argument goes, PTSD is a disorder that was finally 
"recognized" by the APA in 1980, but it had in fact been in existence for decades, 
centuries, or longer469 However, many who have noted PTSD' s conspicuously 
"political" origins question how organizing and lobbying could have resulted in the 
"discovery" of a new disease in an ostensibly science-driven document such as the 
DSM-III4 70 They challenge the notion that PTSD can be understood to exist apart from 
the APA determination through a show of hands in the late 1970s and that the cluster of 
symptoms constitutes a singular disorder. The implications of this debate go to the 
essential validity of using a unique diagnostic label to classify all psychological 
symptoms that are determined to be in reaction t o identifiable events 471 
A group of psychologists offering a critical historical analysis of PTSD explained 
why the origins of the diagnosis have become the focus of such a contentious debate: 
[I]f one can demonstrate that a disorder shows up repeatedly across time and 
across cultures, one has evidence that the disorder is a state of nature rather 
than a social and cultural artifact due to social mores and conventions. 
Conversely, when dis orders come and go we typically suspect that their 
instability is indicative of a social rather than natural basis 472 
Along these lines, many in the field of traumatology or who otherwise work 
regularly with PTSD attempt to point to the timelessness of the condition, stating that it 
466. Editorial, WhaJ is PTSD?, 154AM. J. PsYCH. 14 3, 144 (1997). 
4 67. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 121; Patrick J. Bracken, Post-Modernity and Post-tramnatic Stress 
Disorder, 53 Soc. SCI. & MED. 733, 735- 36 (2001 ). 
468. See WATTERS, supra note 119, at 4 (listing some of the cultural assumptions that lie behind Western 
ideas of mental health); Gerald M. Rosen et al., Searching for PTSD's Biological Signature, in CLINICIAN' s 
GUIDE TO PTSD, supra note 419 , at 97, 97 (noting that the goal of medical nosology, including psychiatric 
classification, is to "reflect[] the true state of affairs in nature" ); Bracken, supra note 467 , at 733 ("Most of 
those \ffio research and write about PTSD appear confident that the syndrome captures something fundamental 
about the way in which human beings deal with trauma." ). 
469. LEYS, supra note 13, at 3; Jones et al , supra note 250, at 158 (noting that some scholars claim to 
identifY PTSD symptoms in the Iliad and seventeenth century writings); Donna Trembinski, Comp(J]'ing 
Premodern Melancholy/Mania and Modern Tramna An Argument in FCNor ofHistorical Experiences of 
Trauma, 14 HlST. OF PSYCHO!.. 80,80 (2011). 
4 70. SHORTER, supra note 172, at 304-05; Jerry Lembcke, The "Right Stuff' Gone Wrong Vietnam 
Veterans and the Social Construction ofPost-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 CRITICAL Soc. 37 , 38 (1998). 
4 71. In 2000, a res olution proposed in the Royal College of Psychiatry in the United Kingdom that 
would hav e stated that the body "believes that PTSD is largely a fictional condition" was defeated only 
narrowly. Bowman, supra note 225, at 821; see also Celia Hall, Stop Cashing In On Stress, Says Psychiatrist, 
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (July 4, 2000), http J/www.telegraph. co. uk/news/newstopics /politics!health/1346 618/S 
top-cashing-in-on-stress-says-psychiatrist.html (criticizing the "compensation culture" created by 
psychoanalysis and lawyers through the application ofPTSD to everyday experience). 
4 72. Baldwin et al. , supra note 13, at 37. 
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is essentially the same disorder once diagnosed as shell shock473 However, a number 
of scholars, both within and outside of the field, conclude otherwise. For example, one 
study of World War I military pension records found that there were virtually no 
complaints of what would now be referred to as "flashbacks," the classic dissociation 
symptom of the PTSD experienced by Vietnam veterans; in fact, a significant number 
of soldiers receiving compensation for war neurosis or shell shock would not have met 
the current PTSD criteria if it were in place at the time4 74 Moreover, cross-cultural 
studies of PTSD have revealed "remarkable deviations from the PTSD symptom 
list. "475 Medical anthropologist Allan Young concluded from his study of the 
development of PTSD that the diagnosis "is not timeless, nor does it possess an 
intrinsic unity. •>476 Rather, he observed, "it is glued together by the practices, 
technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, treated, and 
represented and by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that 
mobilized these efforts and resources. "477 
As an alternative to proving the "timelessness" of PTSD, several researchers have 
attempted to locate a precise biological cause or indicator of PTSD to establish the 
elusive independent validity of the diagnostic category478 Since 1980, numerous 
papers have attempted to align the diagnosis with the "new" biological psychiatry4 79 
Many researchers hope to identity specific psychobiologic responses or "biomarkers" 
to PTSD to improve the reliability of diagnoses. Finding these biological markers, the 
hallmarks of a "naturally occurring and inevitable phenomenon," has become a key 
object of traumatologists480 The expectation is that finding physiological indicators of 
the disorder will put an end to the controversies within psychiatry and allow the 
diagnosis (and presumably the entire field of traumatology) to receive broader 
4 73. See, e.g, BREWIN, supra note 407, at 25- 28 (detailing similarities between symptoms ofPTSD and 
symptoms of shell shock). 
4 74. Jones et al., supra note 250, at 16()-{)1. One theory to account for the incidence of"flashbacks" in 
the later twentieth century is that the symptom is derived from the cinematic technique. Jd. at 162. See also 
Baldwin et al., supra note 13, at 40 (noting the "discontinuity" ofthe conceptualization ofPTSD over time). 
4 75. WATTERS, supra note 199, at 102; see also Derek Summerfield, Cross-Cultural Perspectives on the 
Medicalization ofHuman Suffering, in PTSD: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES, supra note 419, at 233, 233-44 
(noting that Western medicalization of distress has resulted in a wide range of symptoms being attributed to 
PTSD). 
476. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 5. 
4 77. Jd. 
478. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 105-06; Rosen et al., supra note 468, at 98; see also Baldwin et al., supra 
note 13, at 38 ("[P]hysiological differences between persons with a diagnosis of PTSD compared with those 
without the diagnosis ha[ve] been used rhetorically to champion the 'reality' of PTSD and to discredit 
critics."); LEYS, supra note 13, at 254 (noting that the "plausibility" of trauma theories would be "enormously 
enhanced" ifthey were "supported by neurobiological evidence" ). 
479. SHEPHARD, supra note 10, at 388-90; see also Taylor & Asmundson, supra note 380, at 63--{)4 
(reviewing various studies examining potential neurobiological and behavioral-genetic causes of PTSD). Much 
research has focused on the potential role of hormones such as cortisol or norepinephrine. APPIGNANESI, supra 
note 273, at 436-37. 
480. Baldwin et al., supra note 13, at 48-49; see also Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 411 (noting the 
progress made in identifYing biomarkers for PTSD and that "[s]oon it will be more difficult ... to dismiss the 
'validity' ofthe PTSD diagnosis"). 
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acceptance,481 including within the legal realm specifically482 Most recently, a study 
claims to have identified a neurological abnormality in veterans with PTSD through 
magnetoencephalography ( MEG) scans 483 However, no consensus has emerged on any 
biomarkers for PTSD,484 and thus far not one has been identified for diagnostic 
485purposes 
The debate regarding PTSD's origins, however, fails to note that PTSD is not 
unique in its "constructed" evolution; rather, such evolution is perhaps simply more 
conspicuous than in other diagnoses. PTSD provides an example of medical historian 
Edward Shorter's theory of the "symptom pool," the mechanism through which the 
mind experiences and explains a reaction within the person's cultural context at a 
particular time and place486 A patient's unconscious "striving for recognition and 
legitimization of internal distress" may lead the unconscious to manifest such distress 
through means that will lead to such result 487 The patient is not alone in this process. 
Through ''illness negotiation" with a physician, the two "shape each other's perceptions 
of the behavior" with the backdrop of what has been recognized as a "legitimate 
disease category," thereby leading to "scientific validation" of the patient's 
experience488 
This dynamic is particularly powerful with psychiatric diagnoses 489 "Hysteria," a 
psychosomatic illness in which individuals experience paralysis or the sudden loss of 
the ability to speak, hear, or see, was the "archetypal disorder of the Victorian era"; 
however, such symptoms are rarely encountered today 490 Similarly, the symptoms of 
World War I veterans' "shell shock" are quite different from those reflected in the 
current diagnostic criteria of PTSD (which themselves have undergone substantial 
481. Baldwin et al. , supra note 13, at 49. 
482. Two excellent, recent works, Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Fulure ofthe Law, 60 E MORY L.J. 
585, 609--22 (2011), and Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law Rethinking the 
American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT 
LEGAL IssUEs 2010, at 203, 204--{)6 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011), explore the potential impact of emerging 
technological advances for identifYing biological markers for PTSD and other psychological injuries on legal 
decision-making in the future. 
483. See Katie Drummond, Neuroscientists Szy Brain Scans Can Spot PTSD, WIRED.COM (Jan. 22, 
2010, 8:00 A.M.), http ://www.wired.com/dangerroom/201 0/01/brain-biomarker-could-be-the-key-to -ptsd­
diagnosis (study indicating that new brain imaging technology permitted researchers to spot specific brain 
biomarkers, allowing them to diagnose PTSD with ninety percent accuracy). 
484. Baldwin et al. , supra note 13, at 49-52 (critiquing various psychophysiological studies) . 
485. See Pitman & Orr, supra note 427, at 207 (noting that diagnosis ofPTSD continues to rely on "the 
veracity ofthe complainant" ). 
486. SHORTER, supra note 43, at 2-4; WATTERS, supra note 199, at 32. 
487. WATTERS, supra note 199, at 32 (noting that " [t]his sort of cultural molding happens 
imperceptibly and follows a large number ofcultural cues that patients simply are not aware of'). 
488. Id at 33. 
489. Id at 60 (noting that there is "[a] pervasive mistaken assumption in the mental health profession: 
that mental illnesses exist apart from and unaffected by professional and public beliefs and the cultural 
currents ofthe time"). 
4 90. Id at 72; see also WELKE, supra note 18, at 158 (n oting that "neurasthenia" was regarded as 
"America's primary mental disorder" at the turn of the twentieth century and had become "a household 
word"). 
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revision sinceDSM-II/) 491 What PTSD and its forerurmers have in common then is not 
their symptomatology, their theoretical underpinning, or their treatment, but rather their 
utility outside of the clinical setting. This commonality suggests a particularly strong 
role for the symptom pool, but PTSD is by no means the only diagnosis that developed 
in this fashion. 
Indeed, it would be accurate to say that all of the DSM is infused with the policy 
choices made by those in positions of authority to decide the parameters of what is a 
mental "disorder." 492 The diagnostic categories in the DSM do not, for the most part, 
"reflect a coherent progression of empirical research," but rather, are, "at best, a 
categorization of the pain, suffering, or distress."493 The development of medical 
diagnoses generally reflects "negotiation," rather than discovery, and the resulting 
classifications "serve to rationalize, mediate, and legitimate relationships between 
individuals and institutions in a bureaucratic society."494 And the legal system is one of 
the players in such negotiations, particularly with respect to psychiatric diagnoses, 
given the extensive association of psychiatry with the legal system throughout the 
twentieth century495 The demands the legal system brings to these negotiations often 
include consistency, certainty, and reliability and, more generally, the ability to aid in 
the resolution oflegal questions and problems496 DSM-III, at least on its face, appeared 
to satisfy all of these demands,497 and thus it should not be surprising that PTSD­
which purported to provide consistent, certain, and reliable answers on the causation of 
injury-found a central place in litigation so quickly. Therefore, that PTSD is a 
"construct" is simply a given. It is remarkable, rather, because of the manifestly socio­
political and legal origins of this particular psychiatric construct and, accordingly, the 
implications of such origins for its use in determining liability in legal settings. 
The construct-versus-discovery argument itself has implications for the role of 
PTSD in law. As discussed above, many courts and legislatures have framed legal 
standards or requirements directly or indirectly around PTSD on the assumption that it 
491. Bracken, supra note 467, at 735. One analysis of the shifting criteria ofPTSD noted eleven distinct 
changes to the diagnosis in the DSMIII-R and fifteen changes to the DSMIV criteria, all in the space of 
fourteen years. These changes were so significant that a great number of patients who met the criteria lillder 
one would not meet the criteria lillder another, and that, !ll1der the current version, two patients without any 
overlapping symptoms could have the same PTSD diagnosis. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 105, at 124. 
492. Daniel W. Shuman, Softened Science in the Courtroom Forensic Implications ofa Value-Laden 
Classification, in DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: V ALUES, M ENTAL DISORDERS, AND THE DSMS 21 7, 224­
25 (John Z. Sadler ed., 2002); Elizabeth C. Cooksey & Phil Brown, Spinning on Its Axes DSMand the Social 
Construction ofPsychiatric Diagnosis, 28 I NT'L J. HEALTH S cr. 525, 548-49 (1998). 
493. Greenberg et al., supra note 6, at 5, 12. 
494. Charles E . Rosenberg, Framing Disease Illness, Society, and History , in FRAMING D ISEASE: 
STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY, at x ii, xx i (Charles E. Rosenberg & Janet Golden eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
FRAMING DISEASE]; see also GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT : 
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4 7 (2000) (noting the "multitude of local political and social 
struggles and compromises that g o into the constitution of a 'univ ersal ' classification" such as the DSMor the 
International Classification ofDiseases) . 
495. Janet A. Tighe, The Legal Art of Psychiatric Diagnosis Searching for Reliahility, in FRAMING 
DISEASE, supra note 498, at 206, 207-{)8. 
496. Id at 215-16, 219. 
497. See id at 217 (noting that DSM.JII was the most technologically sophisticated edition ofthe DSJo.f). 
65 2011] DIAGNOSING LIABILITY 
represents an advancement in scientific understanding of the psychological impact of 
traumatic events 498 A few courts, by contrast, have dismissed the diagnosis as a mere 
"human construct," using the term to signify that "PTSD" is nothing more than a 
label. 499 However, in making either assumption, these courts fail to recognize the 
complexity not only of psychopathology itself, but of our very understanding and 
explication ofmental disorders and, indeed, all medical diagnoses. 
VI. CONCLUSION- THE LESSONS OF PTSD'S LEGAL HISTORY 
At the time of PTSD's recognition by the APA, few within the psychiatric 
establishment raised concerns about recognizing, treating, and compensating the 
psychological injuries of the people who fought a violent and controversial war. 
However, since that time, PTSD's association with law, and particularly with 
compensation, has led to a backlash against the diagnosis. Many psychiatric and legal 
commentators regard it as a medical term co-opted by the legal profession and its 
clients to be a mechanism either to acquire undeserved compensation or to evade 
personal responsibility500 As a result, the very real psychological impact of horrific 
events is often minimized and claims of psychological injuries continue to be regarded 
with suspicion. 
Some commentators from within psychiatry who have expressed particular 
skepticism about the role of PTSD in legal settings urge a decoupling of legal and 
medical notions of causation embodied in PTSD. The assignment of responsibility to a 
source is the purview of law, not psychiatry. Regardless of the particular school or 
theory, psychiatry has always seen the workings of the psyche as being far more 
complex than the liability questions raised in most civil and criminal cases resolved by 
non-expert fact finders. Those within psychiatry who criticize the legal system for 
taking PTSD and running with it, 501 however, fail to acknowledge that PTSD and the 
legal conceptualizations of emotional injuries share a common past and have evolved 
498. See, e.g, Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeepting Stress The &ience and 
Admissibility ofPost-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 9, 37-39 (2001) (noting 
that "PTSD ... is based on solid science and should be admissible under Daubert"). 
499. E.g., Spencerv. Gen. Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76 (E. D. Va. 1988) (noting that "PTSD is 
simply a diagnostic category created by psychiatrists; it is a human construct, an artificial classification of 
certain behavioral patterns"), overruled inpCD't by Pesso v. Montgomery Gen Hasp, No. 98-1978, 1999 U.S. 
App. LEXIS (4th Cir. May 24, 1999), and Ellis v. Director, CIA, No. 98-2481, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21638 
(4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1999). 
500. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 332, at 468 (stating that "symptoms of PTSD can be easily coached 
and simulated," and that some "individuals and their counsel take advantage of these ploys"); Derek 
Sununerfield, The Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric 
Category, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 95, 96 (2001) ("Once it becomes advantageous to frame distress as a psychiatric 
condition people will choose to present themselves as medicalised victims rather than as feisty survivors.. 
There is a veritable trauma industry comprising experts, lawyers, claimants, and other interested parties ...."). 
For an example of such backlash in the popular culture, see generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE 
EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS,SOB STORIES, AND EvASIONSOF RESPONSIBILITY (1994). 
501. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 230, at 105 ("The legal system ... , which is based on strictly causal 
thinking, gratefully picked up the diagnosis and has built in the meantime awhole industry of victirnology on 
PTSD." (emphasis omitted)). 
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together502 Where physicians have built a theory of causation into the "signs and 
symptoms" themselves, it is not so simple to suggest that "the physician delineates 
signs and symptoms; the legal system decides on compensation."503 Jerome Wakefield 
and Allan Horwitz, two noted scholars of the development and implications of 
psychiatric diagnoses, recently observed of PTSD: "No other psychiatric diagnosis 
involves issues where drawing boundaries is not just a matter of diagnostic 
convenience but also of justice and injustice. "504 The line between law and medicine is 
not merely blurred in PTSD; it is absent. 
PTSD's inextricable relationship to notions of causation and responsibility does 
not, however, mean that the legal system should utilize it freely. In fact, PTSD's 
distinctly legal history suggests that the law should in fact apply far greater scrutiny to 
the role of PTSD in litigation than it does for other psychiatric diagnoses. The studies 
that have called into question the original theoretical assumptions of PTSD and the 
problems inherent in the A Criterion demonstrate that courts should be reluctant to 
allow a PTSD diagnosis to be assigned legal significance in itself Permitting PTSD to 
play a central role in legal settings risks conflating the unsettled psychiatric 
conceptualization of "causation" with the questions of legal or proximate cause 
reserved for fact finders 5 05 
Although unquestionably infused with policy choices, psychiatric diagnoses were 
developed to serve that profession' s clinical and research needs. Law, by contrast, 
serves distinctly normative goals through the development of legal rules or standards, 
which determine the framework to allocate responsibility based upon policy 
determinations reached by "lawmakers" (generally legislators and judges) applying 
their notions of "justice."506 When courts employ legal standards that incorporate 
conceptualizations of "diagnosable" conditions, they are thereby assuming something 
legally significant about the thresholds the psychiatric profession chooses to set507 
However, courts do not acknowledge or understand the construction of psychiatric 
502. In this regard, PTSD can be seen as a "co-production" of psychiatiy and law, to borrow a concept 
from noted science and technology studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co­
Production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE Co-PRODUCTION OF S CIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 1, 2 (Sheila 
Jasanoff ed., 2004) ("Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we 
know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to 
live in it."). I am appreciative ofAllan Young for bringing this term to my attention in our correspondence. 
503. Kinzie & Goetz, supra note 28, at 166. 
504. Jerome C. Wakefield & Allan V. Horwitz, Normal Reactions to Adversity or Symptoms of 
Disorder?, in C LINICIAN'S GUIDE TO PTSD, supra note 419, at 33, 42. 
505. See Shuman, supra note 282, at 7 ("Both Daubert and the DSM make clear that it is not appropriate 
to assume that a psychiatric diagnosis is relevant to, let alone dispositive of, an issue in a case."). 
506. To be sure, PTSD is not unique in this respect since law has certainly relied upon the presence of a 
"diagnosable" mental disorder in other contexts, particularly with respect to preventative detention laws. For 
example, people are subject to involuntary commitment, only where an examiner has found the presence of a 
mental illness. Similarly, sexually violent predator laws universally require a finding of a mental disorder as 
well as a history of sexual violence in order to detain a person. Several conceptualizations of the insanity 
defense require the presence of a mental disease or defect in addition to specific cognitive or volitional 
impairments. MELTON ET AL., supra note 453, at 210-12. 
507. Shuman, supra note 282, at 10 ("[T]he role of PTSD in litigation turns, in part, on diagnostic 
nomenclature that psychiatiy largely controls ...."). 
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disease and the limitations of using psychiatric labels outside of clinical and research 
settings508 Linking PTSD-with its built-in clinical determination of causation-to 
legal standards effectively delegates to the psychiatric profession determinations of 
legal responsibility509 
Accordingly, although PTSD is now commonplace in the legal system, this 
Article suggests that courts and other legal policymakers consider PTSD's legal history 
as part of a reexamination of the roles that law has assigned to the diagnosis. PTSD 
evidence arises in a wide range of legal contexts, including workers' compensation 
claims, criminal defenses and sentencing, and explaining the extent of a personal injury 
plaintiffs emotional distress damages, and there are varying degrees of danger of 
misuse in each of these settings. However, the uses described in Part II-where a fact 
finder is permitted to use PTSD's construction of causation to make a finding of civil 
or criminal liability-likely pose a greater danger of courts unknowingly permitting a 
policy-driven diagnosis to influence a legal outcome. 
Courts should also be cognizant of the fact that laypersons lack the tools to 
understand the limitations of this diagnosis and may misapprehend the significance of 
the diagnostic label. PTSD evidence, like any other expert opinion testimony, should 
not be exempt from the application of the rules of evidence, particularly Daubert 
scrutiny. It represents precisely the kind of expert opinion that is often presented as the 
ipse dixit conclusion of a treatment provider or forensic examiner that Daubert and its 
progeny warn are of little use to lay fact finders who cannot evaluate the reliability of 
the testimony for themselves. 510 It is unlikely that the typical cross-examination of a 
forensic examiner can bring out the full extent of the construction of trauma and 
psychological injury embodied in the diagnosis, the role of the diagnostician's own 
value judgments about causation in applying the diagnosis, and the overall complexity 
of the psychological mechanisms involved in mental disorders, including PTSD. 
Using PTSD as the stand-in for severe emotional distress or proof of a traumatic 
event asks fact finders to distill an elaborate and poorly understood psychological 
process into simple determinations of liability. A PTSD diagnosis provides fact finders 
"a semantic handle for the complexity inherent in diagnostic issues,"511 particularly 
since jurors (like all of us) are drawn to "simple causal explanations. "512 Nonetheless, 
the widespread use of the term, particularly in the wider culture, has rendered it loaded, 
508. See Sparr & Pitman, supra note 420, at 454 ("Beyond its significance as an apparent solution to the 
legal problem of causation, PTSD's greatest importance is that it seems to make scientific and objective 
matters that the court once considered too subjective for legal resolution." (citation omitted)). See generally 
Greenberg et al., supra note 6 (critiquing the forensic use ofDSMdiagnoses). 
509. See Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F 2d 462, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[P]sychiatric judgments may 
disguise, wittingly or unwittingly, political or social biases of the psychiatrist; and excessive reliance on 
diagnoses will pre-empt the primary role oflegal decision-makers."). 
510. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ('[N]othing in either Daubert or the 
Federal Rules ofEvidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data 
only by the ipse dixit of the expert."); see also Smith, supra note 465, at 810-15 (discussing some of the 
unique dangers of admitting psychiatric evidence, particularly DSMdiagnoses). 
511. Greenberg et al., supranote 6, at 10. 
512. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGJNS, supra note 130, at 125 n.25 (citing NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: 
HowJURORS THINK ANDTALKABOUT ACCIDENTS 51-52 (2000)); see also Sparr & Pitman, supra note420, at 
454 (commenting that "PTSD posits a straightforward causal relationship that plaintiffs' lawyers welcome"). 
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diluted, and confused, and it risks being a misleading and unreliable tool in the hands 
of lay fact finders for purposes of assigning legal responsibility or assessing harm. 513 
Indeed, encouraging challenges to PTSD to be played out in front of the fact finder may 
even undermine a plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages or a complainant's 
allegation of sexual assault where the fact finder then links the problems of the 
diagnosis with the legitimacy of such claims and allegations; such a result would hardly 
be just. 
It is important to emphasize here that scrutinizing the use of a PTSD diagnosis as 
evidence of liability does not require us to discount or diminish the recognition of and 
compensation for the events that can give rise to such liability, ranging from the horrors 
of combat, to the exploitation of children, to discrimination in workplaces, to the 
negligent operation of automobiles. Rather, this argument urges that determinations of 
liability for such actions must remain within the legal system without overreliance on 
psychiatry, and that legal barriers to recovery should be removed through legal 
mechanisms such as legislation, judicial opinions, and rules, rather than through the 
adoption of psychiatric standards of causation. PTSD may serve several important roles 
within psychiatry, including those which do not require any particular level of scientific 
reliability, such as to validate a person's reactions to an event or to encourage a person 
to pursue treatment. But psychiatric diagnoses are not fact-finding tools and have no 
place in litigation for such purpose. 
One could certainly say that PTSD has provided important roles in legal contexts 
by, for example, enabling Vietnam veterans to receive critical benefits and health care 
for psychological injuries after exposure to a horrific and arguably unjust war. But such 
arguments are based upon a misplaced assumption that psychiatry was the proper route 
to fix the problem of compensation standards for veterans. The fault was with the VA 
and Congress for failing to provide compensation in the absence of a targeted diagnosis 
and for relying upon psychiatry to dictate compensation determinations in the first 
place. Courts repeat such mistakes by looking to psychiatry to fix problems with legal 
standards when they create legal rules such as "medically diagnosable" requirements to 
recover emotional distress damages514 Although psychiatry may have created a 
diagnosis that is intertwined with legal concepts, the law should not implement legal 
standards that are intertwined with psychiatric concepts without first considering the 
full implications of doing so. 515 
PTSD has served as a critical mechanism in law for other important purposes, 
such as the recognition that misconceptions about sexual assault victims can skew the 
results in prosecutions. It has also played a role in the erosion of the rigid mind-body 
dichotomy in personal injury law to permit expanded recovery for psychological 
injuries in tort actions. The problems in the legal systems that PTSD has been used to 
513. N oah, supra note 405 , at 243 (noting that when legal institutions "rely heavily on clinical 
judgments" it can in tum "distort the diagnostic process"). 
514. See R OBIN F ELDMAN, T HE R OLE OF SCIENCE lN THE LAW, at xi (2009) ("We continually look to 
science to rescue us from the discomfort of difficult legal decisions ...."). 
515. Maintaining a clearer demarcation between the legal and medical judgments not only protects the 
legal system from unintentionally delegating policy-making to medicine, it also protects medicine from the 
influence of the law. See Noah, supra note 410, at 244 (arguing that "legal institutions should better insulate 
the diagnostic enterprise by del inking their decisions from clinical judgments"). 
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remedy should not go unaddressed. Rather, courts should use legal tools to dispel such 
misperceptions about sexual assault so that they do not interfere with fact-finding in 
such cases5 16 For example, "rape shield" laws such as Federal Rule of Evidence 412 
limit a defendant's ability to exploit common (yet wrong) assumptions about the role of 
a woman's sexual "predisposition" in sexual assault cases517 Also, courts should allow 
compensation of psychological injuries through testimony of plaintiffs and their mental 
health providers who can describe symptoms and treatment for such injuries without 
being obliged to convey the impression that the cluster of symptoms signals something 
transformative in the person. Indeed, the American Law Institute's forthcoming 
Restatement (I'hird) of Torts permits recovery for emotional injury without any 
requirement for a medical diagnosis 518 
Although PTSD, given its well-documented legal and political origins, may offer 
perhaps the most stark example of how psychiatric diagnoses can reflect legally­
significant assumptions, we must also recognize that all psychiatric diagnoses reflect 
assumptions and conclusions about human behavior and emotion that reflect the time 
when they were developed. Indeed, unlike many legal rules, such framing can shift 
quite rapidly, with diagnoses being added, removed, or revised, within just a few years 
of the prior conceptualizations. 519 If the law decides to address problems of justice by 
looking to psychiatry or other branches of medicine and science for solutions, it must 
only do so with a full appreciation and understanding of the origins and limitations of 
the concepts it seeks to adopt. Absent such acknowledgement, together with a 
determination that such concepts are in fact appropriate to import into law, the legal 
system simply delegates juridical authority to those fields. 
516. MELTONET AL ,supranote 453, at 226. 
517. FED. R EviD. 412. 
518. The Restatement (Third) ofTorts includes Section 46, which provides as follows: 
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional disturbance to another is subject to 
liability to the other if the conduct: (a) places the other in immediate danger of bodily harm and the 
emotional disturbance results from the danger; or (b) occurs in the course of specified categories of 
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause 
serious emotional disturbance. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. F OR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
2007); see also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 125, at 95 (noting "[t]he Restatement' s emphasis [is] on 
the relational context in which the tort is committed," not "on the categorization of the injury marks"). 
519. See, e.g, JONATHAN M. METZL, THE PROTEST PsYCHOSIS: How SCHIZOPHRENIA BECAME A BLACK 
DISEASE (2009) (discussing the radical re-conceptualization of the diagnosis of schizophrenia in the United 
States in 1950s and 1960s). 
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